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Abstract 
Central to this thesis is the issue of how to account for the effects of micro-level 
organisational factors such as culture and social norms on the technology transfer process. 
The expansion of multinational firms has created a need for increased international 
technology transfer into nations with distinctly different cultures, social norms and 
· methods of organisation. The dilemma of how to deal with the transfer of technology into 
different countries is a continuing problem for academics in the innovation adoption field 
and corporate managers alike. 
A synthesis of the literature revealed a lack of understanding associated with the 
influence of managerial interventions, social, cultural and other organisational processes 
on the adoption decision. In an international context, it was found that there was an 
increased need to understand cross-national differences in the determinants of technology 
adoption. Further, the bulk of conceptual technology transfer models were found to be 
difficuit to operationalise and overwhelmingly unidimensional. This precipitated a need 
to develop a pragmatic interactive and dynamic interdisciplinary model that could be used 
to quantitatively predict transfer difficulty and develop implementation strategy. 
Longitudinal research methods were used to investigate the implementation of a 
knowledge management system within a multinational automotive manufacturing 
organisation. Focusing on two distinct cultures - Australia and India, observations 
showed that innovation perceptions have a comparatively minor influence on the adoption 
decision and advocated a need for frameworks capable of explaining adoption and 
diffusion from a cultural and social basis. These findings were subsequently reinforced 
through an investigative case study of technology transfer within the automotive 
manufacturing organisation at a global (or corporate) level. Both research studies 
supported the conceptualisation of the transfer process as a game between two players 
(management and the workforce) each weighing perceived advantages and disadvantages 
associated with adoption relative to their internal schemata. The extent and seriousness of 
the game is in the first instance determined by the technology itself and later moderated 
by the cultural, organisational and social norms that dictate play. 
Vil 
This game-play notion was the platform upon which specifications for the international 
technology transfer model were developed. An integration of the literature review and 
research case studies, produced a top-level requirements model based on various inputs, 
desired outputs and operating conditions. A variety of interdisciplinary concepts 
including: technology classification, social capital, the social discount rate, investment 
appraisal (utilising cost-benefit analysis) and game theory, were used to construct a three-
stage model of technology transfer. An innovative hypothesis is put forward, enabling 
the derivation of the social discount rate (based on the social time preference rate) from 
estimates of a culture's social capital (principally based on measures of trust). 
Verification and validation of the model showed significant explanatory power in a 
retrospective context. It also highlighted the model's ability to differentiate between 
cultures and its potential ability as a predictive tool. It is thought that the greatest 
application for the model lies in its potential use as a pre-transfer assessment tool aiding 
corporate managers in the formulation of implementation strategy. 
Vlll 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Organisations compete in a world of rapidly changing markets which demand constant 
advances in product and technology. Katz (2004) asserts that organisations must 
contend with the challenges of "dualism" - being able to operate efficiently in the 
present while innovating for the future. Maintaining technological superiority 
however, is not enough. It must be accompanied by an encompassing ability to cope 
with change. Without this fundamental ingredient, organisations face the risk of rising 
inertia and hence being relegated to history as yet another example of a firm that failed 
to innovate. As Amabile (1997) observes, "innovation is absolutely vital for long-term 
corporate success. Because the business world is seldom static, and because the pace 
of change appears to be rapidly accelerating, no firm that continues to deliver the same 
products and services in the same way can long survive. By contrast, firms that 
prepare for the future by implementing new ideas oriented towards this changing 
world are likely to thrive." 
1.1 Problem Definition 
There is an extricable link between an organisation's culture, structure, social norms 
and processes and its capacity for change and innovation. Likewise, this capacity is 
embedded in the organisation's ability to effectively transfer and assimilate 
technology. The challenge is greater in multinational firms that need to consider the 
effects of diverse national and organisational cultures. Given that globally-dispersed 
organisations may be at different locations on an 'innovative culture continuum', 
analysis and strategy development are particularly important when considering 
technology transfer. 
As international firms continue to expand into developing countries, semor 
management are confronted with numerous challenges in relation to the transfer of 
technology. Much of the research to date has dealt with this process at a macro-level, 
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addressing issues such as labour volume and skill in the receiver country, transfer 
medium, market conditions and so on. These approaches however, fail to satisfactorily 
acknowledge the significant impact of organisational factors. This thesis will 
demonstrate that the effective inclusion of micro-level aspects (organisational, 
management and end-user) will provide a greater understanding of the technology 
transfer process. Integration of organisational factors such as culture, structure, 
politics, social norms and processes will allow change agents to more accurately 
evaluate the existing organisational environment in terms of its propensity for 
technology adoption. Thus, three hypotheses frame the approach taken in this thesis: 
Hypothesis 1: That current theories in the technology transfer domain underestimate 
the impact of organisational factors such as culture, structure, politics, social norms 
and processes. 
Hypothesis 2: That a pragmatic model may be developed to quantify organisational 
aspects that impact technology a<f,option. Implicit in the structure of the model will be 
its ability to acknowledge cross-cultural issues. 
Hypothesis 3: That the pragmatic model will serve as a pre-transfer tool for 
predicting the likelihood of successful technology transfer. 
1.2 Research Methodology 
The fieldwork, analysis and development that comprise the novel research in this 
thesis, are built on a detailed understanding of the current state of knowledge in 
relation to innovation adoption. The synthesis of three primary research streams 
allowed identification of gaps in the literature, which drove subsequent work in this 
thesis. The research methodology incorporates the following stages: 
1. Synthesis and analysis of the innovation adoption research field. 
2. Identification of gaps in the literature, which provide opportunities for research 
that will contribute to the overall body of knowledge. 
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3. Execution of organisational case studies to investigate the 'micro-factors' that 
influence adoption. Longitudinal research methodologies were applied in two 
culturally-diverse settings (same multinational organisation; same focal 
technology). 
4. Execution of a corporate case study to investigate the 'macro-factors' that 
influence adoption. A cross-sectional research approach was applied. 
5. Integration of the findings from the case studies with the pre-determined 
knowledge gaps, to develop the top-level requirements for a technology transfer 
model. 
6. Research and analysis of alternative, interdisciplinary concepts for addressing 
the top-level model requirements. 
7. Integration of the interdisciplinary concepts to produce a three-stage model for 
international technology transfer. 
8. Verification and validation of the model using retrospective technology 
implementation studies. 
1.3 Thesis Overview 
This thesis has been structured to complement the research methodology described 
above. The following provides an overview of the thesis and associated research: 
Chapter 2 investigates the current ideas and theories in the research field of 
innovation adoption. An integration of previous research in three domains: technology 
diffusion, technology transfer and the impacts of technology on work, allows 
identification of nine areas of opportunity for increasing the overall knowledge and 
understanding of the innovation adoption field: 
1. Traditional frameworks for technology diffusion lack explanatory power in an 
organisational setting. 
2. Focus on the core characteristics of the technology has led to neglect of the 
social and cultural characteristics. 
3. Cross-sectional research has limited technology diffusion and transfer 
understanding. 
3 
4. Secondary adoption decision determinants are poorly understood (or recognised 
in current approaches). 
5. Little is known about cross-national differences in the determinants of 
technology adoption. 
6. The validity of Hofstede's cultural variation scales remains a focus of debate in 
relation to adoption behaviour. 
7. The bulk of the technology transfer literature is composed of conceptual models 
that are difficult to operationalise. 
8. Research in the technology transfer domain is overwhelmingly unidimensional. 
9. The technology diffusion and transfer literature suggest greater emphasis on 
social and cultural perspectives (a multiparadigm view) is needed. 
The last three of these issues suggest the need for a pragmatic model that is interactive, 
dynamic and interdisciplinary in its ability to describe innovation adoption 
environments. 
Chapter 3 presents the results from an Australian and Indian implementation of a 
knowledge management system within a multinational automotive manufacturing 
organisation (Ford Motor Company). Each case study describes the organisational and 
cultural context under which implementation occurs and the longitudinal research 
methodologies adopted. Fieldwork observations reveal that a majority of adoption 
decision antecedents have their grounding in the social and cultural context of the 
organisation, with very few related to innovation (or technology) characteristics. 
Technology transfer is conceptualised as a game between management and the worker, 
each weighing perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with adoption 
relative to their internal schemata. These schemata are influenced and shaped by both 
organisational and national ~ulture as well as workplace social norms. 
Chapter 4 investigates technology transfer at a corporate (or global) level within the 
same multinational organisation - Ford Motor Company. The case study provides an 
outline of the technological and organisational development of Ford in the context of 
the wider international automotive community. The results of interviews conducted at 
various corporate research and manufacturing facilities within Europe and the United 
States provide an overview of the current status of technology transfer within the 
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organisation. Findings indicate an extension of the game conceptualisation developed 
earlier and the importance of trust as a fundamental mechanism facilitating play. 
Technology transfer involves a complex interplay of economics, structure, 
organisation, social norms, politics and power, all of which are moderated by one 
primary factor - culture. This reinforces the need to develop an interdisciplinary 
model capable of defining and understanding the effects of this complex interplay on 
the transfer process. 
Chapter 5 combines the shortcomings associated with the nine identified areas of 
opportunity and the key findings from the investigative case studies, to develop 
fundamental requirements (inputs, outputs, operational conditions) for an international 
technology transfer model. Mostly qualitative in nature, a number of key concepts are 
introduced with a view to providing a means of quantification and measurement. 
These include: technology classification, social capital, the social discount rate, 
investment appraisal (utilising cost-benefit analysis) and game theory. Integration 
produces a tiered model which proceeds in three stages as follows: (1) technology 
classification to determine analytical depth and precursory transfer difficulty, (2) 
investment appraisal to determine the various costs and benefits associated with 
adoption and thus derive an associated expected value, and (3) game theory to 
construct the impending technology transfer scenario for each stakeholder (or player). 
The expected value is calculated from the net present value based on the social 
discount rate (or in this case, the social time preference rate). An hypothesis which 
relates social capital to the social time preference rate allows quantification across 
multiple national cultures. 
Chapter 6 incorporates application and testing of the technology transfer model based 
on a number of simplifying assumptions. A spreadsheet prototype model is developed 
to simulate the technology transfer process and produce game theoretic player payoff 
matrices across multiple cultures. Verification of the model proceeds using case study 
observations from the Australian and Indian implementations presented in Chapter 3. 
The resultant player payoff matrices accurately verify the specific case study 
implementations undertaken by the researcher. Validation of the model considers two 
novel technologies: the implementation of the Ford Production System and adoption of 
the Grid Strain Analysis technique. The former highlights the usefulness of the model 
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m generating implementation strategy based on an understanding of the 
implementation environment. Both technologies validate the model in a retrospective 
context and underscore its potential as a prognostic (or pre-transfer) assessment tool. 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the research work and associated key findings. 
Conclusions are discussed in the context of the three hypotheses. The significance of 
this research and its contribution to the body of knowledge on technology transfer and 
innovation adoption is discussed in the context of the nine previously identified 
opportunity areas. Limitations surrounding the application and accuracy of the model 
are highlighted and areas for future research summarised. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.1 Definition of Innovation and Technology 
Innovation research has a cross-disciplinary basis spanning many fields including: 
sociology, engineering, economics, marketing and psychology. Each field offers its 
own perspective on the innovation process, which stems primarily from its definition 
of innovation. In a review of the field, Gopalakrishnan et al. (1997) used three 
dimensions - stage of innovation process, level of analysis and innovation type, to map 
innovation across multiple fields. The authors noted that across all disciplines, 
innovation was explicitly linked to 'newness' a concept captured in Rogers' (1983) all 
encompassing definition of innovation: "an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as 
new to an individual or another unit of adoption." Thus, the field of innovation 
research is principally concerned with the processes involved in the exploitation and 
spread of this new idea, practice or object at both a societal and organisational level. 
The terms technology and innovation are quite often used synonymously, however the 
two have distinctly different meanings. In his analysis of organisations, Perrow (1967) 
defined technology as "the actions an individual performs upon an object, with or 
without the aid of tools or mechanical devices, in order to make some change in that 
object." Others define technology as a design for action to reduce uncertainty in cause 
and effect relationships (Rogers, 1983), applying this concept to everything from 
manufacturing hardware (Woodward, 1965) to skills possessed by people (Rousseau & 
Cooke, 1984). Perhaps the most :functional definition of technology however, comes 
from Schon (1967): "any tool or technique, any product or process, any physical 
equipment or method of doing or making, by which human capability is extended." 
Thus, as Leonard-Barton (1990) summarises - "technology is capability, that is, 
physical structure or knowledge embodied in an artifact that aids in accomplishing 
some task." 
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The idea that technology is embodied 'in an artifact' has been extended by Rogers 
(1993), who rationalises technology into two components: (1) hardware - the actual 
material or physical object that is the technology; and (2) software - the knowledge 
and information base that accompanies the technology. Technology classification 
schemes use this simple dichotomy to group technology into categories such as 
product, process, application and management technology (Reddy, 1996). Such 
schemes generally view technology on a continuum starting with 'hard' technology at 
one extreme (product and process based technologies such as capital goods and 
technical specifications) and 'soft' technology at the opposite extreme (management 
based technologies) (Alkhafaji, 1995). The inability to distinctly categorise 
technology, coupled with its existence on a continuum, mean that fundamentally, 
technology encompasses a mixture of hardware and software. 
A technology then, is a sub-set of innovation in-so-far as the technology is perceived 
as being "new" by the individual or unit of adoption. This is independent of time 
relative to the technology's introduction an.cl/or use. To this end, using Schon's (1967) 
definition of technology, the term technological innovation is any new tool, technique, 
product, process, physical equipment or method of making or doing, which extends 
human capability. 
2.2 Innovation Diffusion and Technology Transfer 
The technological innovation process consists of several stages depending on the 
model of development adopted. The unitary sequence model of development views 
the innovation process as occurring in a linear and sequential fashion (Zaltman et al. 
1973), while the multiple sequence model describes the process of innovation as a 
complex multi-path progression of divergent and convergent events (Gopalakrishnan 
et al. 1994, 1997). Followers of the unitary sequence model believe that the 
technological innovation process consists of six basic stages, the first four of which 
can be characterised as the 'innovation generation' phase and the remaining two as the 
'innovation adoption' phase. The process has been captured by Rogers (1983) as 
shown in Figure 2.1. The innovation generation phase is differentiated by the 
identification of a need, followed by research to find a means of satisfying this need. 
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The final two stages within this phase involve the development and commercial 
exploitation (production, manufacturing, marketing and distribution) of the technology 
(Saren, 1984). A decision to adopt the innovation and begin diffusing the technology 
marks the beginning of the innovation adoption phase and is the most critical stage in 
the development process. The final stage entails the evaluation of the technology in 
relation to the original need or problem. 
Innovation Generation • Innovation Adoption 
Figure 2.1: The technological innovation development process (adopted from Rogers, 1983). 
The innovation generation-adoption process thus describes the movement (or transfer) 
of a technology from a "producer" to a "receiver". An integral part of this process is 
the diffusion of innovation stage which can be conceptualised as a sub-process of 
technology transfer. Innovation diffusion is defined as "the process through which an 
innovation is communicated via certain channels over time among the units in a social 
system" (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Valente, 1991). Technology transfer on the other 
hand, is defined by Leonard-Barton ( 1990) as the "transformation of a technical 
concept or proven feasibility into a development state closer to its end use in the 
production of a service or goods." The success of this transfer is then defined as the 
extent to which a target group of receivers finds that this new technology enhances 
their process or output. Rogers (2002) defines technology transfer simply as the 
application (through communication) of information (technology) into use, a primary 
example being the movement of ideas from an R&D laboratory into the marketplace 
(Dorf & Worthington, 1989). Important distinctions have been drawn between 
innovation diffusion and technology transfer (Stewart, 1987; Cottrill et al., 1989; 
Eveland, 1987; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Rogers 2002): 
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• Technology transfer has a producer orientation, while diffusion has a user (or 
receiver) orientation focusing on implementation and use of the technology. 
Leonard-Barton (1990) defines diffusion as a mode of technology transfer based on 
the number of individuals targeted as users of the technology. When the 
technology is being transferred to a single targeted group it is described as being 
'point-to-point', whereas technology intended for a large number of receivers, sites 
or both, undergoes a process of diffusion. Characteristics of these two primary 
modes of technology transfer are described in Table 2.1. 
• Technology transfer has its basis within organisations, while diffusion is grounded 
in person-to-person social networks where individuals form the units of analysis. 
• Technology transfer is planned, while diffusion is sporadic and spontaneous. 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of the two primary modes of technology transfer (adopted from 
Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
Characteristic 
Organisational Span 
Geographic Dispersion 
User Participation in Design 
Customization 
Communication Mode 
Research Development 
PRODUCER 
Point-tO'-Point 
Narrow 
Narrow 
Actual 
Highly Customised 
Negotiation 
Technology available 
Commercialisation point -
to-point 
Diffusion 
Wide 
Wide 
Representative 
Standardised 
Marketing 
RECEIVER (user/s) 
Figure 2.2: A schematic depiction of technology transfer versus diffusion. 
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Perhaps the fundamental distinction between technology ·transfer and innovation 
diffusion is their primary purpose. Technology transfer is principally concerned with 
the commercialisation and use of research embodied within a technology, whereas 
diffusion is concerned with the spread of this technology once it has become available 
within a system. To this end, the definition of technology transfer and diffusion 
adopted for this work (Figure 2.2), is one where technology transfer encompasses the 
movement of technology from a producer to one or multiple receivers - diffusion 
being the process by which the latter is achieved. 
2.3 The Contingent Authority Innovation Decision 
Before the process of diffusion can occur, the receiver must make the decision to adopt 
the focal innovation. Within an organisation, the adoption decision process occurs in 
two distinct stages - an organisational decision to adopt usually made by management 
(primary adoption), followed by implementation based on the adoption decision of 
individual workers (secondary adoption) (Zaltman et al., 1973). This has been 
characterised within the literature as two-step adoption (Leonard-Barton & 
Deschamps, 1988) or two-stage implementation (Lucas, Ginzberg & Schultz, 1990). 
Once the primary adoption decision has occurred, secondary adoption may be induced 
via one of the three strategies (Gallivan, 2001; Agarwal et al. 1997): 
1. total commitment implementation whereby adoption is mandated by 
management; 
2. support for users by providing the infrastructure and resources for users to adopt 
voluntarily; or 
3. advocated adoption achieved through targeted pilot projects, the feedback from 
which can be used to decide upon further implementation. 
The organisational innovation adoption process is thus referred to as a contingent 
authority innovation decision since secondary individual adoption is contingent upon 
the primary organisational decision to adopt (Zaltman et al. 1973; Ram & Jung, 
1991). Further, for each stage of contingent adoption, the decision to adopt may be: 
optional (made independently by the individual), collective (based on a consensus 
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among the members of the group), or authoritarian (mandated by a higher power) 
(Rogers, 1983). Research has shown that the most prevalent combination of 
contingent adoption involves consensus based primary adoption (at the management 
level), followed by mandated secondary adoption (at the user/worker level) (Gallivan, 
2001 ). A classification scheme of the different organisational adoption categories 
represented as a two-by-two matrix is shown in Figure 2.3. 
t' Yes 
= 
"O 
= 0 
~ ~ No 
Primary 
Yes No 
Authority-based Bottom-up adoption 
innovation adoption (pull) 
Adoption but no 
No adoption 
deployment 
Figure 2.3: A taxonomy of two stage adoption types (adopted from Gallivan, 2001) 
The taxonomy shows that organisational innovation adoption can emerge as a bottom-
up (or pull) initiative. This is contrary to the more common mechanism of top-down 
(or push), whereby the innovation is effectively pushed onto users (Chau & Tam, 
2000). Common in the innovation research literature, are cases that detail the 
introduction of new technology, followed by industry-wide mass acquisition, which 
fail to achieve sustained deployment and assimilation (Liker et al. 1992; Cooper & 
Zmud, 1990, Eveland & Tomatzky, 1990). Fichman and Kemerer (1999) refer to this 
incongruence between primary and secondary adoption as the assimilation "gap." It 
is the existence of this gap, which makes the mandatory secondary adoption option 
favourable to management. Using management mandate to provoke initial use of the 
innovation however, will not necessarily achieve prolonged usage or 
institutionalisation into work practices or processes. The latter occurs over a 
sustained period of time and is the result of the receivers' willingness to use the 
innovation in recognition of the benefits (both personal and organisational) that use 
creates (Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Saga and Zmud, 1994; Hage & Aiken, 1994). To 
this end, the strategy that management adopts to provoke secondary adoption is key to 
successful implementation through assimilation. 
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Currently, there is no clear framework within the literature that enables primary 
decision makers within organisations, to develop an optimal strategy based on both 
the technological innovation and other organisational characteristics such as culture 
and social norms. Leonard-Barton (1990), attributes this gap to limitations in 
diffusion research, which has failed to adequately investigate the secondary adoption 
diffusion process, stopping "at the point at which some senior manager - or group of 
managers representing the whole organisation - has decided to adopt." Rogers (1983) 
underscores this further, stating that "diffusion researchers have been more oriented to 
the dependent variable of adoption [the decision], than to actual implementation 
itself." 
2.4 Assorted Literature associated with Innovation Adoption 
The isolation of literature streams within the innovation adoption field has limited 
cross-pollination resulting in knowledge gaps such as the example highlighted above. 
The two primary streams of literature within this field include both technology 
diffusion (encompassing diffusion of innovations) and technology transfer which in 
their own rights have developed as fairly distinct literatures. Cottrill et al. (1989), 
found that in the period 1966-72, the number of diffusion of innovation publications 
outnumbered technology transfer by over 50 percent. Further, of the over 2,000 
publications examined, only a 20 percent overlap between the literature streams 
existed, with little cross-referencing (Rogers, 2002). In a more recent review of the 
literature, Gibson et al. (1990), found that in the period 1985-90, the number of 
technological innovation articles (encompassing diffusion of innovations) had grown 
to outnumber technology transfer by 300 percent. This was primarily in the areas of 
business, economics, finance, management, psychology, and sociology. The trend 
was reversed in the areas of policy, security and international management. 
A secondary aspect of the literature, which is also related to innovation adoption but 
not commonly associated with the field, is the area of research related to the impacts 
of technology on work. A potential receiver faced with a secondary adoption 
decision, will consciously evaluate how the technology in question will impact on 
their work from personal, productivity and organisational points of view. Thus the 
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literature stream forms a key component of the understanding associated with 
innovation adoption within organisations. The following sections evaluate each of the 
critical literature streams associated with innovation adoption - technology diffusion, 
technology transfer and the impacts of technology on work, respectively. 
2.5 Technology Diffusion 
The innovation adoption process within organisations can be broken into two distinct 
phases based on the contingent authority decision (Zaltman et al., 1973). The first 
phase, corresponding to the primary innovation adoption process consists of two sub-
stages, beginning with the process of initiation. This is where the organisation 
becomes aware of the innovation, and its potential application, benefits and 
economics are discussed formally and informally within the organisation. The second 
stage of the primary innovation adoption process is implementation, consisting of the 
decision to implement based upon the evaluation that took place during the initiation 
stage. The implementation process is often heavily influenced by organisational 
politics and bureaucracy to the point where an innovation that has obvious advantages 
for the organisation may not be implemented (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Markus, 1983). 
The second phase, corresponding to the secondary innovation adoption process, 
concludes with the continued use of the innovation by individuals within the 
organisation and is typically labelled assimilation. Note that the definition of 
individual adoption used here constitutes assimilation, not the point at which the 
individual first makes use of the innovation (Rogers, 1983; Bhattacherjee, 1998). The 
innovation adoption process is depicted in Figure 2.4 as an extension of Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.4: The organisational innovation adoption process (extended from Figure 2.1). 
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2.5.1 A Conceptual Framework for Organisational Technology Adoption 
Currently, no single all-encompassing theory of technology adoption and diffusion 
exists. Rogers' classical model of diffusion (Rogers, 1983) was considered a potential 
candidate, however short-comings in an organisational context have detracted from its 
explanatory power (Gallivan, 2001). A broad synthesis of the literature by Frambach 
and Schillewaert (2002), and Agarwal (2000) has produced (when combined), a 
conceptual framework of the factors which are posited to influence adoption of 
innovations in organisations. Frambach and Schillewaert (2002), identified the 
antecedents of both primary and secondary adoption with those comprising the former 
including: innovation characteristics, adopter characteristics, environmental 
influences, social networks and marketing efforts. The latter three factors, in turn, are 
hypothesised to have a moderating influence on innovation characteristics. Secondary 
Marketing 
Efforts 
Social 
Network 
Adopter 
Characteristics 
Innovation 
Characteristics 
Environmental 
Influences 
Primary 
Adoption 
Decision 
Primary Technology 
------- ----- -- ---- --- ---- --------- --- ------- ----- --- --- ------------ ------ --- ---- ----- ------- ------- -----------
Secondary 
Managerial 
Interventions 
Organisational 
Facilitators 
Situational 
Influences 
Social 
Influences 
Beliefs & 
Attitudes 
Personal 
Characteristics 
Available 
1 
Figure 2.5: A conceptual framework of organisational technology adoption (adapted from 
Frambach & Schillewaert, 2002 and Agarwal, 2000). 
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adoption determinants include: attitude, personal characteristics, innovativeness, 
social usage and organisational facilitators. The latter three factors are again 
hypothesised to have a moderating influence on attitude, while personal 
characteristics are said to moderate innovativeness. 
Agarwal (2000) on the other hand, identified only the antecedents of secondary 
adoption and found them to include: social influences, beliefs and attitudes, 
situational influences and managerial interventions and individual differences. The 
latter two factors are hypothesised to have an effect on beliefs and attitudes. While 
both Frambach and Schillewaert (2002), and Agarwal (2000) name secondary 
adoption determinants differently, they each refer to common factors. To this end, the 
two secondary adoption frameworks have been combined, resulting in the conceptual 
framework for organisational technology adoption depicted in Figure 2.5. Subsequent 
sections elaborate on each construct and relationship. 
2.5.2 Core Theoretical Frameworks 
The history of technology diffusion research is deeply ingrained in Rogers' Diffusion 
of Innovation (DoI) theory (Rogers, 1983). The basis for this is grounded in a famous 
study by Ryan and Gross (1943) detailing the diffusion of hybrid com seed in Iowa. 
The field has since then been significantly extended by Information System (IS) 
researchers seeking to explain the secondary acceptance and diffusion of information 
technologies (once the primary decision to adopt has been made and the technology is 
available). These researchers have drawn on theory from social psychology to produce 
their own conceptualisations of acceptance which include: the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis et al., 1989; Moore & Benbasat, 1991), the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Azjen, 1985; Taylor and Todd, 1995), and Social 
Cognitive Theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1997). Each of these, including DoI theory is 
reviewed briefly. 
TRA andTPB 
According to both the TRA and TPB, the manifestation of a user's behaviour toward a 
particular activity is determined or preceded by the user's behavioural intention (BI) to 
engage in the focal activity (the activity in this case being acceptance and adoption of 
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the focal technology) (Moore & Benbasat, 1996). The user's behavioural intention is 
determined by two primary factors including the user's attitude (A) toward the 
behaviour and the subjective norm (SN). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) define the user's 
subjective norm as "the person's perception that most people who are important to him 
think he should or should not perform the behavior in question," while Agarwal (2000) 
explains that attitude captures the user's general affective response (positive or 
negative feelings) toward the behaviour. The difference between the two theories lies 
in the use of an additional variable by the TPB - perceived behavioural control (PBC) 
- as a determinant of behavioural intention. Ajzen and Madden (1986), define PBC as 
"the presence or absence of requisite resources and opportunities," meaning the user's 
"perception that there exists personal and situational impediments to the performance 
of the behavior" (Agarwal, 2000). Thus the TRA and TPB can be conceptualised as 
follows: 
BI =A+ SN 
=A+ SN+ PBC 
(TRA) 
(TPB) 
In a meta-analysis of 87 past empirical studies, Sheppard et al. (1988) found strong 
support for the predictive power of the TRA. 
TAM 
Based on the theoretical foundations of the TRA, Davis (1989) developed the TAM to 
model user acceptance of information systems. Like the TRA, the TAM presupposes 
that attitude predicts behavioural intention which in turn determines behaviour, 
however the subjective norm construct is omitted because "of its uncertain theoretical 
and psychometric status" (Davis et al., 1989). In original work on the TRA, Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975) acknowledged that it was difficult (from an empirical and theoretical 
perspective) to distinguish between the direct effects of subjective norms on 
behavioural intentions from indirect effects via attitude. Further, the TAM posits that 
only two beliefs - perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEU) -
predict the user's attitude toward using the technology. It is further hypothesised that 
perceived usefulness has a dichotomous indirect effect on behavioural intention via 
attitude in addition to a direct effect as captured in the empirical relationships below: 
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BI =A+ PU (TAM) 
A =PU+ PEU 
A number of significant studies on the TAM have involved comparison to extant 
theories in an effort to verify explanatory and predictive power. Davis et al. (1989) 
compared the TAM with the TRA and found that the TAM accounted for a larger 
proportion of the variance in behavioural intentions than the TRA. Adams et al. 
(1992) in a replication of the Davis (1989) study found that perceived usefulness had 
significant explanatory power in terms of usage, while perceived ease of use was 
relatively less salient. Mathieson (1991) compared the TAM with the TPB and found 
that the parsimonious structure of the TAM was not able to provide the explanatory 
power of the TPB relative to the factors that influence a user's behaviour toward a 
technology. Taylor and Todd (1995a; 1995b) produced similar findings and 
consequently developed a decomposed theory of planned behaviour (DTPB) which 
decomposes the attitudinal, normative and control belief determinants from the TPB 
into multidimensional belief constructs. In comparison to both the TPB and the TAM, 
the DTPB provides increased explanatory power for behavioural intentions. 
SCT 
Theories such as the TPB and the TAM can be used specifically to predict acceptance 
behaviours in relation to technology. SCT on the other hand, is used to derive the 
determinants of acceptance behaviours (Bandura, 1997). The core of SCT lies in the 
notion of triadic reciprocity, whereby a user's behaviour is hypothesised to be an 
outcome of a complex set of interactions between individual characteristics and 
situational and environmental factors (Agarwal, 2000). Researchers have used the 
complex theory to successfully examine the effects of individual characteristics such 
as self-efficacy on technology acceptance outcomes (Compeau & Higgins, 1995). 
Doi Theory 
Rogers' (1983; 1995) theory of the diffusion of innovations consists of four main 
elements: the innovation, communication channels, time and the social system. Each 
of these are discussed below. 
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1. The Innovation. Through a synthesis of several previous studies, Rogers (1983) 
identified five key attributes of an innovation that influence acceptance 
behaviour: 
1. Relative advantage - the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
being better than the idea it supersedes. The greater the perceived relative 
advantage of an innovation, the more rapid its rate of adoption. 
11. Compatibility - the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
consistent with existing values, past experiences, and the needs of potential 
adopters. The greater the perceived compatibility of an innovation, the 
more rapid its rate of adoption. 
m. Complexity - the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
difficult to understand and use. The lower the perceived complexity of an 
innovation, the more rapid its rate of adoption. 
1v. Trialability - the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with 
prior to adoptiol).. The greater the trialability of an innovation, the more 
rapid its rate of adoption. 
v. Observability - the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible 
to others. The easier it is for individuals to see the results of an innovation, 
the more likely they are to adopt. 
In the field of information technology, Moore and Benbasat (1991) expanded this 
set of key attributes to include: ease of use (similar in definition to Rogers' 
(1983) notion of complexity); image (captures the perception that using an 
innovation will contribute to enhancing the social status of a potential user); 
result demonstrability (defined by Moore and Benbasat ( 1991) as "the tangibility 
of the results of using an innovation"); visibility (defined by Agarwal and Prasad 
(1997) as ''the extent to which potential adopters see the innovation as being 
visible in the adoption context"); and perceived voluntariness (the extent to 
which the potential users perceive the adoption decision to be non-mandated). 
The literature presents a confused and conflicting vista in relation to both the 
relevance and saliency of different attributes for adoption. For instance, while 
Moore and Benbasat (1991) demonstrated empirically all the attributes discussed 
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to be relevant, Tomatzky and Klein (1982) found (through a meta-analysis of 
past research literature) only three to be significant - relative advantage, 
complexity and compatibility. In a study of the only two attributes used by the 
TAM, Davis (1993) found perceived usefulness to be far more important than 
perceived ease of use, while Adams et al. (1992) obtained results to the contrary. 
Other studies, such as that by Agarwal and Prasad (1997), found different 
attributes can be used to predict different outcomes in terms of current and future 
use intentions. Specifically, voluntariness, visibility, compatibility and 
trialability are significant in predicting current adoption intentions, while, 
relative advantage, visibility and result demonstrability are significant in 
predicting future adoption intentions. The ambivalent nature of these results 
suggest that use of pre-defined attributes to predict adoption behaviour is 
problematic and unreliable. Such attributes are dependent on the technology in 
question, as well as the situational, environmental and cultural characteristics 
surrounding the adoption. As such, attributes should be evaluated in the context 
of the organisation at the time of implementation. 
2. Communication Channels. Rogers (1983) defines communication as "'the process 
by which participants create and share information with one another in order to 
reach a mutual understanding." Two primary communication channels were 
identified by Rogers (1983): 
1. Mass media channels - are all those means of transmitting messages that 
involve a mass medium such as television, radio and newspaper. This 
particular channel is most effective in informing an audience of many 
potential adopters about the existence of an innovation. 
11. Interpersonal channels - involve face-to-face exchange between two or 
more individuals. Various diffusion studies have shown that this is the most 
effective communication channel for diffusion since most people depend on 
a subjective evaluation of an innovation from other individuals who have 
already adopted the innovation. 
Further, the probability of diffusion is increased if the subjective evaluation 
occurs between two individuals who are homophilous. Homophily is the degree 
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to which pairs of individuals are similar in certain attributes, such as beliefs, 
education and social status (Rogers, 1983 taken from Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1964). Paradoxically, the primary problem with technology transfer and in 
particular innovation diffusion, sterns from the overwhelming nature of 
heterophilous communication between individuals. For instance, a university 
researcher is technically more competent than his/her end clients (adopters). As 
such, no diffusion can occur if both individuals are hornophilous since there 
would be no new information to exchange. This notion of heterophily is 
captured by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) using their concept of absorptive 
capacity. They define the concept (in an organisational context) as prior 
knowledge which includes "basic skills or even a shared language but may also 
include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in 
a given field. Thus prior knowledge confers an ability to recognise the value of 
new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends." Collectively, 
these abilities constitute the firm's absorptive capacity. 
3. Time. The time dimension in the diffusion process has relevance in three 
different domains: 
1. The innovation-decision process - is the process by which an individual (or 
any other decision making unit) passes from first knowledge of an 
innovation through to its adoption or rejection. Rogers (1983) 
conceptualises this process as five steps: knowledge; persuasion; decision; 
implementation; and, confirmation. The innovation-decision period is thus 
the length of time required to pass through this process. Meyer and Goes 
(1988), in an adaptation of this process, developed a process model of 
assimilation consisting of three primary decision making stages (knowledge-
awareness, evaluation-choice and adoption-implementation) and nine sub-
stages. 
n. Innovativeness - as defined by Rogers (1983) is the "degree to which an 
individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new 
ideas than the other members of a system." On the basis of an individual's 
(or organisation's) innovativeness they can be classified into five different 
adopter categories (constituting the relative time at which an innovation is 
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adopted): innovator, early adopter, early majority, late majority, and 
laggard. 
m. Rate of adoption is defined as the "relative speed with which an 
innovation is adopted by members of a social system" (Rogers, 1995). 
Plotting the number of adopters on a cumulative frequency basis produces 
an s-shape curved distribution. The larger the gradient of the curve the 
greater the rate of adoption. 
4. Social System. Rogers (1983) defines the social system to be "a set of 
interrelated units [individuals, groups and/or organisations] that are engaged in 
joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal." The relationship between 
the social system and the diffusion process can be characterised into many 
different elements: 
1. System structure - organisations contain two types of structure, the first and 
most prevalent is its formal structure, defined by the bureaucratic and 
hierarchical positions of individuals in the organisation. This patterned 
social relationship structure is defined as social structure. Informal structure 
on the other hand, exists in the interpersonal networks that link individuals, 
determining who interacts with whom and under what circumstances 
(Rogers, 1983). This is known as communication structure and is often 
created where a set of homophilous individuals are grouped together. This 
social structure can facilitate or impede the diffusion of a technology in a 
system and also has a direct effect on an individual's innovativeness. 
11. Norms - are defined as "established behavior patterns for the members of a 
social system" (Rogers, 1983). They define acceptable/tolerable behaviour 
and serve as a guide or standard for individuals to follow. System norms 
can act as a barrier to change thus impeding technology diffusion. 
m. Opinion leadership-is defined by Rogers (1995) as "the degree to which an 
individual is able to influence other individuals' attitudes or overt behavior 
informally in a desired way with relative frequency." An individual's 
opinion leadership is earned and maintained by the individual's technical 
competence, social accessibility, respectability and conformance to social 
norms. Therefore, when social norms are oriented towards change, the 
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opinion leaders are innovative and vice-versa for change adverse norms. 
Opinion leaders are thus the centre of interpersonal communication 
networks, and are able to aide or disrupt the diffusion process. 
The importance of social aspects in the technology diffusion process cannot be 
understated. It is the social system and its elements, which have an overall 
moderating effect on the adoption decision. Positive perceptions of a technology 
based on innovation attributes such as those discussed previously may have little 
or no influence on producing a favourable adoption decision, if the social system 
encompassed by both established norms and negative opinion leadership thwart 
its adoption. Models and frameworks that rely on the prediction of acceptance 
behaviour based solely upon innovation attributes, may lack explanatory power. 
This provides an explanation for the confused and conflicting results highlighted 
previously (the TAM being a case in point). 
It is important to note that all of these theories and models apply to behaviours that are 
under the volitional control of individuals. Although both Moore and Benbasat (1991) 
and the TPB allow for the inclusion of inhibiting or facilitating conditions (through the 
perceived behavioural control and perceived voluntariness constructs respectively), 
these are situational obstacles rather than strict management mandate to adopt 
(Agarwal, 2000). Further, it is clear that across all these theories and models, several 
themes seem to recur. The first of these is the concept of beliefs captured as 
innovation attributes or perceptions being critical determinants of technology adoption. 
The second is the relationship between beliefs and attitudes which mediate an 
individual's intention to use a technology. The third is the importance of the 
situational, social and environmental context within which technology adoption is 
likely to occur. All these themes have been captured by both Frambach and 
Schillewaert (2002), and Agarwal (2000) in a comprehensive literature review which 
led to the development of the overall conceptual framework for organisational 
technology adoption as depicted in Figure 2.5. Subsequent sub-sections discuss each 
of the constructs within the framework in the context of the core theoretical 
frameworks discussed above. 
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2.5.3 Organisational technology adoption decision determinants 
Where similarities or overlap between primary (P) and secondary (S) determinants 
exist, they will be discussed together. 
Adopter (P) and Personal (S) Characteristics 
Significant literature exists identifying scores of organisational (adopter) 
characteristics which can act as determinants of innovation (Fichman, 2000). 
Damanpour ( 1991) in a meta-analysis of the relationships between organisational 
innovation and its potential determinants identified 13 organisational variables that 
influence the ability to innovate. These included variables such as: specialisation 
(represents the number of different specialties found in an organisation (Kimberly & 
Evanisko, 1981; Aiken & Hage, 1971) ), formalisation, centralisation, managerial 
attitude toward change, technical knowledge resources, slack resources, and vertical 
differentiation. The most prominent adopter characteristics have been organised into 
two definitive categories (Fichman, 2000): 
1. Organisational size. Among adopter characteristics organisational size has been 
found to influence innovation and is thought to be proportionately related to 
innovativeness (Meyer & Goes, 1988; Rogers, 1995). An organisation's 
innovativeness is defined as the relative propensity to adopt a new innovation and 
is directly related to its strategic manoeuvrability in terms of having appropriate 
and adequate resources to effect adoption (commonly known as organisational 
slack) (Morrison, 1996; Aiken & Hage, 1971). Organisational size can also act 
as a proxy measure of other organisational variables including scale, wealth, 
specialisation and slack resources, all of which are hypothesised as being 
positively related to innovation adoption (Tomatzky & Fleischer, 1990). 
A wider review of the literature however, presents a conflicting view of the 
associational relationship between size and innovation. Researchers such as 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue that larger organisations suffer from greater 
"structural inertial forces," which negatively effect adoption, while smaller 
organisations are more flexible and innovative resulting in enhanced 
receptiveness (Frambach & Schillewaert, 2002). Others such as Shah and Ward 
(2003), argue that larger organisations have increased access to both capital and 
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human resources which facilitate adoption and find the bulk of empirical 
evidence available in the literature "overwhelmingly" supports this supposition. 
2. Organisational structure. In addition to size, an organisation's structure, whether 
it be described as traditional, mechanical, organic or mixed, has been found to be 
associated with innovativeness (Hull & Hage, 1982). The ambidextrous model of 
innovation (Duncan, 197 6), suggests that an organisation with high structural 
complexity, low formalisation and low centralisation will facilitate initiation 
while an organisation with low, high and high conditions respectively, will 
facilitate implementation. An organisation which demonstrates the 
characteristics of a mechanistic organisation, namely lower complexity, higher 
formalisation and centralisation, lower external and internal communication and 
higher vertical differentiation than an organic organisation, will inhibit 
innovation adoption (Bums & Stalker, 1961; Zaltman et al., 1973; Zammuto & 
O'Connor, 1992). 
The literature which describes the personal characteristics that influence the secondary 
adoption decision, is equally capacious as that which examines the organisational 
characteristics highlighted above (Agarwal, 2000). Core theoretical frameworks, such 
as the TRA, TPB, TAM and Do I theory, recognise the importance of individual 
differences although there is divergence in the causal network of relationships which 
locate this construct. The former three frameworks, grounded in social psychology, 
postulate that individual differences influence attitudes, intentions and behaviours via 
beliefs. Dol theory on the other hand, hypothesises that there are differences in the 
innovativeness of individuals which stem from three major elements: socioeconomic 
status, personality traits and communication behaviours (Rogers, 1995). Zmud (1979) 
in a synthesis of the literature, categorises individual differences into three classes: (1) 
cognitive style - the mode of functioning shown by an individual in his/her perceptual 
and thinking behaviour; (2) personality traits - including among others, locus of 
control, dogmatism, ambiguity tolerance, extroversion/introversion, need for 
achievement, risk-taking propensity, evaluative defensiveness, and anxiety level; and 
(3) demographic/situational variables - including for example, intellect, domain-
specific knowledge, sex, age, experience, education, professional orientation and 
organisational level. 
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Recent studies have also identified two other important personal characteristics which 
are thought to exhibit strong consistent relationships with technology acceptance - self 
efficacy and personal innovativeness. A key operational variable utilised in the 
application of SCT, self-efficacy refers to individuals' beliefs about their ability and 
motivation to perform specific tasks (Bandura, 1977). The greater the self-efficacy an 
individual possesses toward a particular technology, the greater their behaviour toward 
and performance using the specific technology. Based on Rogers (1983) 
categorisation of personal innovativeness, early adopters in a system (including 
innovators and the early majority) generally have: (i) higher socioeconomic status than 
late adopters (including laggards), (ii) different personality traits (such as greater 
empathy, rationality and intelligence), and (iii) more social participation including 
greater exposure to mass media and interpersonal communication channels, and a 
higher degree of opinion leadership. Both Agarwal and Prasad (1989) and Leonard-
Barton and Deschamps (1988) use the personal innovativeness construct as a key 
control variable in predicting technology acceptance. 
Innovation Characteristics {P) and Beliefs & Attitudes (S) 
In general, innovations which possess favourable characteristics tend to be more 
attractive and easier to adopt and therefore diffuse more readily than those with less 
favourable characteristics (Rogers, 1995). The explication and analysis of various 
characteristics has been the focus of a wide number of studies (Tornatzky & Klein, 
1982; Moore and Benbasat, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1988a; Ramiller, 1994). The 
concept and measurement of innovation characteristics however, tends to dominate the 
literature with multiple and conflicting views on both the formation and subsequent 
quantification of these attributes (Fichman, 2000; Downs and Mohr, 1976). The 
problem stems from two main sources: (i) perceptions of innovation characteristics 
vary across both potential adopters and different technologies, and (ii) these 
perceptions operate on two diverse and umelated levels (constituting the intra-
organisational adoption process)·- the perceptions of decision makers charged with the 
primary adoption decision, and in the secondary instance, the perceptions of the 
individuals lower down in the organisational hierarchy (Kraut et al., 1998). 
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A number of different frameworks including Doi theory and the TAM identified 
several attributes or beliefs of an innovation that influence user acceptance (perceived 
usefulness for example). The supposition that beliefs and attitudes are proximal 
antecedents of technology acceptance finds support in a number of these core 
theoretical frameworks, especially those models derived from social psychology such 
as the TPB, TRA and TAM (Agarwal, 2000). Two major views of beliefs and 
attitudes are prevalent in the literature. Lutz (1981) discusses the tripartite view in 
which attitudes are composed of beliefs, affect and conation, where affect denotes 
emotional engagement with the concept and conation represents the action taken in 
response to the beliefs and affect. Most common in the literature however, is the 
unidimensional view in which beliefs, attitudes and behaviour are causal constructs. 
In this respect, behaviour to engage in an activity (use a particular technology), is 
preceded by intention to engage. This in turn, is determined by the individual's 
attitude toward the behaviour, which is implicitly linked to the individual's beliefs 
with respect to performing the behaviour (Pantano et al., 2002). 
The actual formation of these beliefs (or innovation perceptions) is the subject of two 
schools of thought within the literature (Kraut et al., 1998; Webster & Trevino, 1995). 
Rational/contingent theory contends that a potential adopter's beliefs are based 
primarily on an objective assessment of the features associated with the technology. 
The potential adopter uses individual needs, wants and capabilities to make an 
objective judgment. Beliefs such as perceived ease of use, posited by both the TAM 
and Doi theory (captured as perceived complexity) are said to be derived in this way. 
The second theory, that of social learning, asserts that potential adopter beliefs are 
predominantly socially constructed (Fulk, 1993). In an organisational context, such 
perceptions are formed based on the potential adopters observation of group norms, 
associated attitudes and behaviours. There has been significant debate about whether 
the two theories of belief development are competing or complementary (Fichman, 
2000). Earlier research indicated that perceptions were formed either on a 
rational/contingent basis, or a social learning basis - each being mutually exclusive. 
More recent work however, advocates a complementary approach (Kraut et al., 1998; 
Webster & Trevino, 1995). 
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Organisational Facilitators (S) 
Individual usage of an innovation is also affected by the resources and opportunities 
provided by the organisational environment in which the adoption decision is to take 
place (Ajzen, 1991). Leonard-Barton (1988b) defines the delivery system for an 
innovation as the management and support processes which buttress the 
implementation. Various researchers have identified the characteristics which 
constitute an effective delivery system - top management support and technology 
championship (Howell & Higgens, 1990), training, education and organisational 
learning (Igbaria, .1993; Raho et al., 1987), organisational technical support (Davis et 
al., 1989), incentives and control structures (Bhattacherjee, 1998), and user 
participation in system/technological development (Hartwick & Barki, 1994). 
Both managerial interventions and situational influences can act as organisational 
facilitators and for this reason they have been included as separate constructs in the 
conceptual framework of organisational technology adoption, depicted in Figure 2.5. 
Zmud (1984) in a review of previous work, cites the importance of management 
commitment to successful implementation, which can be communicated in many 
ways: open and active campaigning advocating the organisational benefits of the 
technology, the allocation of precious organisational resources such as time, and 
visible use of the technology. Such management support however, needs to be 
demonstrated at an appropriate level in the management hierarchy for it to have a 
positive influence on the adoption decision. Leonard-Barton (1987) found that as 
management directives in relation to innovation were pushed down the organisational 
hierarchy, the supervisor-worker relationship became an influential dynamic mediating 
adoption. The primary reason for such a dynamic, was the fact that typically the 
immediate supervisor is responsible for worker performance evaluation, and as such, 
workers' adoption was strongly mediated by their supervisor's attitude and preference. 
Marketing Efforts {P), Social Network {P) and Environmental Influences (P) 
Some technologies may be more complex, expensive and incompatible than others, but 
these adverse characteristics can be moderated by the marketing efforts of supplier 
organisations (Frambach & Schillewaert, 1998; Eveland & Tomatzky, 1990). Such 
organisations may include R&D laboratories, government agencies, technology 
vendors, second and third tier suppliers, and consulting firms. Researchers have 
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investigated various characteristics of such technology supplier organisations which 
include reputation, marketing support, R&D support, sponsorship and subsidies 
(Robertson & Gatignon, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1986). Frambach and Schillewaert 
(2002), make the point that although these different marketing variables may stimulate 
or facilitate adoption, three main factors are important: "the targeting of the innovation 
[towards adopters that can facilitate acceptance], its communication [via the two 
channels espoused by Rogers (1995)- namely mass media and interpersonal], and the 
activities the supplier undertakes to reduce the perceived risk of the potential 
customer." 
The degree and intensity of marketing effort required by a technology supplier, is 
dependent on the environmental influences the organisation is exposed to. For 
instance, highly innovative industries such as telecommunications and biomedicine, 
must lend themselves to increased adoption if they wish to survive competitively. 
Researchers have identified a number of environmental factors that influence the 
propensity of an organisation to adopt which include {Eveland & Tomatzky, 1990; 
Meyer & Goes, 1988; Robertson & Gatignon, 1986): 
a. competitive pressure; 
b. profitability/wealth; 
c. R&D intensity; 
d. rate of technical change; and 
e. industry concentration - or critical mass. Some organisations with a moderate to 
low innovativeness will only adopt an innovation once a critical mass of industry 
equivalent adopters have implemented first (Rogers, 1991). Alternatively, an 
organisation may only find advantage in adopting the innovation once a number 
of business network partners have adopted (McGrath & Zell, 2001); 
These network partners may be members of the organisation's extended social 
network. Doi theory postulates that the higher the degree of interconnectedness - the 
extent to which organisations share information - the greater the exposure to new 
innovations and the latest technologies (Rogers, 1995). Interconnectedness may be 
quantified in terms of the frequency and richness of interaction between members of a 
social network (conference and industry associations being examples of such informal 
networks). To this end, organisations which invest heavily in establishing a wide 
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social network, increase their communication channels and are more likely to be 
innovators (Nilakanta & Scamell, 1990). 
Social Influences (S) 
The concept of the critical mass described above on an organisational (or primary) 
level, applies equally to the individual. The acceptance of an innovation by an 
individual's peers (superiors, colleagues and customers) may signal its importance and 
advantages, motivating the individual to imitate (Rice, 1990). Frambach and 
Schillewaert (2002) hypothesise that "organisational members will exhibit more 
positive attitudes if people in their social environment also use the focal innovation. 
These usage levels may be so compelling that the opportunity cost for a focal 
individual of not complying becomes too high and may even overcome otherwise 
negative attitudes." Hence individual adoption behaviour may be dependent on the 
conduct of others in the individual's sphere of social influence (Weick, 1995). 
Fulk (1993) argues that social information processing can be used to explain the 
attitudes and behaviour of individuals in a social setting. Such social information can 
take the form of: (1) overt statements that are assimilated, (2) interpretations of events, 
(3) communication that increases the saliency of events, and (4) declaration of 
standards for judging the appropriateness of particular behaviours in the workplace 
(Agarwal, 2000). Orlikowski et al. (1995) has described the role and influence of the 
technology champion on individual adoption as being akin to Rogers' (1983) concept 
of the opinion leader, while Schmitz & Fulk (1991), found in their investigations that 
co-worker behaviour was more influential on individual adoption than that of 
supervisors and management. 
2.5.4 Shortcomings in the technology diffusion literature 
The following issues have been identified as key limitations in the understanding of 
the innovation adoption and diffusion process. Further they constitute the basis and 
justification for this work. 
Rogers (1983) Doi theory is considered "as the closest the field has come" to 
producing a single theory of innovation adoption (Fichman, 2000). However, the body 
of research which constitutes this classical model was based on less complex 
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innovations than currently available today, being adopted autonomously by individuals 
primarily in an unconstrained social setting. Increasing evidence now suggests that 
Doi theory as well as other core theoretical frameworks including the TPB and TRA, 
lack explanatory power in an organisational environment where adoption decisions are 
linked (Attewell, 1992; Eveland & Tomatzky, 1990; Rogers, 1991). Gallivan (2001) 
uses a quote from Wynekoop (1991) to justify this point: 
"Since innovation diffusion theory is based on voluntary adoption 
decisions, one of its primary limitations is its incompleteness in 
the area of organisational implementation of innovations after 
authoritarian or contingent adoption decisions. Innovation 
researchers have neglected this area, leaving the definition of 
independent and outcome variables very exploratory .... 
Organisational and individual implementation outcomes may not 
be the same - that 1s, one may be successful, and the other 
unsuccessful." 
In his own work, Gallivan (2001) finds that these traditional frameworks were not able 
to explain the "importance of key managerial interventions" in addition to "the 
inconsistent influence of the firm's bureaucratic culture in facilitating initial 
innovation adoption, while constraining many of the organisational changes in work 
process and culture required to institutionalise and fully exploit the technology's 
potential benefits." Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) add weight to this point, 
arguing that even the "most influential" modd of intra-organisational acceptance - the 
TAM, is unable to explain the influence of managerial actions and call for further 
research into the influence of social and organisational processes on the individual 
adoption decision . 
The bias of traditional models in favour of innovation perceptions and characteristics 
as core explanatory constructs has detracted from their predictive power. This was 
evidenced in the conflicting literature identifying a multitude of varying characteristics 
and beliefs as determinants of the adoption decision (Fichman, 2000; Downs and 
Mohr, 1976; Wolfe, 1994). Further, the conceptual framework of organisational 
technology adoption (depicted in Figure 2.5) bases both the primary and secondary 
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decision around two key determinants - innovation characteristics and the beliefs and 
attitudes which comprise their formation. A growing body of research demonstrates 
that in some environments, social and managerial influences may override the 
utilitarian and rational explanations of technology adoption grounded in the innovation 
perception construct (Agarwal, 2000; Frambach & Schillewaert, 2002). 
The inclusion of social learning theory as a basis of belief development is confirmation 
that the adoption decision is dependent on determinants that are more complex than 
those derived using traditional rational/contingent theory (Kraut et al., 1998; Webster 
& Trevino, 1995). The literature however, fails to provide direction in relation to 
which theory dominates on the basis of multiple contingencies including technology 
type, adoption environment and situational instance. This can perhaps be attributed to 
research limitations in the bulk of the literature field which utilise a cross-sectional 
design based in controlled environments (such as office situations) and focus on a 
limited number of determinant variables. 
Such research designs make it difficult to evaluate the effects of both social and 
cultural variables on the adoption decision and subsequent diffusion. For this reason, 
Van de Ven and Rogers (1988) call for the adoption process to be analysed as a 
"dynamic, continuous conception in which the variables involved in innovation are 
sequenced and analysed through time." Further, the narrow focus of previous research 
using limited and specific variables have resulted in the conceptual framework of 
Figure 2.5, which consists of a synthesis of the literature. It is however, difficult to 
both operationalise such a framework (for development as a management tool) and 
determine the impact on adoption decisions of second-order or indirect effects such as 
managerial interventions and situational influences in the secondary adoption instance. 
Frambach and Schillewaert (2002) also advocate the need for studies of international 
technology diffusion, noting the significant lack of research in the area (the only 
seminal work being produced by product and marketing researchers). Little is known 
about cross-national differences in the determinants of technology adoption, although 
diffusion patterns have been shown to vary significantly across countries. 
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2.6 Technology Transfer 
The field of technology transfer is multidisciplinary with interest in the area from both 
academia and industry growing rapidly. Over the past quarter century however, major 
contributions to the field have been made from four principle disciplines, each of 
which not only defines the transfer process differently, but also focuses on different 
aspects and outcomes of technology transfer. Zhao and Reisman (1992) provide a 
taxonomic review of technology transfer in each of the major disciplines which 
include economics, anthropology, sociology and management/engineering: 
1. Economics (see Arrow, 1969; Dosi, 1988). Having coined the term technology 
transfer, economists are primarily interested in quantitative measures of the 
influence of technology transfer on economic growth (Mansfield et al., 1982). 
Economists believe that the growth of nations depends on the successful 
application of a transnational stock of knowledge (Kuznets, 1966) and their work 
is concerned with the costs involved in the transfer and the value of resources 
required to accomplish the transfer (Teece, 1977). A number of different 
perspectives have been examined including: transfer between different industries 
and sectors, domestic or national transfer, and international or cross border 
transfer with multinational firms as the focal technology carrier. 
2. Anthropology (see Foster, 1962; Merrill, 1972). The anthropological view of 
technology transfer is primarily concerned with the spread (or transfer) of 
technological innovations from one society to another. As such, the transfer 
process is considered a special case in the overall evolution of cultural and 
societal change. Relative to economists, anthropologists have been more 
concerned with "the relationship between developing technology and culture, the 
psychological character of the people who are changing, and the difficulties of 
the institutions responsible for change" (Zhao & Reisman, 1992). 
3. Sociology (see Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). Sociology considers technology 
transfer on two distinct levels. The lower level involves outcome-driven analysis, 
whereby sociologists (like anthropologists) have investigated the effect of the 
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transfer process on aspects of social living (principally the modernisation of 
society). The upper level involves process driven analysis using Rogers' (1983) 
conceptualisation of the innovation-decision process (knowledge, persuasion, 
decision, implementation and confirmation). As such, sociologists consider the 
technology transfer process from a diffusion perspective as being a unique form 
of communication within society. 
4. Management/Engineering. Scholars have viewed technology transfer as a means 
of gaining and sustaining an organisation's competitive advantage and have made 
the biggest contribution to the field from a variety of diffuse perspectives. Like 
economists, theorists in this discipline are interested in the determinants of 
technology transfer including the various factors which facilitate and inhibit the 
process. Unlike economists however, a qualitative perspective is adopted and· 
encompassed in detailed frameworks and models meant to capture the sequence 
of events involved in the transfer. 
The scattered focus of the technology transfer research field has been criticised by 
Geisler (1993) as consisting of a "hodge-podge of perspectives" and "disciplinary 
biases" with "somewhat chaotic research directions." Similar criticism can be traced 
back to Fischer (1976) who also noted that "little progress [had] been made towards 
establishing a solid conceptual framework" for the field. In an effort to introduce 
some convention in relation to the foundations of the technology transfer field and 
define the main lines of research, Geisler (1993) defines the key elements which 
comprise the domain of technology transfer. Across the disciplines discussed above, 
there have been four main types of research into technology transfer: 
(a) Process is the focus in regard to technology transfer in the greater part of the 
literature. This line of research is primarily interested in the explanation and 
resolution of key questions such as: What does the process consist of?; How does 
it work?; How can it be improved?; Who transfers to whom?; How is the transfer 
processed?; What mechanisms are used?; and what barriers and facilitators exist? 
Research has produced a large number of models and frameworks to describe the 
process and provide answers to these questions. 
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(b) Process and Outcomes considers technology transfer in terms of the process and 
associated outcomes. Its principle avenues of inquiry are centred around key 
questions which include: What are the contributions/consequences of technology 
transfer?; and who benefits from it? This type of inquiry has been hindered by 
the problems associated with the accurate and quantitative measurement of 
technology transfer outcomes. 
( c) Larger System Component considers technology transfer as a component of a 
larger system (the innovation process being a prime example). Autio and 
Laamanen (1995) have referred to this "modern school of technology transfer 
research" as "innovation-oriented technology transfer research" (see also Robbins 
and Milliken (1976)). This is opposed to the traditional school of technology 
transfer research (consisting primarily of both (a) and (b) above), which they 
label as "developing country oriented technology transfer research." 
( d) Case in a Discipline considers the technology transfer phenomenon as a case in a 
given discipline such as economics, international management or public policy. 
The latter constitutes a large area of research that is concerned with the 
establishment of public policy (particularly within the United States) in relation 
to technology transfer (Bozeman, 2000). Such studies analyse government policy 
on a domestic (Crow & Nath, 1990) and international level (Correa, 1994) within 
both the United States (Bozeman, 1994) and Europe (Rothwell & Dodgson, 
1992). Geisler (1993) states that findings from research categorised under this 
particular element are not generalisable and contributions to the technology 
transfer domain have been non-significant. 
The bulk of this work is primarily centred around the mechanisms associated with the 
transfer process (as defined in part (a) of Geisler's (1993) domain mapping). As such, 
the following sub-sections will focus on the models and mechanisms, which constitute 
the transfer process, and the barriers and facilitators that influence transfer success. 
2.6.1 Models and mechanisms of technology transfer 
In a review of the literature (primarily centred around university-industry interactions), 
Autio and Laamanen (1995) isolate technology transfer mechanisms into three 
partially overlapping categories. The first two categories encompass process 
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Technology Transfer Mechanism Citation(%) 
Consultation 54 
Continuing education 23 
Contract research 70 
Direct marketing of generated technology 8 
Expert services 23 
"' Generating end user demand 15 Q; i:J 
.E 
Q; 
Influencing key decision makers 15 
00 Information services 15 I 
"' Postgraduate education 15 
"' Q; i:J 
0 Research projects 70 
""' ~
Resource sharing, use of laboratory facilities 38 
Sponsored research 8 
Student exchange 8 
Undergraduate education 15 
Visits 23 
Broker organisations 15 
Centres of excellence, high tech centres 23 
Cooperative research programs 23 
"' 
Development companies 8 
= 
.:a Innovation centres, incubators, research parks 15 ..... C1 
"' ·a Innovation officers 8 
C1 
~ Joint ventures 15 
""' 0 
I Liaison programs, industrial affiliate programs 38 
"' 
"' Movement of researchers into industry 62 Q; i:J 
0 
""' 
Movement of researchers to research institute 62 ~
New companies 38 
Research and development consortia 38 
Satellite university 15 
Congresses, workshops, seminars, briefings 54 
Doctoral theses, master's theses 15 
"' New products ..... 8 
= c. 
..... Patents, licenses 70 
= 0 
Resource and research databases 8 
Scientific publications and other documents 38 
Figure 2.6: Technology transfer mechanisms. Citation percentage indicates the number of 
articles (relative to the total number reviewed) that cited the particular mechanism (adapted from 
Autio & Laamanen, 1995). 
mechanisms in the form of services and organisational arrangements. These 
process categories outweigh the final category - research output mechanisms - by 
more than 300 percent (as depicted in Figure 2.6). In terms of international (or cross-
border) technology transfer, the most popular mechanisms include: information 
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exchange between scientists and engmeers at international meetings, international 
publications, export of goods (which may be followed by instruction and training by 
the exporter), reverse engineering, the establishment of overseas subsidiaries by 
multinational organisations, technology licensing agreements, and joint ventures 
(Mansfield, et al., 1982; Myllyntaus, 1990). The use of intermediaries such as 
technology brokers, innovation agencies and transfer consultants have also been 
identified as key mechanisms which can "help to bridge the gap between technological 
opportunity and (often poorly articulated) user needs" (Bessant & Rush, 1995). 
The relationship between technology type and transfer mechanism has been 
conceptualised in a matrix by Behrman and Wallender (1976). The matrix is based on 
seven distinct phases of manufacturing technology transfer, the initial three phases 
constituting development of the manufacturing facility, and the later four phases 
constituting start-up and operation. Behrman and Wallender (1976) identify a number 
of different mechanisms which can be used during each phase: documentation 
(manuals, designs, specifications, reports), instructjon (formal or on-the-job), 
conferences and seminars, visits and exchanges, equipment, and trouble shooting 
assistance. The matrix forms the basis of a large number of diverse technology 
transfer models available within the literature. It contains two key elements that 
comprise the nucleus of all technology transfer models - the technology and the 
transfer channel. Aharoni (1991) captures the four core elements of technology 
transfer in a typology which constitutes a generic technology transfer model: 
1. Technology donor - could be a commercial firm, university, or research 
laboratory 
2. Technology-hardware (artifact or machinery) or software (knowledge) 
3. Transfer channel- also known as the mechanism (a joint venture for example) 
4. Technology receiver- could be a commercial firm, subsidiary or individual 
As a consequence of the inherent complexity associated with technology transfer, there 
is a strong desire to model the process. Further, since technology is developed in 
different locations for different people and purposes, no single all-inclusive model of 
technology transfer is applicable in all situations. The bulk of the models focus on 
transfers: (1) between firms (inter-firm transfer), (2) between external R&D 
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laboratories and organisations, (3) to lesser developed or developing countries (Bruun 
and Mefford, 1996; Afriyie, 1988; Parry, 1981), and (4) between universities in 
collaborative agreements with industry and government. A selective review of the 
literature, provides a representative impression of the range of models available, some 
of which are detailed here. 
The General Model 
Proposed by Samli (1985), the general model consists of five key components which 
include: the sender, the technology, the receiver, the aftermath and the assessment, as 
depicted in Figure 2.7. The model proposes that the sender's and receiver's needs 
must coincide for the transfer to be mutually advantageous. Further, the receiver's 
needs not only dictate the appropriate technology but the most effective means (or 
channel) of transfer. Samli (1995) advocates the assessment of technology 
appropriateness based on five factors: (1) market conditions in the receiver (or host) 
country, (2) raw materials required for production, (3) economies of scale, (4) labour 
in terms of volume and skill, and (5) adaptability of machinery and product. The 
choice of transfer channel is also a function of the donor's needs and the absorptive 
capacity of the receiver (Aharoni, 1991). The final two stages of the model involve the 
evaluation of the outcomes of the technology transfer. The aftermath is associated 
with the immediate and direct impact of the transfer, while the assessment is related to 
longer-run, more far-reaching impacts and outcomes. 
Sender Caused 
Needs Barriers Needs 
Donor's ! ! ! Receiver's 
knowledge background 
Sender Technology Receiver Aftermath 
of the receiver's -markets 
background I l l - raw materials - labor -know-how 
Willingness Receiver Caused Readiness - willingness 
Barriers - ability 
"-------------11 Assessment!~----------~ 
Figure 2.7: The General Model of technology transfer (adopted from Samii, 1985). 
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The Transfer and Absorption Model 
In a comprehensive analysis of various research, development and demonstration 
(RD&D) projects, Kingsley et al. (1996) noted that there was a distinct difference 
between technology that was transferred to a specific receiver, and technology that was 
absorbed by individuals or organisations that were part of the transfer, but not the 
intended receiver. They produced a staged model of the transfer/absorption process as 
depicted in Figure 2.8. Each numbered stage of the transfer or absorption process acts 
as a score from which a typology of outcomes can be developed (captured in a two-by-
two technology transfer versus technology absorption matrix). For instance, projects 
which scored high in transfer (6-7) but low in absorption (1-2) tended to be market 
induced transfers, while projects that scored high in both instances (6-7 and 3-4 
respectively), tended to be contractor and sponsor-induced transfers. 
Project 
Activity 
Stop 
Stop 
Technology Absorption Process 
Technology Transfer Process 
Benefit 
(Disbenefit) 
I Out-:e~Door H Stop 
Benefit 
Response (Dis benefit) 
Figure 2.8: The Technology Transfer and Absorption Model (adopted from Kingsley et al., 1996). 
The Interactive Broadcasting Model (or intra-firm technology transfer 
The role of organisational learning and knowledge transfer was encapsulated by 
Gilbert and Cordey-Hayes (1996) in a model that follows the flow of knowledge that 
accompanies technology transfer. The model suggests that the ability of an 
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organisation to implement new technology is encapsulated in its receptivity (Trott et 
al., 1995), a concept originally developed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and 
described as absorptive capacity. Modelling intra-firm technology transfer as a 
knowledge transfer process, Malik (2002) develops a model based on a broadcasting 
analogy, whereby absorptive capacity defines the ability of the receiver to understand 
the 'messages' being 'transmitted'. In Malik's (2002) model (depicted in Figure 2.9), 
the 'message' constitutes the technology while the 'mode of transfer' constitutes the 
channel. The broadcast model shows a message being sent to a receiver from a 
transmitter (or a donor) and subsequent feedback to provide outcome evaluation (as 
defined by the aftermath and assessment elements in Samli's (1985) general model). 
Transmitter 
- Can the transmitter 
send the message? 
- Is the message sent 
to the right people? 
- Does the message 
carry strength? 
Impact on innovation 
activity 
Inhibiting - lack of trust 
Facilitate - market pull 
Factors Influencing 
the Transfer Process 
Message 
Mode of Transfer 
- Embedded know-how 
- Movement of people 
- Information transfer 
- Plant, IT, equipment 
Feedback Mode 
Receiver 
End-market input sent 
back 
- Is the receiving 
apparatus on? 
- Is the message 
received and understood? 
- Does the message 
change work practices? 
Figure 2.9: Interactive Broadcasting Model for intra-firm technology transfer (adopted 
from Malik, 2002). 
2.6.2 Barriers to and facilitators of technology transfer 
Factors that influence the transfer process, such as lack of trust and market pull, are a 
key aspect of Malik's (2002) broadcasting model (Figure 2.9). There is vast 
qualitative literature, which details a number of factors that have been observed to 
either foster or hinder technology transfer. Godkin (1988), in a review of the literature 
documented well over 100 different factors, each of which could be grouped under the 
six category headings: labour, government, industry, higher education, transnational 
and cross-cultural. The types of factors influencing the transfer and their relative 
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importance, depend on the type of transfer being undertaken. For instance, inter-
organisational transnational transfer is influenced by factors such as: country specific 
regulations, national policies, and intellectual property laws (Al-Ghailani & Moor, 
1995; Simon, 1991). Intra-organisational transfer however, is influenced by a diverse 
range of factors, some of which are detailed in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Various barriers and facilitators of technology transfer (Godkin, 1988; Malik, 2002; 
Szulanski, 1996; Souder & Padmanabhan, 1989; Smilor & Gibson, 1991; Ounjian & Carne, 1987). 
Insufficient absorptive capacity 
Insufficient resources (time and money) 
Inadequate performance management system 
Distant relationship between transfer partners 
Failure to reward 
No structure for innovation or transfer 
Cultural/social asymmetry between transfer partners 
High management/personnel turnover 
Mismatch in value between transfer partners 
Inadequate communication skills 
Bureaucratic delays 
Facilitato.rsr : 
Top management support 
User involvement in development 
Comprehensive user training 
Technology transfers agents/champions 
Trust and goodwill between transfer partners 
Willingness to share knowledge 
High emphasis placed on R&D 
Recognised need (demand pull) 
Clear understanding of mutual needs 
Perceived positive reward 
Affiliation with university 
A study by Souder and Padmanabhan (1989), identified a number of barriers which 
R&D departments encounter when transferring their outputs to manufacturing. Over a 
number of cases, they were able to develop a regression equation to calculate the 
probability of transfer success: P(s) = 1.0 I (1.0 - 0.78e-0.4SN), where N is equivalent to 
the number of technology transfer promoters minus the number of barriers for the 
situation under investigation. The resultant exponential curve demonstrates a decrease 
in the probability of success as the number of barriers exceeds the number of 
promoters and vice versa. With the probability of success effectively approaching one 
as N approaches six, Souder and Padmanabhan (1989) recommend 'neutralising' 
barriers, i.e. eliminating barriers by matching them with specific promoters, as 
opposed to simply overwhelming the number of barriers with promoters. Although the 
probability calculation may be simple, its accuracy as a management tool suffers from 
a series of shortcomings. This is primarily a consequence of an implicit assumption 
that all barriers and promoters have equal influence on the technology transfer (the 
lack of an adequate weighting system). Further, there is an inherent assumption that 
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the technology transfer is completely volitional, which in an organisational context is a 
rare occurrence (Agarwal, 2000). 
2.6.3 Culture as a barrier and facilitator 
Cultural and social asymmetry between transacting partners in the transfer process, can 
inhibit transfer success. Kedia and Bhagat (1988) noted that there had been little 
emphasis placed on the empirical investigation of cultural constraints, much of the 
emphasis instead being placed on economic factors that affect the transfer of 
technology. The authors noted, in relation to such economic analyses: 
"Although these studies are helpful to the policy makers of a 
nation that seeks to lower the economic cost of imported 
technology by providing industry-specific lessons and negotiating 
guidance, they offer little in terms of our theoretical 
understanding of the constraining influences of the cultural 
factors involved in ·such transactions. Culture of the recipient 
organisation, strategic management issues, and, perhaps more 
important, the cultural differences between the two nations 
involved, play significant roles in determining the efficacy of 
such transactions." 
To investigate the efficacy of international technology transfer, Kedia and Bhagat 
(1988) proposed a conceptual model composed of two causal antecedents 
(organisational culture differences and specific characteristics of the technology) and 
two moderating factors (as depicted in Figure 2.10). 
An important distinction in the conceptual model of Kedia and Bhagat (1988) is the 
implicit separation of organisational culture (as an antecedent) and societal culture (as 
a moderator). Hofstede (1980; 1991) in his foundation work on the characterisation of 
societal cultures, made it clear that indeed "the two types of 'culture' are of a different 
nature." On a nationalistic level, culture is found to reside mostly in values that are 
acquired through a process of socialisation within the family early on in life. On an 
organisational level however, culture is found to reside mostly in practices that are 
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learned through socialisation in the workplace. To understand the differences between 
values and practices, one must examine their constituent components. Practices 
consist of three main elements: 
Rituals - activities that are considered to be socially essential within the culture (ways 
of greeting and paying respect to others) 
Heroes - persons who possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture (this is 
equivalent to the concept of the opinion leader in Rogers' (1983) Doi theory) 
Symbols - words, gestures, pictures or objects that carry a particular meaning only 
recognised by those people belonging to the culture 
As such, practices are visible to outside observers, but their meaning is hidden, only 
able to be interpreted by those belonging to the culture. Values, on the other hand, are 
"broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others" (Hofstede, 1991). For 
instance, values determine the difference between good and evil, or irrational and 
rational. Such values are not directly observable by an outsider, QUt can be inferred by 
the way people act under certain circumstances. 
Antecedent 
Characteristics of 
Focal Technology 
Product-embodied 
Process-embodied 
Person-embodied 
Antecedent 
Differences in 
organisational cultures 
between the transacting 
organisations 
Societal Culture-Based 
Differences 
Absorptive Capacity of 
Recipient Organisation 
Effectiveness of 
Technology 
Transfer Across 
Nations 
Presumed causal 
influences 
_ _ _ _ _ Presumed moderating 
influences 
Figure 2.10: A conceptual model for understanding cultural constraints on international 
technology transfer (adopted from Kedia & Bhagat, 1988). 
In a review of the technology transfer literature, Kedia and Bhagat (1988) did not 
discover any specific theoretical analysis or empirical studies that rigorously examined 
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the importance of transnational cultural variation. Consequently, in an effort to 
operationalise the societal culture moderator, depicted as part of their conceptual 
model, they used four dimensions of cultural variation proposed by Hofstede (1991) 
and one other by Glenn and Glenn (1981). Kedia and Bhagat (1988) propose that the 
effectiveness of technology transfer is dependent on the cultural compatibility between 
transacting nations along each dimension. Each dimension is defined as follows: 
1. Weak versus strong uncertainty avoidance - the concept of uncertainty avoidance 
is defined as the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by 
uncertain or unknown situations. Strong uncertainty avoiding cultures try to 
mitigate such situations through strict adherence to explicit and formal rules. 
These countries are likely to reject new and novel ideas associated with basic 
innovation. These cultures are instead said to be more adept at developing and 
implementing these basic innovations due to a sense of detail and procedure. 
Hofstede's study (1980) revealed that the highest scores for uncertainty 
avoidance were obtained for countries such as Greece, Japan and France, whereas 
low scores were obtained for Scandinavian countries, Great Britain and India. 
2. Individualism versus collectivism - the term individualism pertains to cultures in 
which ties between individuals are loose (everyone is expected to look after their 
own self-interests in the domains of both work and non-work). This is in contrast 
to collectivist societies where individuals are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups and as such tend to be more 'other' focused. Hofstede (1980) found that 
most westernised countries such as the United States, Australia, Great Britain and 
Canada were particularly individualistic, while Latin American countries, 
Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and Greece were collectivist in 
orientation. 
3. Small versus large power distance - the term power distance describes the extent 
to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a 
country, accept an unequal distribution of power and reward as normal. 
Organisations that exhibit large power distances are hierarchical in nature, 
subordinates are considered to be unequal and submissive, and power is 
centralised. Kedia and Bhagat (1988) posit that technologies that have the 
potential to disrupt the distribution of power in the recipient organisation are 
likely to be least effectively transferred. Hofstede (1988) found large power 
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distance countries to include the Philippines, Mexico, India, Turkey and Brazil, 
while small distances exist in Nordic countries, Austria and Ireland. 
4. Masculinity versus femininity - refers to dominant values in a society in relation 
to assertiveness, acquisition of money and status, and achievement of visible and 
symbolic rewards. Overtly masculine cultures express such values and 
tendencies while feminine cultures emphasise quality of life, modesty, 
consideration for others, and relationships before money and achievement. Kedia 
and Bhagat (1988) hypothesise that although organisations located in 
individualistic cultures have a higher propensity for technology adoption, 
collectivist cultures which are also masculine have a similar propensity for 
adoption (South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore being cases in point). Further, it is 
also hypothesised that masculine cultures (because of their overt desire for 
money, status and achievement) are more effective technology adopters and 
diffusers than feminine cultures. Hofstede (1980) identified strongly masculine 
cultures to include Japan, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Mexico, whereas 
strongly expressed feminine cultures include Nordic and Latin American 
countries. 
5. Abstractive versus associative tendencies - refer to the thinking patterns that 
dominate the culture. Associative cultures are characterised by individuals that 
tend to utilise associations among events (as their dominant thinking pattern) 
even though such associations may have little logical basis. Abstractive cultures 
on the other hand, utilise cause-effect relationships based on rational thinking -
this being the dominant thinking mode in the majority of Western countries. 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988) propose that because technological changes are suspect 
in associative cultures, abstractive cultures are more effective technology 
adopters and diffusers. Glenn and Glenn (1981) identify Latin American 
countries (such as Peru, Columbia, Venezuela) and India as being predominantly 
associative. 
On an organisational level, Kedia and Bhagat (1988) used the concept of negotiated 
order to examine the differences in organisational culture between two transacting 
partners (Fine, 1984). The theory of negotiated order argues that social order is 
negotiated, and organised activity such as structural change (the result of technology 
transfer) is not possible without some form of continued negotiation, which may 
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require some revision of the negotiated order. The theory has six dimensions which 
focus on: (i) the number of negotiators, their experience and representation, (ii) the 
order in terms of negotiational sequence and frequency, (iii) the relative distribution of 
power among the transacting parties, (iv) the stakes and visibility of the negotiated 
outcomes, (v) complexity, and (vi) the alternatives to avoiding or discontinuing 
negotiations. Kedia and Bhagat (1988) propose that any significant difference in the 
negotiated orders of the two transacting organisations (in terms of the above six 
dimensions), will inhibit the effectiveness of the ensuing technology transfer. 
Subsequent studies into the effect of cultural variation on the efficacy of the transfer 
process, have adopted either Hostede's (1991) dimensions or one of Kedia and 
Bhagat's (1988) propositions as their grounding basis (Jensen & Scheraga, 1998; 
Herbig & Palumbo, 1994; Rubin, 1993; Lin & Berg, 2001). Jensen and Scheraga 
(1998) develop another conceptual model based on the notion that the cost of 
technology transfer is dependent upon the cultural distance between transacting parties 
(Scheraga et al., 2000) - the cultural distance defined along both Hofstede's (1991) 
and Glenn and Glenn's (1981) cultural differentiation dimensions. Like Kedia and 
Bhagat (1988), Jensen and Scheraga (1998) argue that in some cases the cultural 
environment will add costs to the transfer while in others it will lower the cost, and as 
such, transfers are more easily achieved between similar cultures. 
2.6.4 Shortcomings in the technology transfer literature 
Testing of Hofstede' s ( 1991) cultural variation dimensions have yielded mixed results 
in the literature. In a limited study focusing on two developed cultures - the United 
States and Japan - Herbig and Palumbo (1994) found the Hofstede scales adequate in 
discerning cultural variation and their influence on adoption behaviour. Lin and Berg 
(2001) however, using regression analysis, found the effects of cultural difference on 
technology transfer effectiveness to be insignificant. Further, Rubin (1993) in a much 
broader study of technology transfer from developed (Canada) to developing countries 
(primarily in Asia and Africa), used a composite measure of transfer success correlated 
with the differences between cultural scores (obtained from Hofstede's (1980) study) 
on each of the four dimensions. Based on this measure, the relationship between 
cultural match and transfer success, was only supported on the uncertainty avoidance 
dimension. 
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Kedia and Bhagat (1988) highlight the lack of reliable quantitative cultural variation 
measurement techniques (on both a societal and organisation level), stating "in future 
analyses, if more reliable and empirically anchored measures of such dimensions are 
available, one could use them also in addressing this issue of effectiveness of transfer." 
The problem is further exacerbated by the number of yet untested conceptual 
technology transfer models available in the literature. Such models are based on 
qualitative descriptors which are: (i) difficult to operationalise, and (ii) give no 
indication of how an interplay between different cultural, economic and sociopolitical 
factors will affect the transfer process. To illustrate this point, Souder and 
Padmanabhan (1989) view successful technology transfer "as a matter of identifying 
the prevailing barriers in each transfer situation, defining the appropriate system of 
promoters, and then manipulating these promoters to overcome the barriers." They 
then proceed to develop a probability of transfer success equation dependent upon the 
number of situational barriers and promoters. The problem with such an approach is 
that a. system of barriers and promoters have complex inter-relationships with each 
other, and changing one promoter may have indirect effects on a number of other 
factors. It is these secondary, indirect, interactive effects that remain unrecognised in 
the literature. 
Perhaps the single, most critical shortcoming in the technology transfer domain 
however, is its overtly unidimensional orientation (Geisler, 1993; Zhao & Reisman, 
1992). The problem was recognised by theorists as far back as Fischer (1976) who 
stated that "what would appear useful, however, is the consideration of behavioral, 
social and political variables as well as economic variables" in refining technology 
transfer models. Kedia and Bhagat (1988) again noted an "urgent" need for 
interdisciplinary frameworks to aid in theory development (above and beyond those 
that dominate the literature based solely on economic factors). Herbig and Palumbo 
(1994), in their studies of the adoption behaviours of the United States and Japan, 
noted that culture could explain between 33 and 65 percent of the observed variance in 
adoption. The remaining variation they attributed to external factors, which have their 
grounding in economic incentives, bureaucracy and political systems. They state that 
culture and these external factors "together must be analysed" to provide a total view 
of technology transfer. 
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The development of interdisciplinary models that are quantitative in nature, may act as 
powerful management decision and strategy tools. Existing models such as those 
highlighted above, suffer from a number of inherent limitations. Samli's (1985) 
General Model and Kedia and Bhagat's (1988) Cultural Constraint Model are both 
unidimensional, with the former ignoring variance due to cultural/social factors and 
the latter ignoring economic factors. Like these two models, the Transfer and 
Absorption Model proposed by Kingsley et al. (1996) is static in nature. It gives a 
broad and generic view of the impending transfer process, but it gives no indication of 
the conditions, methods and strategies that should be employed for the ensuing 
transfer. The development of an interactive and dynamic interdisciplinary model 
which can be used to quantitatively predict transfer difficulty and develop strategy 
prior to the transfer event is needed. Such a model, can be used as a pre-transfer 
assessment decision tool by corporate management. 
2.7 Impacts of Technology on Work 
The impact of technology on work is dependent on a variety of determinants which 
include the nature of technology and the organisational context under which it is being 
introduced (Liker at al., 1993). In a review of the literature relating to the "social 
impacts of technology'', Liker et al. (1999) noted four common conceptions from 
which the authors developed a contingency model of the impacts of technology, as 
shown in Figure 2.11. The definition of each of the factors which influence the 
impacts of technology in the model, vary across a number of different sociological 
paradigms. Lewis (1998) identified over 20 different paradigms, which essentially 
define the problem and how to analyse and solve the problem in inherently different 
ways. From a technology transfer and diffusion perspective, these paradigms are of 
the greatest interest. 
Each paradigm presents a different perspective - in terms of the importance of the 
individual and/or other organisational factors (such as culture) - to the determination 
of transfer success and subsequent diffusion. It is the individual's perception of how a 
new technology will impact not only on his/her working environment, but his/her 
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personal life, that is critical to the adoption decision. As such, it is important to 
consider the implications of each paradigm in terms of the contingency model shown 
in Figure 2.11. In generalised terms, the model indicates that the outcomes of 
technology are not only dependent on the technology itself, but also the organisational 
context and process of selection and implementation (Liker et al., 1999). 
Nature of Technology 
(What?) 
Organisational Context 
• Management philosophy 
• Organizational design 
• Labor relations 
• Culture 
• Organisational size 
Outcomes 
• Level of analysis 
(organisational, 
departmental, individual) 
t-----r------~~'------.....----..L • Business ~ ' ~ • Management control 
• Complexity 
• Autonomous vs. systemic 
Technology Selection 
Process 
(Why?) 
• Objectives 
• Decision Process 
• Interest e:rouns 
Implementation 
Process 
(How?) 
• Quality of work life 
• Employee Attitudes 
• Scope of implementation 
• Political interests 
• Power balance 
Figure 2.11: A contingency model of the impact of technology (adopted from Liker et al., 1999). 
The importance given to each of these factors dictates a particular paradigm. Liker et 
al. (1999) found that some researchers associated only the nature of technology with 
outcomes, while others associated additional factors such as the implementation 
process and some organisational characteristics including culture. In order to 
differentiate between the different paradigms, Liker et al. (1999) constructed a two-by-
two matrix based on two dimensions which form part of a continuum. Shown in 
Figure 2.12, the vertical dimension distinguishes between static and dynamic views of 
technology impacts. In static views of technology, the implementation process is 
considered inconsequential and outcomes are dependent on the technology and 
existing organisational context. Dynamic views on the other hand, highlight 
implementation as a complex process that occurs over time concurrent with social 
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processes of transformation. The horizontal dimension distinguishes between 
paradigms which have a large technology-centred focus, from those that focus on 
contextual factors (primarily social and cultural in nature). Liker et al. (1999) states 
that a paradigm concerned primarily with social context (such as the interpretivist and 
political interests paradigms) rates the organisational context of the firm as being equal 
to, or superior to, the technology. Each of the major paradigms, as defined in Figure 
2.12, are discussed briefly below. 
Dynamic 
Static 
Technology Focus Contextual Focus 
Figure 2.12: A multiparadigm view of technology impacts (adopted from Liker et al., 1999). 
2. 7 .1 Paradigms of technology impacts 
Technological determinism is a static, non-contextual traditionalist paradigm whose 
proponents believe that the right technology will lead to the right outcomes regardless 
of the organisational, social and cultural context. Theorists believe that the 
organisation must adapt to the technology, as the key. variable to which everything else 
is deferential. Liker et al. (1999) outline the propositions that reflect the technology 
determinist view: (a) technology is the solution to the problems organisations face, (b) 
advanced technology tends to drive organisational change in a democratic direction 
toward reduced management, and ( c) technology type determines the optimal 
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organisational design. The latter proposition is reflected by Perrow ( 1967) who argues 
that the "structure and goals [of an organisation] must adjust to technology or the 
organisation will be subject to strong strains." This is derived from an underlying 
belief that technology is an independent variable, whereas both organisational structure 
and goals are dependent variables. Gerwin and Kolodny (1992) state that 
technological determinism dictates that social systems will adapt to technical systems 
- "the work organization, the job designs, the organizational arrangements, the reward, 
and other support systems (i.e. the total social system) is then put in place to fit the 
technical solution and make up the total production system." 
Management of technology is a dynamic engineering based paradigm whose followers 
believe that the right technology design, in combination with the right implementation 
process, will lead to the right outcomes (Liker et al., 1999). Of central importance to 
this paradigm, is the belief that the process is predictable - a large emphasis being 
placed on strategic planning. This is based on an underlying assumption that 
technology adoption proceeds in a linear, sequential fashion delineated by stages, 
which can be precisely planned. Of equal importance is the adoption of an integrative 
systems perspective in relation to change, one which draws on an interdisciplinary 
field of inquiry (including management and systems theory, organisational behaviour, 
sociology, economics and political science). Sociotechnical Systems (STS) theory 
forms the foundation for this systemic approach (Majchrzak, 1997; Gerwin & 
Kolodny, 1992; Cohen-Rosenthal, 1997; Matthews, 1994). 
Developed by Emery and Trist (1960), STS theory advocates organisational design 
based on the following three tenets (Gerwin & Kolodny, 1992): (1) the organisation is 
an open system in continuous interaction with the environment, (2) the design of 
organisations is based on joint optimisation of the social and technical systems, and (3) 
there is choice in organisational design. This latter point rejects the idea espoused by 
technological determinists that the technological imperative dominates the design of 
work. Further, unlike technological detenninists which favour a Tayloristic approach 
to technology management (independent workers motivated by a system of rewards 
and punishment), STS theorists believe in increasing the interaction between system 
elements by worker participation in the planning and implementation of decisions 
(Walton & Susman, 1987; Liker et al., 1999). This may involve cross-disciplinary 
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teams that span hierarchical boundaries. A similar approach is adopted by other 
management of technology philosophies including human centred design and dynamic 
systems. 
In STS theory the type of technology and subsequent implementation revolve around 
supporting the individual and social system. Key issues before proceeding include 
consideration of design features to support ease of use, organisational learning, 
structure and behaviour. Implementation is considered in terms of training 
requirements, an appropriate reward and recognition system, and contingencies to stem 
the effects of middle management resistance (Liker et al., 1999). 
Interpretivism is a dynamic contextual approach which has become the dominant view 
of academics in relation to the impacts of technology on work (Adler, 1992). The 
interpretivist perspective has its roots in the social construction of reality and symbolic 
interactionism, arguing that specific features of a technology bring about new patterns 
of role interaction (Barley, 1986). Symbolic interaction is not exclusively concerned 
with the study of symbols, but is primarily concerned with the study of human 
meaning, which manifests itself in symbolic realms and associated actions. Thus 
symbolic interaction is primarily concerned with "how events and situations are 
interpreted through individual "sensemaking" processes. According to this 
perspective, human beings possess images of themselves that are shaped by 
meaningful interaction. These self-images influence how people assign meaning and 
how they eventually engage in meaningful action" (Prasad, 1993). Using symbolic 
interaction to understand technology change is a powerful way of comprehending not 
only how the individual develops meanings in relation to the technology, but how 
these crystallise into collective realities. 
The interpretivist perspective encourages open dialogue and negotiation as a 
prerequisite of technology change. Prasad (1993) proposes that technological 
symbolism is a result of both managerial activity and sociocultural influences, and as 
such open dialogue between managers and adopters can encourage the construction of 
positive symbolism early on in the implementation process. The interactionist 
supposes that the nature of technology is socially constructed and corresponds to the 
adopter's position and status in the social structure. Unlike the management of 
52 
technology perspective, interpretivism views the implementation process as being 
largely unpredictable and relies on a re-organisation of the negotiated order which 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988) use to define organisational culture. Liker et al. (1999) 
believe that the interpretivist perspective overall has the potential to increase 
understanding of how technology decisions are made and provides opportunity for 
"jointly developing the people and technology toward desirable ends." 
Political interests is a static, contextual approach whose proponents believe that 
people act and react according to static, predictable roles, which are determined by the 
organisational hierarchy and relative power. Work in this area stems from labour 
process theory, based on the writings of Karl Marx, whose central thesis rests in the 
introduction of new technology into the workplace to increase management control 
over craft and production workers (Dean et al., 1992). Braverman (1974) describes the 
central claims of the political interests paradigm: 
"The. mass of humanity is subjected to the labor process for the 
purposes of those who control it rather than for any general 
purposes of "humanity" as such. In thus acquiring concrete form, 
the control of humans over the labor process turns into its 
opposite and becomes the control of the labor process over the 
mass of humans. Machinery comes into the world not as the 
servant of "humanity,'' but as the instrument of those to whom the 
accumulation of capital gives the ownership of the machines. The 
capacity of humans to control the labor process through 
machinery is seized upon by management from the beginning of 
capitalism as the prime means whereby production may be 
controlled not by the direct producer but by the owners and 
representatives of capital." 
To this end, the introduction of new technology, is for the express purpose of wealth 
and control accumulation by management over the worker. This leads to the deskilling 
of work, increased monitoring of employee performance and an overall reduction of 
union influence and power (hence their support for this paradigm). Because of these 
supposed management motives, the workers are in a constant state of conflict with the 
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organisational hierarchy. Liker et al. (1999) characterises the organisation from a 
political interests perspective as being one in which worker-management 
communication, trust and morale are low, power is concentrated at the top of the 
hierarchy and the only means by which frontline workers can earn power is through 
knowledge, skill and/or union bargaining strength. 
2.7.2 The multiparadigm view and its meaning in the technology transfer domain 
Each of these major paradigms has implications not only in terms of the impact of new 
technology on work, but on the adoption decision and subsequent assimilation. It is 
the perception of the individual in relation to how a particular technology will impact 
on their working environment, that will form the basis of their adoption decision. As 
such, the paradigm through which implementation is undertaken, will moderate the 
individuals' perceptions and strongly influence their decisions to adopt. The 
technology diffusion literature has shown that social and managerial influences have 
an equivalent (if not greater) impact on the development of individual innovation 
perception than utilitarian and rational approaches. based on an objective assessment of 
technology features (Agarwal, 2000; Frambach & Schillewaert, 2002). This is the 
difference between interpretivism and determinism as approaches to technology and its 
implementation within the organisation. 
The introduction of new technology presents a complex social reality. Liker et al. 
(1999) states that "very different technologies are brought into very different social 
settings for very different reasons, often with completely opposing effects." As such, 
each paradigm offers, to some degree, benefits and weaknesses, in terms of the overall 
affect on technology transfer. Adopting a deterministic approach towards simple 
technology (such as a new machine tool) may adequately dictate its implementation. 
In the case of complex technologies, however - ones which have social, cultural and 
personal connotations - such an approach will probably prove unproductive. To this 
end, the interpretivist perspective is the only paradigm which does not oversimplify 
reality, accounting for both process (in terms of implementation) and context (in terms 
of the technology and other organisational factors). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
A synthesis of the innovation adoption literature, shows that the process of transfer and 
accompanying diffusion, is a complex phenomena. Researchers have contributed to 
the field in many and varied ways making the domain broad and difficult to 
systematise into a single complex theory or set of theories. This fragmented approach 
to research has resulted in several disparities in the understanding of the innovation 
adoption process, particularly within an organisational context. Consequently, many 
opportunities for further research exist. These opportunities have been emphasised in 
a review of three literature streams relating to the innovation adoption field -
technology diffusion, technology transfer, and the impacts of technology on work. In 
summary, the following areas have been highlighted as providing potential opportunity 
for increasing the overall knowledge and understanding of the innovation adoption 
field: 
2. 8.1 Traditional frameworks of technology diffusion lack explanatory power in an 
organisational setting. Such frameworks are unable to adequately explain the 
influence of managerial interventions, social, cultural and other organisational 
processes on the adoption decision. 
2.8.2 An overt focus by the technology diffusion literature on utilitarian and rational 
explanations of technology adoption (based on core characteristics of the 
technology), have also detracted from the explanatory power of traditional 
frameworks. An increased role for social learning theory is thus called for .. 
2.8.3 Cross-sectional research designs based in controlled environments have 
limited diffusion and transfer understanding, particularly in the area 
surrounding the social and cultural processes that influence the adoption 
decision. 
2. 8. 4 In an effort to determine the impact of secondary or indirect effects (such as 
managerial influences) on the secondary adoption decision, longitudinal 
research designs are needed. The increased understanding from such designs 
may lead to the development of management tools to aid in the diffusion 
process. 
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2. 8. 5 An increased understanding of international technology diffusion is needed. 
Specifically, little is known about cross-national differences in the 
determinants of technology adoption. 
2.8.6 Evidence in support of the effectiveness of Hofstede's scales in predicting 
adoption behaviour has been mixed and contradictory. More methods of 
measuring cultural variation on both a national and organisational level are 
required. 
2.8. 7 The bulk of the technology transfer literature is composed of conceptual 
models that are difficult to operationalise. Further, such models give no 
indication of how different cultural, economic and sociopolitical factors affect 
the transfer process. 
2.8.8 Research in the technology transfer domain has been overwhelmingly uni-
dimensional. The development of an interactive and dynamic interdisciplinary 
model which can be used to quantitatively predict transfer difficulty and 
develop strategy is critical. Such a model, can be used as a pre-transfer 
assessment decision tool. 
2.8.9 Such a model must take a multiparadigm view of the technology transfer 
process (as shown in Figure 2.13). The technology diffusion and transfer 
literature streams have indicated that social and cultural contexts are 
important. Therefore, a combination of the management of technology, 
interpretivist and political interests perspectives are needed for advanced and 
complex technologies. 
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Dynamic 
Static 
Technology Focus Contextual Focus 
Figure 2.13: Shaded area indicates the relative importance of the particular technology impact 
paradigm on the transfer process. 
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Chapter 3 ~Implementation Case Studies 
Research in technology management and transfer has primarily adopted a positivist 
tradition. The rationale which surrounds the researchers' overwhelming acceptance 
and use of positivism as the basis for their research methodology, is a belief that it is 
the best way to investigate human and social behaviour - especially within 
organisations. Research methodology grounded in positivism espouses the view that 
the social world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured through 
objective, cross-sectional methods (such as survey and formal interview), as opposed 
to being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition (Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991). The latter forms the basis of what is typically referred to as 
interpretivism or social contructionism and utilises longitudinal qualitative data 
collection methods such as ethnography and action research. This 'new paradigm' 
argues that reality is socially constructed rather than objectively determined. 
Consequently, the role of the researcher is not to gather facts and measure how often 
certain events occur, but to understand the different meanings and constructs 
individuals associate with external stimuli - in this case, the introduction of new 
technology. 
Key management areas including marketing, organisational behaviour and operational 
research have advocated an increased need for social constructionist methodologies 
encompassing field studies and action research (Meredith et al., 1989; Easterby-Smith 
et al., 1991). The innovation adoption field is another area where these techniques can 
be used to extend understanding and develop theory. Such opportunities exist in the 
examination of the affects of social, cultural and contextual factors on technology 
transfer and hence the adoption decision (see for example §2.8, summary points 2.8.1, 
2.8.2, 2.8.6, 2.8. 7 and 2.8.9). The research undertaken here employs a number of 
social constructionist methodologies including ethnography, participant observation, 
interview and action research to investigate how such factors influence the 
implementation and adoption of a new technology. The research is conducted within a 
58 
multinational automotive manufacturing organisation (Ford Motor Company) and is 
based on two case studies involving the implementation of a knowledge management 
system, called Simpress. To examine the effects of national culture on the transfer and 
adoption process (as per §2.8, summary point 2.8.5) the first case study was conducted 
within the organisation's Australian stamping operations (developed country) and the 
second within its Indian stamping operations (developing country). 
3.1 The Focal Technology - a Knowledge Management System 
The technological change at the core of these research case studies, encapsulates the 
development and implementation of a knowledge management system for automotive 
manufacture. Over the past decade, the adoption of knowledge management by 
organisations in the manufacturing industry has been rapid. The reasons for this are 
primarily centred around: 
(i) the growth of the global knowledge economy and the removal of existing trade 
barriers which protected organisations from international competition; 
(ii) the downsizing and global inter-organisational movement of experienced and 
skilled personnel to competing organisations (resulting in organisational 
knowledge loss); and 
(iii) the growth of advanced manufacturing design tools (such as CAD and FEA) 
which require high volumes of knowledge input to be effective (Cardew-Hall et 
al., 2002; Leake & Wilson, 1999). 
The adoption and practice of knowledge management is primarily a techno-social as 
opposed to techno-centric process. As such, the management of knowledge requires 
the integration of key organisational elements including people, culture, strategy, 
structure, processes and technologies (Thomas et al., 2001; Ruggles, 1998). The 
conversion of information into knowledge · requires human insight, experience and 
creativity - a process which cannot be entirely automated. Thus, knowledge 
management involves the management of people for the conversion of an individual's 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge and the interaction of these individuals with 
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the technologies that facilitate this process. Such is the basis of a Knowledge 
Management System (Gallupe, 2001). 
The organisational adoption of a knowledge management system necessitates a long 
return on investment relative to other complex technologies. Further, implementation 
involves changes to many key aspects of organisational functioning (Grover & 
Davenport, 2001), which include: 
• Strategy - 'How can knowledge enhance our business, how can we go about 
creating and utilising such knowledge and what are the processes which will 
facilitate this?' 
• Structure - 'How does our existing organisational structure support or inhibit 
knowledge transfer and the creation and embedding of knowledge, or what 
structural conditions do we need to create to support this?' 
• Technology - 'What technologies will support knowledge transfer and facilitate 
the use of knowledge in everyday organisational functioning?' 
• People/culture - 'How does our existing organisational culture support a 
knowledge management philosophy, or how do we create such a culture?' 
This last point is dependant on whether the organisation decides to adapt its knowledge 
management objectives to the existing culture or endeavour to reform the culture (De 
Long & Fahey, 2000). Consequently, an organisation has two primary implementation 
options, as detailed in Figure 3.1. The organisation can decide to: 
(i) use the existing people/culture to shape its knowledge management strategy 
thereby determining both the appropriate technology and structure; or 
(ii) implement a strategy to revolutionise its existing culture/people facilitated by the 
appropriate selection of both technology and structure. 
Some knowledge management practitioners believe that a change in organisational 
culture is a necessary prerequisite for the successful implementation of a knowledge 
driven philosophy (Damodaran & Olphert, 2000). This may not always be the case 
however, especially in innovative organisations which exhibit an open and team 
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driven culture. Further, some organisations may display a deeply ingrained culture 
that is knowledge adverse and emphasises the individual - in a worker versus 
management survival game. These organisations, which are typically large and exist 
in established industry sectors such as manufacturing, find that invoking a change in 
organisational culture requires massive effort over a prolonged period of time. 
Combined with a long-term return on investment this is a major inhibitor of 
knowledge management adoption. In addition, the manufacturing industry with a 
history of downsizing and redundancy faces additional barriers as they try to rebuild a 
culture of trust and valuing the individual (De Long & Fahey, 2000). 
~ Technology 
(i) People/Culture can Strategy rmines 
mold ~riate 
Structure 
~ Technology 
(ii) Strategy to People/Culture ac tated 
change ~ Structure 
Figure 3.1: The knowledge management implementation process 
3.1.1 Technological System Development 
The development and implementation of the Simpress system within both case study 
organisations, was the first knowledge management initiative of its kind. As such, 
management was not prepared to undertake radical cultural change and preferred 
instead to adopt a strategy of adapting the technology and structure to the existing 
culture and people (implementation option (i) in Figure 3.1). While it was realised that 
some cultural change had to occur to ensure assimilation, this was to be kept to a 
minimum. Within the Australian stamping plant, the basis for this decision stemmed 
from two other primary factors. Firstly, the original development and implementation 
was undertaken in the Australian organisation during a critical business period. 
Suffering from the effects of an economic downturn the organisation was preparing to 
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launch a new vehicle model whose market success was fundamental for the 
organisation's long-term survival. All organisational efforts were aimed at supporting 
this goal, and as such, the implementation of the knowledge management system was 
to have a minimal impact. Secondly, the implementation was a plant initiative and 
thus lacked the appropriate senior (or corporate) management support to effect 
significant cultural change. Previous experience has shown that a top down senior 
management support strategy is needed to effect the cultural change associated with 
knowledge management implementation process (ii) in Figure 3.1 (Purvis et al., 2001; 
Johannessen et al., 1999; Wigg, 1997; Damodaran & Olphert, 2000). Further, this 
need becomes critical in traditional industries such as manufacturing, which have a 
strong history of unionism. 
In spite of these potential obstacles, plant management decided to proceed with the 
development and implementation of the Simpress system. A clear need to capture and 
utilise the organisation's knowledge assets had become apparent as more than a decade 
of downsizing and outsourcing had resulted in significant knowledge loss. Prior to 
production development, the system had gone through a series of prototype 
refinements commencing in August 1998 with the installation of the first standalone 
prototype of the Simpress system (in the Australian plant as depicted in Figure 3.2). 
Using feedback from plant personnel and management, the prototypes were gradually 
refined to fit traditional work practices, organisational procedures and the specialised 
language used by stamping personnel. The in-plant consultation and system 
prototyping led to the identification of a number of core elements that a stamping 
knowledge management system, such as Simpress, should encompass (Pantano et al., 
2003; Cardew-Hall et al., 2002). These included: 
• Knowledge collection at the source. There are a large number of knowledge 
generation points across the stamping process, all of which involve problem 
description using specialised language. 
• Visually based. Stamping personnel are spatial and visual thinkers and thus 
require an image-based or geometric model approach to data representation. 
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• Job enhancement. In a stamping manufacturing operation, data collection is an 
overhead, thus the data collected must not only provide value to user, but 
demonstrate that the user's knowledge is valued. 
• Part/tool based. Stamping personnel associate knowledge with specific tools and 
parts, however, a means for the addition of process information to parts such that 
generic process issues experienced across multiple part sets can be recorded, is 
essential. 
• Simplicity. The majority of shop floor stamping personnel are only moderately 
computer literate, meaning that interface design and data input should be strictly 
controlled making use of check and drop down selections. 
• Modular approach. Since the system is to be adapted to existing culture and 
practice, multiple data entry methods and applications are required. Further, data 
should be stored centrally to allow global access across worldwide manufacturing 
operations. 
• Integration. The data entry methods and applications should complement existing 
work procedures, systems and management practice. 
1998 
Aug 
1999 2000 
System Prototyping & 
Technological Development 
May 
2001 2002 
July Sept Nov Present 
Figure 3.2: Simpress development and implementation timeline (Australian case study). 
T':"'o specific work practices were targeted for production development and 
organisational implementation of the first version of the Simpress system. These were 
captured in two self-contained modules based on the specific functional requirements 
dictated by each work practice. Together the modules constitute the core identity of 
the system whose major purpose is to capture information and knowledge at the shop 
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floor level (the source), and transfer this knowledge and information upstream in the 
automotive manufacturing process, to the designers and engineers responsible for the 
processes, tools and parts associated with the stamping function. Typically, 
experienced and skilled craftsmen, technicians and engineers intuitively understand the 
manufacturing envelopes associated with stamping tools. The aim of Simpress is to 
capture this tacit knowledge and make it available on an organisational level such that 
it can be incorporated into future designs. This has the potential to reduce new model 
launch lead times and reduce the costs associated with rectification of design errors 
later in the manufacturing process. Further, after successive generations of knowledge 
entry, Simpress has the potential to develop into an integrated stamping knowledge 
base which can be used globally to train new operators and craftsmen through the 
development of tool and part histories. These histories, which currently exist in the 
minds of experienced craftsmen and operators, constitute the stamping plant's most 
valuable knowledge asset. 
.From a functional perspective, the two modules which represent the Simpress system 
include: 
Future Model Improvement (FM!) 
The FMI module is designed to capture any repetitious problems/issues that shop floor 
stamping personnel may encounter during new model launch. In addition, any ideas 
personnel may have in relation to the improvement of tools, parts or processes can also 
be lodged as a FMI. Once the shop floor operator has electronically lodged the FMI 
through the Simpress system, it is sent to a central controller who assigns the FMI to a 
designer or engineer upstream in the automotive manufacturing process for actioning 
(as shown in Figure 3.3). It is the responsibility of the assignee to action the FMI such 
that the cycle of repetition is broken prior to the next model launch. This could be 
achieved for example, through the revision of organisational best practice or design 
standards to reflect the problem, issue or idea. The assignee then describes the action 
to be taken within the FMI, which after management approval, is returned to the FMI 
originator as feedback. 
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Issue 
The issue module uses an almost identical interface sequence to the FMI module. Its 
functionality and purpose is fundamentally different to the FMI module in two distinct 
ways: 
(i) Once the issue has been electronically lodged through the Simpress system, 
additional work (progress) may be added. This underscores the purpose of the 
module, which allows shop floor personnel to detail solutions/fixes to problems/ 
issues they may have in relation to a certain tool or part during new model 
launch. The solutions/fixes may take an extended period of time to implement, 
the functionality of the module allowing the shop floor operator to catalogue their 
progress. 
(ii) Upon closure of the issue it remams on the Simpress database for future 
consultation. This is in contrast to the FMI module which requires actioning and 
approval. 
Together, these two modules also constitute the plant's 'lessons learned' system. 
Prior to the designing of tools for an impending new model launch, the Simpress 
system is consulted to ensure that all previous model shop floor problems and issues 
are addressed at the less costly design stage. The Simpress system also incorporates 
searching and data extraction functions to facilitate this. 
returned for farther clarification 
Figure 3.3: FMI module system diagram 
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A further key outcome of the prototyping and in-plant consultation process, was a 
recognition that the existing paper-based systems, which had a similar function to both 
the FMI and Issues modules, were not used. Such systems were perceived as being 
non-value adding since the information contained within them was typically not 
processed or acted upon. While encouragement and reassurance was needed during 
the implementation phase to overcome this long standing perception, various 
technological features were incorporated into the Simpress system to aid in reducing 
these negative perceptions. The FMI process ensures that all stakeholders are 
informed of a Simpress entry. This is achieved through the use of electronic 
communication media such as automated email and message noticeboards. As the 
FMI progresses through each value adding stage, it can be monitored electronically by 
the originator until feedback is received. Further, the system is designed to 
complement organisational management practices by generating message reminders 
after pre-determined time periods of inaction, and sending review and progress reports 
to senior management on a periodic basis. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
When considering technology adoption, a clear distinction between the technology 
itself and the adopting individual's perception of the technology is needed. While the 
innovation adoption literature focuses heavily on the latter, paradoxically it continues 
to adopt research frameworks grounded in the positivist tradition when a social 
constructionist perspective is methodologically superior (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). 
Research using positivist cross-sectional designs are unable to correlate outcomes with 
dynamic innovation practices. Such intellectual shortcomings have been recognised 
by innovation researchers who concede that the majority of the literature consists of 
retrospective case histories which are conducted after the outcomes of innovation are 
known. These studies are biased by a priori knowledge of the success or failure of the 
focal innovation and dependent on the historical recollection of a select few, usually in 
senior management positions (Van de Ven & Rogers, 1988; Van de Ven & Poole, 
2000). 
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Further, since innovation is a process (as depicted in Figure 2.1), cross-sectional data 
lacks a necessary temporal dimension. Van de Ven and Rogers (1988) thus call for an 
intellectual shift towards what they term "process research" defined as "a type of data 
gathering and analysis that seeks to determine the time-ordered sequence of a set of 
events." Such research is qualitative in nature, has an interpretive or social 
constructionist grounding, and allows dynamic, chronological investigation of the 
relationships among variables. This is opposed to variance research, which is 
quantitatively oriented towards a single dependent variable such as adoption (Leonard-
Barton, 1980). Argyris (1985) has argued that new methods and skills of action 
science are needed to conduct the longitudinal real-time research required to 
understand the complexities associated with the organisational innovation process. 
Van de Ven and Poole (2000) have highlighted that such research in the past has not 
been possible because of a lack of organisational access and the need for prolonged 
researcher commitment. As a consequence, "very few processual studies of innovation 
in organisations have been conducted" (Van de Ven and Poole, 2000). 
In this respect, the longitudinal, action research undertaken here serves as a major 
contribution to the field of innovation. Conducted within a multinational organisation 
over a prolonged period, ethnographic techniques were employed to make real-time 
observations of the innovation process as it unfolded. This engendered the 
development of unique insights into the organisational, cultural and social subtleties 
that affected the implementation process from the dual perspective of both 
management and the worker. As Nidumolu et al. (2001) states, the use of interpretive 
research methods derived from ethnography "follow discovery oriented procedures 
that are particularly powerful in casting a new light on complex processes whose 
structure, dimensions and character are yet to be understood. This allows us to focus 
not just on everyday actions, but also to examine the specific actors and their actions 
embedded within the context of interest that create the actions we observe." 
The terms ethnography and participant observation are usually used synonymously 
(Burawoy et al., 1991). Anthropologists however, generally consider participant 
observation to be an ethnographic technique (Silverman, 2000; Dobbert, 1982; Ellen, 
1984; Fetterman, 1988; Werner & Schoepfle, 1987). Put simply, the term ethnography 
is the method of describing a social group or culture. It necessitates fieldwork 
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involving immersion in a culture over an extended period of time and is based on 
learning through social participation. The case study research undertaken here, is 
described as processual ethnography by Werner and Schoepfle (1987) and concerns 
the ethnography of social process - functionally and synchronically (or diachronically 
in this case). The fieldwork associated with traditional ethnography consists of a 
mixture of participant observation and interview. The following methods and 
techniques were employed to conduct both the Australian and Indian case study 
research: 
Participant observation 
Jorgensen (1989) states that the methodology of participant observation is "exceptional 
for studying processes, relationships among people and events, the organisation of 
people and events, continuities over time, and patterns, as well as the immediate 
sociocultural contexts in which human existence unfolds." Like the process of 
technology transfer and diffusion, participant observation is recommended for research 
problems that are concerned with human meanings and interactions viewed from the 
insiders' perspectives (in this case those faced with a primary or secondary adoption 
decision). The power of this methodology has its foundation in the insider's 
conception of reality (the introduction of new technology, or in this case Simpress), 
which is not directly accessible to outsiders and associated positivist research 
techniques. Jorgensen (1989) argues that insiders manage, manipulate, and negotiate 
meanings in particular situations (such as technology introduction), intentionally and 
unintentionally obscuring, hiding or concealing these meanings from the viewpoint of 
outsiders. Participant observation is an instrument used to uncover these concealed 
meanings, offering greater insight into the implementation process. 
The participant aspect of the participant observation methodology was achieved in 
both case studies using action research (detailed below). In each case, observation was 
conducted over the implementation period and into the assimilation phase of the 
transfer. In the Australian case, researcher entry into the plant involved multiple roles 
- mostly surrounding the typical function of a graduate engineer undertaking a variety 
of small tasks (none of which were associated with the implementation per se). This 
allowed the development of a comfortable degree of rapport, even intimacy, with the 
people, situations, and settings within which the impending action research 
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(implementation) took place. Due to locational and financial constraints the same 
level of researcher integration prior to implementation was not possible in the Indian 
context. In each case, to maintain access and unobtrusiveness, the researcher dressed 
like shop floor personnel, maintained shift hours, worked a variety of shifts and was 
physically located on the shop floor for the duration of each study. 
Participatory action research 
Selener (1992) defines action research as a "cyclical and on-going process of problem 
definition, data gathering, feedback to the client group, discussion of the data, action 
planning, action taking, and evaluation." In this sense action research is applied and 
oriented towards problem solving. Its nature requires a collaborative relationship 
between researcher and those who perceive the need for change (which in the case of 
technology transfer are the producer and receiver). Unlike traditional research 
approaches (including the exclusive use of participant observation), the researcher not 
only participates in the research, but in the implementation of results. In an 
organisational context, it is considered that both researcher and client (receiver) have 
knowledge and experience which can contribute towards the solution of the problem. 
Therefore, action research is a process of collaborative learning which consists of fact-
finding, changing the situation accordingly, and subsequent evaluation. 
Seror (1996) states that because most models of technology transfer have primarily 
focused on the technology, with little attention given to the "systemic adaptation of 
organisational culture and behavior," an action research approach to new technology 
implementation is necessary. Further, Van de Ven and Poole (2000) state that action 
research in a technology transfer context needs to be undertaken from a manager's 
perspective. They reason that without observing the innovating process from such a 
perspective, "it becomes difficult (if not impossible) [for a researcher] to understand 
the dynamics confronting managers who are involved in the innovation effort." This 
approach however, suffers from a critical. limitation - it fails to consider the 
perspective of the worker, or the secondary adoption individual. It is the dynamics of 
this perspective that are equally, if not more, important to the implementation process 
than that of management. In any event, without secondary adoption, there cannot be 
technology transfer. 
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The participatory action research undertaken here consists primarily of the following 
two characteristics (Selener, 1992): 
1. Action research is problem-focused and problem-solving oriented and develops 
practical knowledge. In each case the organisational problem was centred around 
the practical implementation of Simpress. The action research allowed the 
identification and analysis of problems relating to the implementation and the 
discovery and use of solutions to these obstacles. 
2. Action research is collaborative and the researcher is a change agent who 
becomes involved in the organisation under study. In each case the researcher 
acted as the change agent and so was directly involved in the implementation of 
the Simpress system. By its nature, action research emphasises a mutual 
dependence between the researcher and organisation, each of whom have specific 
skills, experiences and competencies which are important to achieving the 
change. Selener (1992) states that: 
"The members of an organisation are an important resource 
since they are likely to be in close contact with the 
problems under study. They are a significant source of 
knowledge and information and their collaboration may be 
a critical factor for the implementation of successful 
changes since they are aware of the kind of changes needed, 
and the resources to be invested. It also increases the level 
of responsibility and commitment of the members in the 
change process since the participants might be influential in 
the decisions of the changes to be implemented." 
Further, since the researcher acted as the change agent in each case, unbiased 
observation of the implementation process from both the managerial (primary) 
and worker (secondary) perspective was possible. As a change agent, the 
researcher was given access to both the managerial and worker forums that 
typically surround the implementation process. It is the social, cultural, political 
and bureaucratic subtleties which underline each of these forums, that determine 
the implementation dynamics of the transfer process. 
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InfOrmant interviews 
In an organisational context, some individuals are able to provide historical data, 
knowledge about interpersonal relationships and a wealth of information about 
everyday life in general (Fetterman, 1998). Such individuals are described in 
anthropological terms as informants and make rich interview sources. Identified by 
the researcher during the implementation process, informants representing various 
areas of both the managerial and worker groups were selected for interviewing. A 
cross-section of informants were identified, representing in some cases, members of 
the mainstream, informal (opinion) or formal leaders and boundary spanners. The 
interview format was open-ended allowing the informants to talk freely and express 
their opinions in a confidential setting. 
3.3 Australian Implementation 
The Australian implementation case study took place over a period of twelve months 
(beginning in May 2001, as depicted in Figure 3.2). The first seven months were 
occupied with the production development and implementation of the Simpress 
system. After official launch (in November 2001 ), the assimilation period was 
observed by the researcher for a further 5 months (ending in April 2002). The case 
study was undertaken within the Australian subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company -
Ford of Australia (FoA). 
3.3.1 Organisational overview 
Incorporated in 1925, the Ford Motor Company of Australia began manufacture of 
Model T cars, Model TT trucks and Fordson tractors in Geelong, Victoria. This was 
followed in 1926 by the establishment of major manufacturing/assembly plants in most 
other Australian states. Following cessation of vehicle manufacture to support war 
time production in 1940, FoA announced an expansion to its Geelong facilities 
enabling it to manufacture previously imported components such as wheels, axles, 
brakes and fuel tanks. Forced by other manufacturers such as General Motors Holden 
(GMH) to again increase locally manufactured content, FoA announced significant 
investment in an engine assembly facility and the acquisition of new larger body panel 
presses for its Geelong operations. With market share still continuing to fall relative to 
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its major competitor GMH, FoA announced its biggest investment in Australia to date. 
In 1958, it built the largest automotive assembly plant in the southern hemisphere in 
Melbourne, Victoria, located approximately 110 kilometres from its Geelong 
manufacturing operations. In addition, it upgraded its Geelong operations, expanding 
its foundry, casting and machining facilities (enabling it to make new six cylinder 
engines), and also modernising both the stamping presses and the tool room. This was 
followed in 1960 by the release of the first FoA Falcon. 
Today much of the infrastructure in the stamping area remains unchanged. Various 
waves of modernisation have involved the reconditioning of presses, incorporation of 
line automation and the purchasing of computer controlled machining equipment in the 
tool room area. The press area consists of twenty stampings lines, all of different sizes 
to accommodate the stamping of various automotive components. FoA designs, 
manufactures and assembles a single model - the Ford Falcon and its derivatives. The 
remaining Ford product range consists of imports from Asia, North America and 
Europe. This is in contrast to its 1952 operation, when the company was ass~mbling 
over 12 different models, which were designed in Europe or the United States and 
consisted primarily of imported components. The Ford Falcon gained prominence in 
1962 after production of the vehicle topped 100,000 units. Since 1972 the Falcon has 
been totally designed in Australia, with today's model (Falcon BA), comprising the 
seventh major body change to the Falcon brand. Achieving sales leadership in the 
years 1982 - 1997, the Falcon now ranks second and FoA third overall in a tough local 
market. Principal competitors include Toyota Australia and GMH, both of which 
manufacture and assemble cars in Australia. 
In 1984, FoA invested $69.1 million in the development and implementation of a 
CAD/CAM computer system for its Geelong operations (Tuckey, 2000). This enables 
the design and simulation of stamping tools to manufacture the over 400 stamped 
parts, which comprise the Falcon and its derivatives. Over 90 percent of these parts 
are stamped in the Geelong Press area. Together these functions define the stamping 
process - a key element of the automotive design, manufacture and assembly process, 
as shown in Figure 2.4. Stamping consists of seven key elements, the combination of 
which forms the four core departmental areas within the Geelong stamping plant : 
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1. Die process design - involves the planning and design of the multiple stamping 
operations required to manufacture a specified part. Part specifications are 
provided by product developers. Process design is completed by engineers and 
designers located in the Stamping and Structures Engineering area of the plant 
(S&SE). 
IL Die tool design - involves the design of the multiple stamping tools required to 
achieve the stamping operations specified by the process designer. Die design and 
simulation is completed by CAD designers located in the S&SE area of the plant. 
111. Die build - involves manufacture of the multiple stamping tools according to the 
die designers specification. A pattern of the tool is made and cast. The rough 
casting is then machined to exacting specifications and finish. Various 
mechanical elements are also added to the die according to its desired stamping 
operation. Die build is completed by skilled craft and tradesmen in the tool room 
area of the plant. Approximately 30 percent of the dies required for a new model 
are manufactured in the FoA tool room- the rest are manufactured by suppliers in 
Asia. 
1v. Die tryout - involves fine tuning the die for high volume production. In the 
majority of instances, the die which emerges from the die build area is not capable 
of producing a quality and accurately dimensioned part. The skilled craft and 
tradesmen in die tryout, modify the tool (in most cases without changing the shape 
of the stamped part) such that it is able to produce a stamped part within tolerance, 
sustainable over multiple production runs. Die tryout is completed in the tool 
room area of the plant. 
v. Production/die maintenance - involves the high volume production of stamped 
parts and the maintenance of associated dies. The smaller press lines (used to 
produce small structural components) are manual, requiring over 5 unskilled 
operators per line. The majority of the larger press lines (used to produce body 
and chassis parts) are now automated and require 3 to 4 semi-skilled operators per 
line. This is in contrast to the over 20 unskilled operators that were required when 
the line was operated manually. Die maintenance craft and tradesmen repair dies 
which break during a production run or require periodic maintenance to ensure 
stamped components remain within tolerance. 
vi. Sub-assembly - involves the high volume production of sub-assemblies made 
from a combination of stamped components. The majority of production in this 
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area is performed by semi-skilled operators who use automated welding and 
transfer robots to manufacture the sub-assemblies. Unskilled personnel also 
manufacture smaller structural sub-assembles manually. 
Current stamping production levels involve the processing of over 300 tonnes of sheet 
steel daily and the production of over 84,000 body and chassis sets annually. The 
assembly plant produces approximately 450 units per day which consist of a mix of 
Falcon base models and derivatives. 
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Figure 3.4: The FoA automotive design, manufacturing and assembly process. 
The organisation employs over 5,500 personnel, with 3,000 of these employees 
located in its Melbourne facilities. The remainder are employed within its Geelong 
operations with 838 hourly payroll and 157 salary personnel located within the 
stamping plant. All management and white collar workers are designated as salary 
personnel, while all blue collar shop floor workers are paid by the hour. The Geelong 
stamping plant operates 3 shifts on a 7 day per week basis. A payroll employee 
breakdown on a per shift basis across four key stamping plant departments is shown 
in Table 3.1. The ratio of female to male personnel is overtly in favour of the latter at 
around 90 percent. Further, approximately 45 percent are of non-Australian descent 
(either first or second generation) with the bulk originating from central and western 
Europe. 
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Table 3.1: Geelong stamping plant employee breakdown per shift (format: (female/male) total). 
N/S = Night Shift : D/S = Day Shift : A/S = Afternoon Shift 
N/S (12.00pm-7.30am) D/S (7.30am-4.00pm) A/S (4.00pm-12.00pm) Total 
Tool room (2/27) 29 (3/132) 135 (2/54) 56 (7/213) 220 
Press shop (2/36) 38 (l I/81) 92 (4/52) 56 (17/169) 186 
Die Maintenance (0/8) 8 (2/23) 25 (Oil I) I I (2/42) 44 
Sub-assembly (Oil) l (29/76) 105 (I6/26) 42 (45/103) I48 
3.3.2 Implementation context 
The prototyping and technological development period ended in the preparation of a 
proposal and associated costing for a plant-wide implementation of the Simpress 
system. A plant management meeting held in May 2001 approved the proposal 
(primary adoption decision) and production development programming began 
immediately (as depicted in Figure 3.2). A 'technology champion' was appointed by 
senior management to oversee the implementation and an official launch date -
November 21, was designated (marking the point at which the secondary adoption 
decision is made available). The role of the technology champion is to ensure any 
organisational obstacles encountered in the development and implementation are dealt 
with in a timely manner and also to give the technology an identity and importance 
within the organisation. Having previously identified the organisational processes the 
Simpress system would complement (hence ensuring minimal impact on culture and 
organisation), the die tryout and die maintenance areas were targeted as pilot shop 
floor implementation areas. A common technique for the introduction of new 
technology within the manufacturing industry, piloting the implementation of new 
technology in certain targeted areas has specific advantages. It allows management to 
assess both the implementation and technology on a smaller-scale before larger 
organisation-wide implementation. In particular cultures, this approach may create a 
technology pull through competition between intra-organisational areas. 
After pilot stage implementation, Simpress would be made available to the remaining 
stamping plant areas including die build, production and sub-assembly. The 
functionality of the Simpress system and in particular the FMI module, also meant that 
both die process and die tool design areas in the S&SE department would have to 
participate in the pilot launch. The designers and engineers from these areas of the 
stamping plant would be responsible for actioning the FMI' s submitted by shop floor 
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craft and tradesmen and providing feedback. Further, these same designers and 
engineers would use the knowledge captured in Simpress to enhance future model 
launches and hence needed to be familiar with the operation and functionality of the 
system. A users forum was established which consisted of various engineers, 
designers and shop floor craft and tradesmen from each of the pilot launch areas. The 
main aim of the users forum was to provide feedback to th€ production development 
team on various aspects of the system including interface design and operation. 
Meeting on a regular basis, the forum also acted to increase ownership of the system 
by promoting a sense of user involvement in the development of the technology - an 
infrequent occurrence in a manufacturing environment where technology is most often 
pushed onto the end user. 
Forum participants were encouraged to discuss the system and its development with 
their colleagues to broaden the scope of involvement and reduce the impact associated 
with technology introduction. To emphasise the involvement and ownership aspects 
of the implementat\on, the system (in various stages of development), was shown to all 
personnel in each of the pilot areas with feedback recorded and in most cases acted 
upon. The consequence of this extended involvement was a greater understanding of 
the system by prospective users before the official launch date and a greater sense of 
ownership. Work practices were developed around system use, and were documented 
and made part of the ISO 9001 plant operating system. System manuals were 
developed and training undertaken for all designated users (including designated area 
management), two weeks prior to launch. Contrary to the majority of technology 
previously implemented in the stamping plant, individual secondary adoption by shop 
floor users was on a discretionary basis. To promote secondary adoption, senior plant 
management support for the system was demonstrated by active campaigning to 
middle and lower level management. Discussion between the plant manager and users 
on the shop floor highlighted the organisational importance of the system. 
3.3.3 Data collection and analysis 
The fieldwork undertaken during the 12 month case study period utilised a mixture of 
action research and participant observation. Essentially the researcher was perceived 
as an employee {described by Easterby-Smith et al. 1991, as being appropriate when 
"the researcher needs to become totally immersed and experience the work or situation 
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at first hand"). After an entry period of 2 months during which the researcher 
undertook the role of a graduate engineer, adopting plant routines and dress, work on 
the Simpress implementation began. This assimilation period allowed workers and 
managers alike to identify the researcher not as an academic but as a work colleague. 
This created a powerful and rich dynamic between the researcher and organisation, 
allowing individuals to be quite frank in their thoughts and opinions in relation to both 
the Simpress system and the organisation as a whole. The researcher was 
subsequently made part of the implementation team, working closely with the 
'technology champion' to oversee the development and implementation process (in 
essentially a project management role). Employing an action research philosophy, the 
first task was to gain a greater understanding of the underlying culture in each of the 
pilot launch areas. This was achieved using participant observation techniques which 
included general and in-depth conversation with individual workers and lower-level 
management in the area, participation in area meetings, general observation and the 
completion of small tasks within the area itself. 
The general and in-depth discussion often delved into the individuals' perceptions of 
the Simpress system and their opinions in relation to its successful adoption. Based on 
this feedback, a strategy for implementation was developed (encompassed within a 
planning document), to best account for the barriers the system might face (this 
follows process methodology (i) as depicted in Figure 3 .1 ). The strategy involved 
some technological changes to the system itself, the drafting of new work practices 
and procedures, and a commitment by senior management to overhaul traditional work 
practices which had seen similar paper-based systems fail. The implementation plan 
was adopted by management and the 'action taking' aspect of the action research (as 
described by Selener, 1992) was enacted. The researcher's participative role meant 
observation in a number of situations and functions was possible. These included: 
i. attending senior management meetings to discuss implementation strategy and 
progress within each pilot area; 
n. coordination and negotiation between management and workers for resources, 
needs and wants; 
111. meeting with union officials and stewards to discuss the impact of the Simpress 
system upon members' work practices; 
77 
1v. identification of area opinion leaders and discussion of system perceptions; 
v. development of training schedules and training programmes with the training 
department; 
vi. demonstration of the system during vanous stages of development to senior 
management and various worker groups. 
Daily observations were recorded by the researcher in a field notebook at the end of 
each working day. Field notes were collected on a daily basis beginning just before 
the primary adoption decision, extending through the implementation period and 
ending one month after the launch of the system. Field notes were then collected on a 
weekly basis for the remainder of the assimilation period (ending in April 2002). 
Owing to the prolonged nature of engagement, ethical considerations were dealt with 
in several ways. All observations were conducted overtly, in full view of 
organisational members. The researcher's background was disclosed upon entry to 
the organisation and was made public upon questioning by organisational individuals. 
At all times senior organisational management was aware of the research being 
conducted and the methodology used to collect data. All interviewing was conducted 
with the express prior permission of direct management and the consent of the 
individual. Permission was also sought before corporate and company confidential 
documentation was viewed, cited and copied. 
During the process of daily observation and discussion, informants were identified 
from each of the pilot implementation areas. To supplement observational field notes, 
these informants were invited to an interview session conducted in March 2002 ( 4 · 
months following system launch). In total, ten informants were identified - a mix of 
both workers and lower/middle-level management. All interviews were open-ended, 
the majority running for a duration of 1.5 hours, allowing informants to express their 
opinions in relation to the Simpress implementation, its assimilation and any general 
opinions in regards to the performance of the organisation in relation to past 
technology and innovation implementation. The interviews were conducted within 
the plant by a third party independent interviewer and were not taped. Notes were 
made during the interview, and directly following the session, expanded into greater 
detail. Informants were identified by the researcher as either a person who possessed 
significant organisational insight, a person with significant organisational experience, 
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an opm1on leader, or a person intimately associated with the Simpress 
implementation. 
A grounded theory methodology was used to analyse both the field notes and 
interview transcripts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). 
Application of the methodology involves the systematic analysis of qualitative data to 
develop themes, patterns and categories. Data analysis was undertaken in four 
sequential steps: 
1. Familiarisation - field notes and transcripts were re-read. 
2. Reflection - the data contained within the field notes and transcripts were framed 
in terms of previous research, models and ideas (such as those outlined in 
Chapter 2) 
3. Conceptualisation - concepts were formulated using open coding of field notes 
and transcripts. Concepts are important for understanding the situation and relate 
to how individuals view an issue (in this case technology implementation). For 
example, concepts for innovation adoption could include Rogers' (1995) 
innovation characteristics, such as compatibility, complexity and so on. 
4. Cataloguing - once it had been established that the identified concepts were 
important to an individual or groups explanation of technology implementation, 
these concepts were catalogued. For example, the concepts compatibility and 
complexity were catalogued under the category 'innovation perceptions'. 
3.3.4 Organisational structure and culture 
The case study allowed the researcher to gam an understanding (through both 
observation and participation) of the culture which describes the plant. To place 
codified and catalogued observations from the Simpress implementation in context, an 
understanding of the culture and work life within the plant is necessary. 
Qualitative description of organisation 
The organisational structure within the stamping plant has remained unchanged for 
decades and is exceedingly hierarchical. This creates a distinct culture within the plant 
made apparent by the gross differentiation between management and the worker. The 
result is an overwhelmingly negative view of management by shop floor blue collar 
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workers and a consequently ingrained culture characterised by a unionised workforce 
in continual conflict with management (somewhat reminiscent of English stamping 
plants in the late 1960's and 1970's such as Halewood and Dagenham). The 
management culture is heavily political and bureaucratically driven by a performance 
evaluation system based on limited objectives. Management consists of a dual mix of 
university graduates (with those in senior positions having joined the company in the 
late 1980's, early 1990's), and others who have managed to make a transition to 
management from the shop floor (primarily based on experience). Typically older 
than their graduate colleagues, these managers on average reach department 
management level before career progression is halted (due to a lack of educational 
qualifications and a company preference towards graduates). 
In 1997 the lean manufacturing paradigm was introduced to the stamping plant 
through the implementation of the Ford Production System (FPS). Similar to the 
Toyota Production System, it utilises lean manufacturing principles such as Just In 
Time, In Station Process Control, Kanban, Quick Die Changeover and so on. Its 
implementation revolutionised the operating systems within the plant, but the cultural 
and structural transformations which are meant to accompany the lean exemplar, have 
remained largely umealised. The result has been mixed confidence and minimal 
commitment toward the system by shop floor workers. A key aspect of the FPS, is the 
structuring of workers in associated areas into small units named 'Natural Work 
Groups' (or NWG's). These groups are essentially self-governing, the philosophy 
surrounding their introduction being one of greater empowerment and participation in 
organisational decision making. Each group holds regular meetings to discuss 
performance and problems/issues within their area. A leader for each NWG is 
democratically elected by its members (subject to union and management approval). 
The leader's basic function is to coordinate the group and serve as a conduit between 
the group and management. The organisational structure is thus a two-layer worker 
structure encased by a top-heavy management structure as shown in Figure 3.5. 
The introduction of NWG's was accompanied by the development of another and 
perhaps unexpected cultural phenomena. Individual workers began to view their 
identity in the organisation as being bound to the NWG, and as such, the groups have 
become political and competitive entities having an overall negative impact on 
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organisational performance and productivity. Management has used the competitive 
and political characteristics of NW G's to speed past technological implementation, by 
introducing technology to certain (more powerful) work groups, hence creating a 
competitive pull among the remaining groups. Overall however, the NWG's have 
become insular, failing to communicate with other units in the same area and perhaps 
more problematic, between shifts. The sharing of information between groups and 
areas has been reduced as individual work groups seek organisational recognition. 
Further, individual workers within the NWG's seem to have lost their identity -
decisions made by the group (often predominated by a select few - the opinion 
leaders), being enforced through fear of ostracism. The individual worker however, 
feels protected from management and comfortable within the NWG environment. 
Senior Management 
Figure 3.5: FoA stamping plant organisational structure. 
During the early 1990's the stamping plant went through a period of downsizing and a 
number of experienced personnel were made redundant. This had a largely negative 
impact on the culture of the organisation, reinforcing the lack of trust in management 
and low overall morale which exists between workers on the shop floor. The abolition 
of the plant recognition system for worker contribution has had a severe impact on 
productivity and workplace improvement. Compounded by instances where 
recognition was not properly accorded to individuals for productivity improvement 
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ideas, many individuals have adopted a "leave your brain at the gate" mentality. In 
general, relations between management and the shop floor workers can be 
characterised as a survival game where each side tries to take advantage of the other, 
with the lowest possible investment of resources and sacrifice. 
Demographics within the worker group can be divided into three distinct catego!ies, 
based on both age and years of organisational service. The first category are the 
younger workers (category Y) who entered the organisation during or subsequent to 
the downsizing of the early 1990's. Aged between 17 and 30 years, category Y 
constitutes approximately 25 percent of the overall workforce and is characterised by 
an average organisational service of 5 years. Category Y is generally more innovative 
than the remaining two categories, a result of their constant exposure to technology, in 
particular IT, during their education. The second category is the middle aged workers 
(category M), aged between 31 and 45 years. They form the largest group constituting 
approximately 40 percent of the overall workforce and characterised by an average 
organisational service of 1 ~ years. Over 60 percent of category M commenced 
employment with FoA between the ages of 17-20, and have thus been with the 
company for the majority of their working life. Workers in this category are 
accustomed to organisational norms, are familiar with policy and procedure and 
generally convey a negative opinion of management and organisational operation. 
Category M workers are content with their position within the organisation, a 
consequence of both protracted and limited organisational career paths, and an 
acceptance of the organisation's preference for university graduates in management 
roles. Many in this category view ascension to a management position (the only viable 
career progression) as duplicity. The last category constitutes the senior workers 
(category S), aged between 46 and 65 years. They constitute the remaining 35 percent 
of the shop floor workforce and have been most affected by the earlier organisational 
downsizing which resulted in the retrenchment of a large number of colleagues. 
Average organisational service for this category is 30 years, with over 60 percent of 
the workers having been employed for 30 years or more commencing employment at 
17-20 years of age. Collectively, they are pragmatic and hold strong opinions of 
management, many of which are grounded in the repressive dictatorial culture 
prevalent in the plant during the late 1970's and early 1980's. 
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Although they are considered the least innovative category, they are highly 
experienced and knowledgeable, many having performed the same job function for 
several years. They are extremely influential over category Y and to some extent 
category M workers, acting as opinion leaders, mediators and facilitators within their 
work groups. They feel threatened by the innovators within both categories Y and M 
who they perceive as a danger to their continued employment and organisational 
worth. Category S workers are particular dominant over their younger counterparts. 
From a pedagogical perspective, category Y workers look to their senior colleagues for 
guidance and know-how. Consequently, culture, social norms, traditions and both 
techniques and methods of working used for decades are directly passed on to another 
generation of workers. This can negate an organisation's efforts to innovate, 
modernise its culture, and adopt new work practices. 
The management culture within the plant is predominated by an overt focus on career 
progression. This dictates a result driven ethos based on qqantitative performance 
measurables such as production output, profit and return on investment. Annual 
management performance is graded on a limited and narrow set of measurables which 
are given priority (to the detriment of other 'extra organisational initiatives'). 
Globally, the company has a human resource policy based on the individual 
development of a broad skill set which has resulted in a exceptionally high 
management turnover rate. These factors combine to yield a management culture 
focused primarily on the individual and the production of short-term results. This 
short-term perspective combined with strict budgetary and resource constraints, has 
resulted in the isolation of departments as managers try to protect assets and resources 
and seek recognition within an inter-departmental competitive environment. A strong 
management-union dynamic also exists within the plant. The majority of workers 
have strictly defined work patterns and any deviation to this regularity by management 
is met immediately by union claims for increased remuneration. 
Quantitative validation 
Quantitative survey data to validate the above qualitative cultural observations can be 
obtained from two sources. On an annual basis the plant conducts attitudinal and 
behavioural surveys to evaluate the performance of the FPS. The NWG Satisfaction 
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Survey (SS) is given to all shop floor workers and asks them to answer questions 
relating to different aspects of work and group functioning. The survey uses a five 
point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The results for both the 
2001 and 2003 surveys are presented in Table 3.2, and show the percentage of 
respondents (in press shop and tool room) who answered either: agree or strongly 
agree. Similarly, the FPS Behaviour Survey (BS) is given to all shop floor workers 
and uses a four point scale (strongly agree: agree: disagree: strongly disagree). The 
results for the 2003 survey are presented in Table 3.3, and like the NWG SS, show the 
percentage of respondents who answered either: agree or strongly disagree. 
Respondents for the FPS BS include tool room and press shop operators, S&SE white 
collar engineers and designers, and an aggregate category for stamping plant 
maintenance operators in general. 
There is an immediate and clear distinction between the responses given by office 
based engineers and designers in the S&SE department and other shop floor 
departments. Respondents in S&SE answered more favourably to all questions in the 
FPS BS with large differences between responses (see for example question 5, 14, 17, 
19 and 23). This indicates a distinction in the perception of both organisation and 
work environment - individuals from the S&SE department are, on average, more 
content and satisfied with their surrounds. Shop floor workers however, have become 
less satisfied with the support provided by S&SE to their work (SS question 14). A 
key outcome of Simpress system prototyping, shop floor workers continually 
commented on the lack of communication between shop floor departments and S&SE. 
This was precipitated through a general lack of interest by engineers and designers in 
the performance of the stamping tools and processes they had designed. As a 
consequence, there is a general perception among both craft and tradesmen, that 
engineers and designers in the S&SE department exist in a "ivory tower." 
While job satisfaction remained on average above 50 percent (SS questions 5 - 7), 
personal satisfaction and morale among workers was extremely low (SS questions 1 -4 
and BS question 1). In particular, the work environment and organisation is such that 
between 65 and 70 percent of shop floor workers do not "look forward" to coming 
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Table 3.2: FoA NWG Satisfaction Survey results for 2001 and 2003 (result indicates percentage of 
respondents who answered either: agree or strongly agree). 
Questions 
Approximate Sample Size (number of respondents) 
2 
3 
4 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I feel valued as an employee of Ford Motor Company 
I am satisfied with Ford Motor Company at the present 
time 
My work gives me a feeling of personal accomplishment 
I look forward to coming to work 
I can be open with people in my group 
The members of my work group listen to each other's 
opinions 
In my work group, members participate in making 
decisions 
Other work groups cooperate with my work group to 
complete tasks 
Plant management actively encourages my work group to 
function effectively 
Union leadership actively encourages my work group to 
function effectively 
Engineering provides an adequate level of support to my 
work group 
I have the necessary tools and equipment to be an 
effective work group member 
I am satisfied with information I receive from 
management on what's going on in our plant 
My supervisor does a good job keeping me informed 
Communication between shifts in my department is good 
Members of my work group clearly communicate with 
each other 
Our work group receives feedback on our objectives, 
goals and activities 
The Ford Production System is 
employees and Ford Motor Company 
Press Press Tool 
2001 (%) 2003 (%) 2001 (%) 
55 40 65 
50 50 31 
42 55 36 
52 58 49 
33 34 16 
84 68 69 
74 53 67 
72 50 63 
30 39 19 
39 18 22 
33 32 21 
34 26 14 
54 53 33 
37 39 27 
51 47 33 
32 39 30 
64 68 65 
40 29 25 
Tool 
2003 (%) 
55 
51 
53 
57 
32 
77 
64 
68 
26 
42 
28 
19 
51 
51 
49 
36 
68 
40 
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Table 3.3: FoA FPS Behaviour Survey results for 2003 (results indicate percentage of 
respondents who answered either: agree or strongly agree). 
Questions Press Tool S&SE Operator 
Approximate Sample Size (number of respondents) ~ 53 .. ,, .. " lf:PIBJWIMiAi,; .· ,, .,, .·~~''' ·< .. ) ·:.: ,.,~t"'!JW'., '.j ·L': 
I People are treated with dignity and respect 56.1 47.6 81.3 46.0 
2 People contribute openly in the meetings I attend 50.9 47.6 87.5 43.8 
3 People admit mistakes 28.1 28.6 50.0 25.0 
4 People can participate in decisions about their work 56.1 38.1 87.5 45.8 
5 Before making decisions, people gather information 40.4 33.3 75.0 41.7 
6 
Positive contributions to the plant's business are publicly 33.3 19.0 43.8 25.0 
recognised 
7 
People focus on the problem (instead oflooking for 
36.8 14.3 43.8 27.1 
someone to blame) 
·· (:oN€fINUo~stt~~ .. 
. ~ ~'~~fliktg:t.i ... .. •/'/ . . •. f". ;;.·;• .. ~ . '" •.. :,:·r, '; ....... .••}·:· .· •.' 
8 People share ideas and knowledge 64.9 52.4 81.3 56.3 
Plant leadership (union and management) are on the plant 
9 floor daily to provide assistance and improve the 43.9 33.3 37.5 35.4 
business 
10 People are coached and trained by their 52.6 38.l 68.8 41.7 leaders/supervisors 
II 
People are encouraged to improve their knowledge and 64.9 42.9 81.3 47.9 
skills 
12 People are encouraged to search for and discuss problems 49.l 42.9 50.0 37.5 
13 
When looking to make improvements, people look how 36.8 38.l 68.8 29.2 
the improvement impacts other areas 
14 People from outside areas help to solve problems 28.l 14.3 68.8 22.9 
15 People ask for and offer help with their jobs when needed 57.9 47.6 81.3 47.9 
'~)lOCi.SSJ\NDRE~tlL,TSD\U~i\I~:;. ···\1:! ;~}if'· ::1 ~·i:· . Hl~;:i:~ '.!!~;:~~:) ~>. .. ·
•\•' 
16 People follow the established work procedures 38.6 38.l 62.5 29.2 
17 When things go wrong, people respond rapidly 56.I 47.6 93.8 47.9 
18 People look for ways to improve their work 61.4 57.l 87.5 54.2 
19 
People can see how their job fits in with the overall goals 45.6 19.0 81.3 35.4 
of their organisation 
20 Decisions are made on a timely basis 43.9 28.6 62.5 27.l 
21 Decisions are based on fact (instead of opinion) 38.6 33.3 50.0 29.2 
22 
Decisions are made to eliminate the problem completely 22.8 19.0 43.8 16.7 (not the quick fix) 
23 People deliver what was promised 26.3 23.8 62.5 16.7 
to work on a daily basis (SS question 4) and many operators fail to understand how 
their jobs contribute to the overall organisation (BS question 19). In terms of NWG 
satisfaction the majority of group members indicate that they are comfortable within 
the group environment, able to be open and contribute their opinions (SS questions 8 -
10 and 21). As expressed previously, cooperation with other work groups, both 
between shifts and across departments, remains low (SS questions 11 and 20). This 
extends to problem discussion and solution among groups (BS questions 8 and 12 -
14). Further, shop floor workers feel that collectively, both management and union do 
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not adequately support the functioning of the NWG (SS questions 12 - 13 and BS 
question 9). This does not however extend to immediate supervisors in lower level 
management (SS questions 16, 17 and 19). Often these supervisors have come from 
the shop floor and are former colleagues which means workers have a higher level of 
trust and respect for this level of management. Shop floor workers are also aware that 
often such supervisors are placed in awkward and difficult situations having to act as 
negotiators between senior management and work groups (with whom they have to 
work on a daily basis). 
The information and communication flow throughout the plant remams low (SS 
question 18). Shop floor workers feel that management is secretive and selective in 
communicating information and as a result, social networks on the shop floor are ideal 
for spreading rumour, hearsay and opinion. The effects associated with the abolition 
of the plant reward and recognition system are evident in results to SS questions 23 
and 24, and BS question 6. On average over 75 percent of shop floor respondents feel 
that. both individuals and work groups are not being acknowledged properly for their 
ideas and contributions. This has a stifling affect on plant productivity improvement 
since there is no mechanism to encourage worker creativity and knowledge 
application. Workers' views on the FPS (SS question 25) indicate that although the 
system may shape the operation of the plant (dictating work flows), the underlying 
philosophy of lean manufacturing (being one which encourages worker :flexibility and 
participation), has failed to significantly permeate the existing traditional and 
embedded culture. Further evidence of this, is seen in shop floor operators' responses 
to BS questions 2 and 4. 
Plant culture precipitates a fear of reprisal for the admission of mistakes (BS question 
3). This aspect of culture has a negative impact on the successful operation of 
knowledge collection systems (such as Simpress) which rely on the documentation of 
mistakes for future organisational learning and improvement. Consequently a 'blame 
culture' has developed, where individuals seek to censure others, instead of 
collectively discussing the problem, learning and taking action (BS question 7). A 
lack of management involvement on the shop floor (BS question 9), has meant that 
established work procedures are not adhered to, individuals instead seeking shortcuts 
or using traditional methods of work (BS question 16). Shop floor operators believe 
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that the company is slow and lethargic to respond to problems and issues (BS question -
17), which is perhaps a result of the organisational decision making process 
(characterised as slow, based on opinion and short-term solutions (BS questions 20 -
22)). This is a consequence of the short-term outlook and management performance 
evaluation systems prevalent throughout the plant. Further, around 80 percent of shop 
floor workers believe that colleagues and management are unable to deliver on 
promises, exacerbating the lack of trust and integrity which exists within the plant (BS 
question 23). 
3.3.5 Codified observations 
The codified and catalogued observations presented in Table 3.4, are the results of the 
implementation case study presented in chronological order (or as close as possible). 
Primary and secondary adoption decision determinants, identified in Figure 2.5, were 
used for categorisation during the cataloguing process. The table presents a 
description of the observation, followed by the concepts it represents and the category 
used for cataloguing. 
1 
2 
3 
Table 3.4: Australian implementation case study observation results. 
(* n/a - indicates observations that have no direct influence as decision determinants) 
The system prototyping and technological development 
period (Figure 3.2), utilising extensive in-plant consultation 
(prior to the primary adoption decision), demonstrated the 
benefits and potential of the Simpress system to plant 
management. This had a positive influence on the primary 
adoption decision. 
Organisational downsizing in the early 1990's, resulted in an 
extensive loss of shop floor knowledge assets (the most 
pronounced coming from a loss of category S workers). 
Plant management therefore, recognised the significance of 
knowledge and experience (especially within categories M 
and S) and wanted to capture and harness these assets for 
organisational posterity. This had a positive influence on 
the primary adoption decision. 
FoA exists in a tough local market and faces increasing 
competition globally. Any new technology which may 
induce a competitive advantage through increased quality or 
productivity is seriously considered. Accordingly, 
management believed the Simpress system was capable of 
trialability, relative 
advantage 
I 
innovation 
characteristics 
rate of technical 
change, 
organisational size 
I 
environmental 
influences, 
adopter 
characteristics 
competitive pressure, 
risk reduction, 
interconnectedness 
I 
environmental 
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delivering reduced launch lead times and costs relative to its influences, 
local competitors. This had a positive influence on the social network 
primary adoption decision. 
4 System prototyping and technological development was image, 
closely followed (and to some degree funded) by the parent management attitude 
organisation in the United States. Thus management in I 
Australia felt obligated to implement the Simpress system. innovation 
If the system proved successful, management would be characteristics, 
adopter 
viewed 'favourably' by senior corporate management in the 
characteristics 
United States. This had a positive influence on the primary 
adoption decision. 
5 The economic investment required to implement the system complexity, 
is considered high by management for two main reasons: innovativeness 
(i) a long return on investment (relative to the short-term I 
outlook dictated by plant management cultural norms); innovation 
and characteristics, 
(ii) the system has no real tangible outcomes which can be adopter 
characteristics 
economically justified (not with any accuracy). 
This had a negative influence on the primary adoption 
decision. 
6 An exceptionally high management turnover rate (during the organisational size, 
system prototyping and technological development period) organisational 
resulted in a delayed adoption decision. Over 4 changes in structure 
senior plant management during this time, meant additional I 
effort was required to demonstrate the philosophy and adopter 
characteristics 
benefits associated with the system to each successive wave 
of management. This had a negative influence on the 
primary adoption decision. 
7 During the implementation period, it was difficult to obtain n/a * 
both commitment and organisational resources from various 
department and lower level managers. The problem 
stemmed from an underlying belief by such managers, that 
the implementation was not a serious organisational 
initiative. The situation was resolved through the 
involvement of the technology champion who in some 
instances was also forced to engage the plant manager. 
8 The technology champion assisted in overcoming the n/a * 
organisational politics prevalent in management. The 
champion constantly reminded management of its 
commitment, support and resource availability at high level 
meetings. The simple act of adding the champion's name to 
an email message (addressed to lower and middle 
management for example), meant an immediate response 
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followed by action. This had a positive influence on the 
implementation. 
9 Shop floor individuals involved in the development of the user participation, 
system, had a much more informed opinion of its potential innovation 
which they disseminated to others within their NWG. This perceptions, 
had two possible effects on adoption: interconnectedness 
(i) if their perceptions were positive, then this had a I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
positive influence on secondary adoption (for them and 
organisational 
others within their social network); or facilitators, 
(ii) if their perceptions were negative, then this had a social influences 
negative influence on secondary adoption. This became 
especially detrimental as they expressed their opinions 
to others, and more so if they were viewed as opinion 
leaders within their group. 
10 Some shop floor individuals viewed management support of organisational 
the Simpress system as non-genuine. They perceived some culture 
managers as using the system and its implementation as a I 
"stepping stone" to further their career progression. This beliefs & attitudes, 
was indicative of lower and middle level management (as managerial 
interventions 
well as some department managers) and highlighted the 
need for management support at an appropriate level (refer 
to Obs. #21 for example). Overall, this had a negative 
influence on secondary adoption. 
11 The training given to shop floor workers was not of an education and 
appropriate level. As such individuals felt uncomfortable training 
using the system after the training session. Workers instead I 
preferred continual and repeated training sessions in their organisational 
actual environment (on the shop floor) as opposed to in a facilitators 
classroom. This had a negative influence on secondary 
adoption. 
12 The training sessions allowed shop floor workers to innovation 
comprehensively view and use the system for the first time. perceptions, 
This allowed them to gain an understanding of the system organisational 
and the benefits of applying it to their work. While the culture, 
workers were satisfied with the system from a technological management support 
I 
perspective, they conceded that "as is always the case, we beliefs & attitudes, 
will not be given the time or resource to use the system" managerial 
(see Obs.# 22). This had a negative influence on secondary interventions 
adoption. 
13 A large proportion of previous technology implementations innovation 
had failed to materialise (especially in relation to IT). This negativism, 
was primarily the result of shrinking commitment and organisational 
importance by management after implementation. These culture 
I 
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14 
15 
16 
17 
past experiences have lead to the development of an overall 
negative perception of technology implementation. This 
was especially pronounced in worker categories M and S. 
This had a negative influence on secondary adoption. 
System prototyping and development was undertaken by 
university academics (based in the plant environment). This 
occurred over an extended period of time (as depicted in 
Figure 3.2). Both of these factors resulted in a negative 
influence on secondary adoption because: 
(i) a negative perception towards university academics 
exists among shop floor workers; and 
(ii) the protracted prototype development created a 
perception of incompetence and organisational 
indifference. 
The shop floor manufacturing environment often presents a 
range of conflicting work priorities (for supervisors and 
associated workers). The result is that workers fail to realise 
the potential of the system in the critical period following 
launch. As time goes by, both the organisational visibility 
and use of the system is reduced and secondary adoption 
becomes less likely. This had a negative influence on 
secondary adoption. 
Strong routinisation of work patterns passed on from 
generations of previous workers, dominates the shop floor 
culture. These patterns dictate a worker's function and thus 
attempting to implement new modes of work is exceedingly 
difficult (especially among category S workers). The 
application of indirect pressure down the organisational 
hierarchy (known as 'coaching') was necessary to provoke 
and initiate use of the system. 
A strong NWG culture stifles the expression of individual 
beliefs and innovativeness. Workers take pride in both 
being a member of the group and in its success. The 
prevailing group mentality however, was not favourable to 
system adoption because individuals were forced to adopt 
group perceptions and opinions at the expense of their own. 
This was especially detrimental for workers which have a 
high natural innovativeness. The problem was further 
exacerbated by the intimate communication networks which 
exist among work groups. Thus, negative perceptions in 
relation to the system held by more influential work groups 
have the potential to spread rapidly to other groups. This 
may result in a negative influence on secondary adoption if 
beliefs & attitudes, 
situational influences 
organisational 
culture, 
development timing 
I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
situational 
influences, social 
influences 
organisational 
culture, 
management support 
I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
organisational 
facilitators, 
managerial 
interventions 
organisational 
culture, 
management support 
I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
managerial 
interventions, social 
influences 
innovativeness, 
organisational 
culture, 
interconnectedness 
I 
personal 
characteristics, 
beliefs & attitudes, 
social influences 
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perceptions are likewise negative. 
18 Workers within category S, are in general less innovative, innovativeness, 
more traditional in nature and suffer from greater innovation organisational 
negativism than their colleagues. They also act as opinion culture, innovation 
leaders and have a strong influence on workers from negativism 
category Y. Realising that they are not capable of I 
personal 
assimilating new technology as fast as their younger 
characteristics, 
counterparts, they tried to moderate adoption and in some beliefs & attitudes, 
cases discourage or slow use. This had a negative influence social influences 
on secondary adoption. 
19 Adoption and use of the Simpress system is viewed by some innovation 
workers as means of being noticed within the organisation perceptions, 
and perhaps moving into management. The strong divide organisational 
which exists between management and the workforce thus culture 
makes such movements (or 'defections') highly I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
controversial. The problem was further exacerbated by the 
social influences 
strong connotations associated with workers using a PC for 
any extended period of time - this behaviour closely linked 
to a management or office worker role. This had a negative 
influence on secondary adoption. 
20 The less innovative workers particularly within category S innovation 
and to some extent category M, have a low computer perceptions 
literacy. The introduction of the Simpress system, thus I 
proved to be particularly problematic for such workers beliefs & attitudes, 
evoking feelings of fear and inadequacy. This had a personal 
characteristics 
negative influence on secondary adoption. 
21 Workers expected clear and continued support from the management support 
plant manager. This was a signal to them that the Simpress I 
initiative was organisationally important and the problems managerial 
associated with implementation and assimilation could be interventions, 
resolved. The majority of these problems had been organisational 
facilitators 
experienced by shop floor workers in the past when using 
traditional paper-based systems. Consequently, the plant 
manager demonstrated support (more so than the majority of 
his junior colleagues) through actual contact with workers to 
discuss the system, messages to supervisors/middle 
management and meetings with senior managers to discuss 
the system. This observation supports the criticality of 
management support at an appropriate level and had a 
positive influence on secondary adoption. 
22 The application of pressure to use the system by senior management 
management combined with a lack of organisational slack, support, 
meant that lower level managers were forced to use the organisational 
culture 
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system. No relief in work commitments by senior I 
management meant that lower level management was forced managerial 
to continue production and output at the same levels with interventions, 
the same workers. Thus workers were not able to use the beliefs & attitudes 
Simpress system and lower level managers (supervisors) 
were instead forced to use the system in their place. This 
had a negative influence on secondary adoption. 
23 Entries into the Simpress system are identified using the innovation 
individual worker's name. Individual identification had a perceptions, 
negative influence on secondary adoption as individuals organisational 
feared organisational reprisals for any mistakes or poor culture 
quality workmanship which may be captured within the I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
system. During system prototyping and technological 
social influences 
development, workers specifically requested that system 
entries be identified by NWG to avoid identification of the 
individual. This proposal was rejected by management. 
24 Previous system prototypes were described by workers as innovation 
being too complex and time consuming to use. Therefore, perceptions 
both ease of use and entry speed were identified as system I 
characteristics that would facilitate secondary adoption. beliefs & attitudes 
25 The shop floor work environment contains the bulk of the organisational 
organisation's experience, practical know-how and culture 
knowledge. Skilled workers (such as craft and tradesmen) I 
understand that their organisational worth is bound in this beliefs & attitudes, 
knowledge. As a result they are not prepared to part with situational influences 
these assets (through entry into the Simpress system) for 
fear of devaluation and dispensability. These perceptions 
are especially pertinent among category S workers most 
affected by earlier organisational downsizing. However, the 
paradox remains that these are the most experienced and 
knowledgeable individuals within the organisation. This 
had a negative influence on secondary adoption. 
26 Existing relationships between shop floor departments and organisational 
engineers/designers in S&SE are characterised as non- culture, 
cooperative and standoffish. This outlook was grounded in interconnectedness, 
the supercilious "I know how to do it better" notion that knowledge utility 
engineers sometimes display over experienced and skilled I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
workers in the field. As a consequence shop floor 
social influences 
individuals believed that personal knowledge entered into 
the system would not be properly valued by 
engineers/designers in S&SE. The situation was further 
exacerbated by a fear that the system would be used to 
accord blame to certain individuals/departments for mistakes 
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and poor quality workmanship. Combined, these factors 
had a negative influence on secondary adoption. 
27 The previous work practices, which the Simpress system innovation 
intended to replace, were unsuccessful primarily because of perceptions, 
a lack of feedback. To individual workers this devalued the knowledge utility 
information and knowledge and made it seem I 
inconsequential. The Simpress system was designed to beliefs & attitudes, 
organisational 
facilitate electronic feedback which had a positive influence facilitators 
on secondary adoption. The accessibility of the system also 
increased its value to individual workers who could use it in 
their everyday work. The system also had the potential to 
increase communication between departments. 
28 A perception among lower and middle level management organisational 
that the system is "just another management fad," was culture, management 
prevalent. These managers viewed system use as being support 
temporary (to satisfy senior management) until such time as: I 
(i) either management forgot about the system; or (ii) a few beliefs & attitudes, 
managerial 
system entries on their behalf were viewed by management, interventions 
hence affirming their supposed 'support' of the system. The 
dominance of this perception (among management) was 
based on previous experience with organisational 
technology implementation. This had a negative influence 
on secondary adoption and assimilation. 
29 These fad based perceptions (see Obs. #28) were moderated management 
through rigid incorporation of system use into plant support, 
management metrics. This had two effects: organisational 
(i) junior management understood that system use was culture 
being monitored by their superiors and thus utilised the I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
system (primarily through direct and subordinate use) to 
managerial 
create 'favourable impressions'; and interventions 
(ii) workers understood that the system was receiving high 
exposure within the organisation. 
After implementation of the system, metrics related to use 
were presented at weekly management meetings. This had a 
positive influence on secondary adoption. 
30 After launch, workers (through the union), tried to seek incentives, 
additional remuneration for using the system. Workers organisational 
(primarily in categories Mand S) were of the opinion that culture 
the skills involved in using the system (given that computers I 
are not part of their everyday work environment) should organisational 
facilitators, 
accrue additional progression pay points. Craft and beliefs & attitudes 
tradesmen are graded accorded to progression points which 
they receive once they master a particular skill (the highest 
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being level 6). The shop floor individual would thus accrue 
the allocated points once they had made a certain amount of 
entries into the system. While this would have had a 
positive influence on secondary adoption, the proposal was 
not accepted by management. Further, while increased 
remuneration may have increased system use in the first 
instance, it is probable that the individual's motivation 
would have been limited (probably to the minimum number 
of entries) and system entry quality diminished. 
31 The introduction of new technology is viewed by workers as incentives, 
a means of transitioning to management. The majority of organisational 
shop floor workers generally accept that they will continue culture 
to work in the same environment for the rest of their I 
working life within the organisation (as a result of limited organisational 
facilitators, 
career paths). The following was noted during an interview beliefs & attitudes, 
with a category M shop floor craftsman: social influences 
"I have no career goals beyond what I do 
now. I'm at level 6. There's no career path 
for me. No "toys" are going to cheer me up. 
People might use it if they thought it would 
get them somewhere. But there isn't 
anywhere for us to go after level 6." 
Consequently, as the majority of shop floor workers do not 
view a management transition as a career option, they are 
not prepared to use new innovations such as Simpress. This 
had a negative influence on secondary adoption. 
32 While the use of management metrics increases the organisational 
organisational importance of the system, the competition it culture, management 
incites between departments can have a diminishing affect support · 
on entry quality. Individual managers perceive an increase I 
in organisational visibility once they utilise the system beliefs & attitudes, 
managerial 
which creates a competition based on entry numbers. This interventions 
leads to a lack of quality in information entry which 
devalues the system for all users. 
33 Changes to system configuration, operation and interface innovation 
after launch (and hence also initial system training), serves perceptions 
to further confuse timid workers. Although being able to I 
customise the system to suit operations and work practices is beliefs & attitudes 
advantageous, doing so in the intervening period between 
training and individual adoption has a negative influence on 
secondary adoption. 
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34 Continued promotion and support of the system must occur n/a * 
after the implementation event. The implementation (ending 
in launch) should not signal an ease in organisational effort 
towards promotion of its use and associated benefits. In 
fact, effort should increase during the critical individual 
adoption period which follows launch. Otherwise, 
decreased assimilation will have a negative influence on 
secondary adoption by laggards who view the system with 
decreasing importance. 
3.3.6 Discussion 
Each of the observations presented m Table 3.4, are disparate and have unequal 
influence on the adoption decision. The categorisation of each observation however, 
can assist in the assessment of its overall significance as a decision determinant. 
Aggregating each of the categories gives a rudimentary illustration of the extent to 
which each of the categories contributes towards adoption. While it was significantly 
more difficult to collect observations based on the primary adoption decision 
(primarily due to an initial lack of access to the appropriate management forums), the 
observations that were made (Obs. #1-8), have been aggregated by category and 
depicted in Figure 3.6. Overall, adopter characteristics such as organisational size, 
structure and innovativeness, as well as innovation characteristics similar to those 
identified by Rogers (1983), seemed to dominate the primary adoption decision. 
Innovation 
Characteristics 
30% 
Environmental 
Social Network 
10% 
Adopter 
Characteristics 
40% 
Figure 3.6: Determinant significance on primary adoption. 
While an affirmative primary adoption decision had been made by the plant manager, 
this did not guarantee the support of other senior management and their junior 
colleagues. Their support instead was conditional on the personal advantage they 
perceived in adopting the system. In this case, most managers perceived relatively 
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little personal advantage in the successful implementation of the system within their 
areas of responsibility. Further, most felt that on an organisational level the system 
was unable to complement traditional methods of work, and an unwillingness to 
change, meant that the system would be unsuccessful anyway. The paradox remained 
however, that it was these same managers that had the power to change these 
traditional methods of work. Consequently, the intervention and application of a plant 
manager edict to use the system, was necessary. This was then conveyed to workers 
by lower management thus also influencing the secondary adoption decision. While 
the application of pressure by senior management may be an effective tool to promote 
initial adoption, it is a short-term, unsustainable and all-to-familiar solution to the 
adoption and diffusion problem. Both workers and management (middle and lower 
levels) have come to understand that this pressure is only temporary - until such time 
as another organisational initiative becomes the "flavour of the month". Thus, 
assimilation of the system is based on the voluntary as opposed to forced adoption of 
the system in the first instance. 
An overwhelming number of observations associated with secondary adoption (Obs. 
#9-34) have their grounding in the cultural and social context of the organisation. 
Evidenced in Figure 3.7, the beliefs and attitudes category had the greatest influence 
on the secondary adoption decision. The deconstruction of this category into its 
principal concept components is shown in Figure 3.7(b). It emphasises the 
overpowering influence of organisational culture on the formation of the individual's 
beliefs and attitudes toward adoption. The prominence of other categories such as 
organisational facilitators, managerial interventions and social influences further act to 
accentuate the significance of cultural and organisational factors on the adoption 
decision. The inability of traditional frameworks to explain the affect of such factors 
on the adoption and diffusion process (as highlighted in §2.8, summary point 2.8.1) is 
based on an overt tendency to use much simpler characteristics, inherent in the 
technology (as highlighted in §2.8, summary point 2.8.2). The results of this case 
study illustrate that innovation perceptions have a comparatively minor influence on 
the organisational secondary adoption decision. Further, the results advocate a need 
for frameworks capable of explaining adoption and diffusion from a social and cultural 
basis (social learning theory for example) as opposed to traditional utilitarian 
approaches. 
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(a) Personal Managerial 
Characteristics Interventions 
6% 16% 
Organisational 
Facilitators 
13% 
Beliefs & 
Attitudes Situational 
42% Influences 
Social 6% 
Influences 
17% (b) 
Organisational Innovation 
Culture Perceptions 
Figure 3.7: (a) Determinant significance on secondary adoption. (b) Beliefs & Attitudes 
primary concept composition. 
The strength of the NWG as a decision making entity and its overriding influence on 
the individual was demonstrated in a number of observations. Quantitatively, the 
distinction is also evident in Figure 3.7(a) which depicts the dominance of the social 
influence category over personal characteristics. On a broader level, the observations 
highlight the divide between management and worker groups which is characterised by 
distrust, manipulation and exploitation (see for example Obs. #10 and 19). In this 
particular case however, the divide between the two groups had an especially 
detrimental effect on the adoption of the system. The fundamental nature of the 
system's operation, required that one group (the workers) depart with their knowledge 
and in doing so empower the other (the managers). As such, transfer, adoption and 
hence diffusion can be conceptualised as a game between the two groups, each 
weighing the perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with adoption 
relative to each other. The extent and seriousness of the game is determined in the first 
instance by the technology itself and later moderated by the cultural, organisational 
and social norms which dictate play. 
The time dimension also has a profound effect on the adoption decision (see Obs. #5). 
In this particular instance, it was difficult for both management and workers to 
comprehend, much less appreciate, the benefits associated with system use, given the 
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long return on investment. The problem is exacerbated both by an organisational and 
national (characteristically Australian) culture which supports a short-term 
(consumerist) outlook. In such cultures, the development and diffusion of innovations, 
which have a long materialisation perspective, is difficult. 
3.4 Indian Implementation 
The Indian implementation case study took place over a period of four months 
(beginning in June 2003, as depicted in Figure 3.8). The first 10 weeks were occupied 
with the production development and modification of the operational Australian 
Simpress system. After official launch (in September 2003), the assimilation period 
was observed by the researcher for a further 3 weeks (ending in October 2003). The 
case study was undertaken within the Indian subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company -
Ford India Limited (FIL). 
2002 
May 
Scoping 
Visit 
Primary 
adoption 
decision 
2003 
June August Sept 
2004 
Oct Mar Present 
\l 
Follow-up 
Visit 
Figure 3.8: Simpress development and implementation timeline (Indian case study). 
3.4.1 Organisational overview 
The organisation's initial presence in India was established in 1926 when assembly 
facilities were launched. These were later discontinued in 1954 due to the adoption of 
a closed socialist economy by the then Indian Government, following independence. 
Ford subsequently re-entered the market in 1969 as part of a joint venture with Escorts 
Ltd., primarily producing tractors until 1991. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
economy and the liberalisation of western European economies, the Indian 
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Government decided to adopt economic reforms, pursuing an open market policy. 
This created a market and economic environment favourable to entry by foreign 
multinationals with the first of those - General Electric - commencing operations in 
the early 1990's. In November 1995, Ford again entered the market establishing a 
50:50 joint venture company with the Indian organisation Mahindra & Mahindra to 
manufacture utility vehicles and tractors. Known as Mahindra Ford India Limited, the 
company launched the Ford Escort in the third quarter of 1996 (which won the 
prestigious JD Power Award for quality later that same year). In February 1999, Ford 
obtained majority shareholding in the company with an 85: 15 equity pattern, and the 
organisation was renamed Ford India Limited. 
Later in 1999, the company shifted its operations to Maraimalai Nagar, 45 kilometres 
from the southern capital city of Chennai (formerly known as Madras). The new 
integrated manufacturing facility covers over 350 acres, has a total annual production 
capacity of 50,000 vehicles and cost approximately US $400 million. The facility's 
opening was accompanied by the launch of the new Ford Ikon (based on the Fiesta 
platform) and is the current mainstay of the organisation's Indian product range. 
Winning a number of awards in both 1999 and 2000 (including 'Car of the Year' and 
the JD Power Award for quality), the vehicle competes in the mid-size car segment. 
Attracted by a lucrative market which is characterised by a population of over 1 billion 
and high sales growth rates (56 percent in 2000), a number of international automotive 
manufacturers have also established operations in India. The Indian market is ranked 
second behind that of China in terms of future growth and profitability. This is a 
consequence of India's widespread poverty which precludes the rapid increases in 
individual expendable income which China is expected to achieve. Most of the 
entrants in the Indian market, which include General Motors (GM), Peugeot, 
Mitsubishi, Honda, Hyundai, Fiat, Proton and Daewoo, are themselves based in the 
mid-size car segment and in direct competition with the Ford Ikon. Decreasing market 
sales and improved product offerings by its competitors have prompted Ford to 
undertake its first major re-design of the Ikon which is scheduled for launch in 2005. 
Imports and the assembly of Completely Knocked Down Kits (CKDs) at its Chennai 
plant supplement the FIL product range. 
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Manufacture of the Ford Ikon is assisted by over 90 Indian suppliers, some of which 
also supply the international market. As a group, Indian automotive suppliers are 
gaining a greater share and increased presence in the global market; a result of both 
low labour costs and excellent engineering and technical prowess. Capitalising upon 
the resulting low product manufacturing costs and comparative quality, automotive 
manufacturers have begun to use India as an export base to the Asia-Pacific, Africa, 
South America and Europe. As an example, export of Ford Ikon CKDs in 2001 topped 
28,000 units and constituted over 66 percent of total car exports from India. Year 
2002 local market share for FIL was approximately 2 percent as depicted in Figure 3.9. 
Ford 
2% 
Toyota 
4% 
14% 
Others 
13% 
Fiat 
4% 
Hyundai 
15% 
47% 
GM 
1% 
Figure 3.9: Indian market share by manufacturer 2002 (source: Wards Communications, 
Primedia, 2002). Maruti a joint venture between the Indian government and Suzuki holds 
principal market share across all segments. 
The FIL stamping area consists of a single sequential press line which manufactures 
between 20 to 26 part sets comprising mostly large chassis and structural components. 
All other stamped parts (primarily small structural components) are manufactured by 
local suppliers. Current stamping production levels average between approximately 
2000 - 2500 body and chassis sets monthly. Unlike FoA, Indian stamping operations 
are not supported by internal S&SE and tool room departments (as depicted in Figure 
3.4). Die process and tool design is done externally (by FoA for instance) and tools 
are subsequently built by external manufacturers located in Asia. The Indian stamping 
operation thus consists of the press shop which is supported by a die maintenance team 
(also responsible for internal die tryout). The sub-assembly area is located within the 
body shop which is separated from the stamping area. 
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The organisation employs over 970 personnel within its Chennai manufacturing plant. 
This consists of approximately 260 manufacturing and support salaried staff and 720 
hourly payroll shop floor workers (or technicians as they are commonly referred to in 
India). The Indian stamping plant operates 2 shifts on a 6 day per week basis (this was 
reduced from a previous 3 shift operation due to decreasing market demand for the 
Ikon). The stamping plant accommodates 6 salaried staff and 69 technicians - 56 of 
whom work in the press area and associated support functions and 13 within die 
maintenance. The ratio of female to male technical personnel is in favour of the latter 
by around 94 percent (65 male to 4 female technicians). Further, all personnel 
(salaried and technical) within the stamping area are oflndian descent. 
3.4.2 Implementation context 
The main aim of the Simpress implementation was to introduce the system (already 
operating in FoA) to the Indian stamping plant. Changes to system interface design, 
functionality and operation were to be kept to a minimum, ensuring commonality 
between the Australian and Indian systems. This would allow the development of an 
integrated knowledge base such that data within the system could be interrogated using 
common search and extraction algorithms. Essentially, this supported a high level 
organisational vision for the system to be implemented in plants globally, allowing 
communication and knowledge flows to increase. Eventually this would mean for 
instance, that tooling engineers in Ford Germany could search the Simpress system for 
particular solutions to a formability problem for a specific part. If shop floor 
technicians in India had previously encountered the same problem and entered its 
resolution into their local Simpress system, then Ford's German engineers could apply 
the knowledge learnt to their particular situation. 
Such is the potential of the system and the pnmary reason associated with FIL 
management approving its subsequent implementation (primary adoption decision). 
The system's existing operation within FoA and potential for access to its knowledge 
contents were perceived as major advantages to its adoption. During the opening of 
the Chennai manufacturing facility in 1999, a large number of press and die 
maintenance technicians had been sent to FoA for intensive training over a period of 3 
to 6 months. Therefore, they inherently understood the knowledge and expertise held 
within FoA and had over the years made urgent requests for assistance to solve 
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incapacitating problems. The Simpress system was seen as an additional means of 
tapping into this knowledge. Further, since the bulk of Indian product development 
and subsequent die process and tool design is done externally (mostly within FoA), 
capturing knowledge within the Simpress system would allow foreign engineers and 
designers immediate access to this data during new model development. 
The organisational decision to adopt was made during the May 2002 scoping visit (as 
depicted in Figure 3.8). At this time the system and associated modules (including 
FMI and Issues) were demonstrated to a select group of managers and stamping 
technicians. Discussions relating to the use of the system within the Indian plant 
environment were held and a number of comparative processes identified. However, it 
became clear that new processes of work would also need to be adopted since the 
fundamental operation of the system was not able to be re-engineered to mimic 
existing procedures. Subsequent to the visit, issues relating to physical system and 
database location, funding and specific implementation plans were still to be finalised. 
Proposals to re-locate the Simpress system IT infrastructure (from FoA Melbourne 
headquarters) to Ford's regional IT hub located in Singapore were investigated. This 
would befit the system's function as a growing regional application and increase the 
possibility for future global implementation (especially within China). It became 
apparent however, that the costs, procedures and timescales involved in a potential 
system migration were too large. Thus an alternative proposal was developed to host 
the Simpress India system on FoA IT infrastructure in Melbourne, access being 
facilitated by a high speed link which connects all Ford Asia-Pacific entities via its 
Singapore hub. Thus a separate instance of the Simpress Australia system would be 
created for India (with its own database) and hosted on the same IT infrastructure (as 
depicted in Figure 3.10). Common search functions would be built into each system 
thus allowing searches across either country (or both). The proposal was put forward 
to FoA IT and FIL management in June 2003. Its acceptance (pending the negotiation 
of a service agreement and approval by IT control regulators) marked the beginning of 
the development and implementation phase as depicted in Figure 3.8. 
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Simpress Australia: 
http://hub.foa.ford.com/web/simpress/simpress.html 
Figure 3.10: Asia-Pacific regional operation of the Simpress system. 
All system development and program modifications were undertaken in Australia prior 
to departure. A separate database was established (thus separating Australian data 
from Indian data) and existing search functions modified to allow cross country 
searching. The Issues module was also changed to allow electronic distribution to 
individuals within the same department. This was done to complement a specific 
Indian work practice involving the cataloguing of changes to tools and parts and the 
need to make other individuals within the NWG and across shifts aware of such 
changes. Implementation plans were developed (also from Australia) in coordination 
with specific Indian contacts (one from the training department and another from the 
die maintenance area). The following tasks were completed prior to departure: 
i. Drafting IS09001 work procedures for each module. These procedures were left 
incomplete until discussion with stamping plant management regarding which 
new and existing work processes the particular module would encompass. 
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II. Development of a training package. The wording used was simple and sentences 
emphasised the personal and organisational benefits associated with adopting the 
system. Training was example-based so that individuals could use the system in a 
number of different hypothetical work situations. 
111. Modification of existing system manuals. Shop floor manuals developed for use 
in Australia were modified such that specific Indian examples were referred to. 
IV. Initial population of the Simpress database. The system was populated with data 
supplied by the Indian die maintenance contact, including part and die numbers, 
part CAD diagrams and steel specifications. 
v. Drafting of a service level agreement. The agreement states the responsibility of 
each party in relation to system failure, periodic downtimes and future upgrades. 
vi. Approval of system control documentation. All Ford IT systems are scrutinised to 
ensure security and data integrity based on a confidentiality classification. 
Control documentation was completed and approved before official system access 
was allowed. 
VII. System access forms and prpcesses developed. Individuals requiring access to the 
system must gain the official approval of their department manager and access be 
recorded for future audit purposes. 
v111. Drafting of a timing/implementation plan. The plan was based on observations 
made during the scoping visit and accounted for the limited time available for 
launch and subsequent observation during the assimilation period. 
Upon arrival at the Chennai stamping plant (in mid-August 2003), meetings were held 
with management to discuss the processes which would dictate Simpress system use, 
and identify the individuals who would be given initial access and subsequently 
trained. The timing/implementation plan was ratified (with a designated launch date of 
September 3) and the stamping plant manager essentially designated as technology 
champion. The role of the technology champion was similar to that in the Australian 
implementation context - to ensure organisational obstacles encountered in the 
implementation were dealt with in a timely manner. This was particularly critical in 
this instance due to the limited time available for implementation. The following 
events (in sequential order) led to the launch of the system: 
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1. In conjunction with system developers in Australia, debug and test the system in 
the Indian IT environment. 
2. In conjunction with the FIL training department, organise training sessions and 
installation of the required infrastructure (including computer terminals and 
manuals). 
3. In conjunction with the FIL IT department, orgamse and coordinate the 
installation of the Simpress system on stamping plant computer terminals and 
organise access for individuals previously designated by management. 
4. Conduct successive training sessions. 
5. Designate an official Simpress trainer (to conduct future system training) and 
oversee their performance in the final training session. 
The system was officially launched by the entry of both a FMI and Issue by the die 
maintenance NWG leader. As in the Australian implementation context, secondary 
adoption by shop floor technicians was on a discretionary basis. To promote adoption 
however, senior plant management (including the Manufacturip.g Vice-President) 
actively campaigned (mostly through discussion both informally and at meetings), 
encouraging system use and highlighting the organisational importance ofthe·system. 
3.4.3 Data collection and analysis 
Similar to the Australian implementation case study, fieldwork involved a mixture of 
action research and participant observation. An assimilation entry period however, 
was not possible in this case, due to the distance involved and the logistics of 
implementation (the development being undertaken in Australfa). Nonetheless the 
researcher was essentially perceived as a foreign Ford employee sent to implement a 
new system. Stamping personnel were accustomed to this, since many foreign 
employees (especially Australian) had been sent to the plant during its launch and in 
the years subsequent, to develop and implement corporate systems. Dressed as a Ford 
employee and adopting plant routines (which included for example going to lunch with 
stamping technical personnel), the researcher was perceived not as an academic but as 
a work colleague. This perception was supported by continual requests for 
information and assistance in relation to technical stamping matters by shop floor 
technicians (for which the researcher referred to relevant contacts in the Geelong 
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stamping plant). Essentially being responsible for implementation, the researcher 
worked closely with the technology champion (in a project management role). 
The 'action taking' aspect of the research was enacted by completing the sequential 
tasks dictated by the timing/implementation plan (refer to points 1-5 on the previous 
page). The researcher's participative role meant observation in a number of situations 
and functions was possible. These included: 
1. Management meetings to discuss progress and demonstrate the system, 
11. Coordination and negotiation between management and technicians for resources, 
needs and wants, 
m. On the shop floor discussing work flows and the use of Simpress to aid future 
organisational improvement, 
1v. Discussion of system perceptions with various shop floor technicians. 
Daily observations were recorded by the researcher in a field notebook at the end of 
each working day. Field notes were collected on a daily basis from arrival at the 
manufacturing plant and extending through to the end of the assimilation period 
(marked by the researcher's departure). Ethical considerations were dealt with in a 
similar way to the Australian case study, namely: (i) the researcher's background was 
not hidden in any way and disclosed upon questioning; (ii) organisational management 
was aware of the research being conducted; and (iii) all interviewing was conducted 
with the express prior permission of direct management and the consent of the 
individual. Further, preliminary outcomes and the researcher's perception of the plant 
culture in relation to technology transfer were discussed with management prior to 
departure (as part of a de-briefing session). 
The short observational period necessitated the need to supplement field work with 
informant interviews. In total, five informants were identified - a mix of both shop 
floor technicians and salaried management. All interviews were open-ended (with a 
selection of questions intended to provoke the individual into open discussion related 
to the question topic). The following topics were covered in the interview questions: 
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• Perceived barriers to implementing new technology in the stamping plant 
• Personal benefits in the introduction of new technology 
• Personal knowledge entry into an organisational system 
• Individual uptake of new technology and associated motivations 
• Uptake and participation in new systems 
• Opinion leadership and effects on individuality 
Interviews ranged in duration from 30 - 60 minutes and allowed informants to express 
their opinions in relation to the Simpress implementation and the organisation in 
general. The interviews were conducted by the researcher, recorded (and later 
transcribed). Confidentiality of interview transcripts and individual anonymity was 
guaranteed by the researcher prior to recording. All informants were identified by the 
researcher as either a person possessing significant organisational insight, experience 
or opinion leadership. The same grounded theory methodology used to analyse both 
field notes and interview transcripts in the Australian case study, was also used in this 
instance. This ensured uniform and consistent data analysis across both case studies. 
3.4.4 Organisational structure and culture 
To enhance the contextual understanding of the codified and catalogued observations 
associated with the Simpress India implementation, an appreciation of the culture and 
work life within the plant is necessary. The following descriptive overview is based 
on both observation and participation within the culture by the researcher over the case 
study period. 
Qualitative description of organisation 
Relative to Australia, the culture that exists within the plant lends itself much more 
readily to the introduction of new technology. This is a consequence of both the 
surrounding environment (outside of the organisation) and the relative newness of the 
organisation and its members. Unlike Australia, the negative view of management by 
shop floor workers and the feeling of mistrust does not exist. Instead, workers openly 
acknowledge that there is no difference between management and themselves (aside 
from the superficial distinction between salary and payroll remuneration types), and 
thus cooperate together as a team based on mutual respect. The management culture 
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within the stamping plant is neither heavily political nor bureaucratic and is not driven 
by personal desires to perform based solely on career prospects. Instead, management 
is focused on the performance of their area and associated people, and they see 
innovation and technology as means to enhance these aspects. This underlying culture 
is a characteristic of Southern India in general and explains why a number of 
multinationals such as Hyundai, Volkswagen and Honda have also established 
manufacturing facilities within the region. 
The north of India is considered to be more developed and progressive than their 
southern counterparts, adopting western traditions much more rapidly. This difference 
in culture is most visible in individual attitudes towards family. Grounded partly in 
Hinduism, South Indian's continue to adopt a traditional ideology, one which dictates 
the operation of the family, everyday life, marriage and work. As part of this ideology 
the man is expected to provide for the family (and not just his immediate wife and 
children but his parents and siblings as well) and thus faces considerable pressure to 
find and maintain an economic means of sustenance. When combined with other 
factors, including India's status as a developing country and its immense population, 
the consequence is a highly competitive job environment with highly adaptive and 
willing individuals vying for a limited number of jobs. Some organisations have taken 
advantage of this situation by exploiting individuals, while others such as FIL have 
applied this social situation to enhance the culture of their organisation. Further, the 
prevailing social situation has also contributed in part to the advanced education of its 
people relative to other western cultures. The Indian's are well known for their 
technical and engineering prowess facilitated by high levels of education (which in the 
past had been mired by the effects oflndia's socialist economy). 
Together, all these factors have created a culture within the plant that is open, willing 
to change and ambitious. There is an overwhelming hunger among all employees 
within the plant to succeed, which has associated advantages and disadvantages. In the 
short-term, this desire drives the individual to learn, contribute and participate in their 
work environment, an attribute particularly favourable for technology adoption. 
Collectively, the individuals work as a team since they see their personal development 
encapsulated not only within the success of the organisation (FIL) but their workmates 
as well. Thus, individuals are open and willing to share ideas and most importantly, 
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the competitive and somewhat destructive spirit which is prevalent among groups in 
Australia is not apparent. Workers continually describe themselves as being "proud" 
and "happy" when their work colleagues make productivity improvements and state 
that it provides inspiration and desire for them to do the same. In some instances, 
workers of one particular NWG, would give unprompted assistance to another in 
aiding to either resolve a particular production problem or increase efficiency. In 
recognition of this assistance, the receiving NWG would reward and thank the other 
with a gift. Hence this culture drives a philosophy of continuous improvement both 
organisationally and personally within which individuals perceive the adoption of new 
technology as a positive contribution. 
In the long-term however, the overpowering desire for personal development may 
cause the organisation to literally 'suffocate'. The average worker age within the 
stamping plant is approximately 30 years and all are considerably well educated, 
holding bachelor degrees, and in some instances masters degrees. The relatively small 
size of. the organisation within India will make it impossible to support the active 
development of all its workers, each of whom desire to progress within the 
organisation. Therefore, both care and thought will be needed in developing a human 
resource solution to this problem before it becomes organisationally destructive, 
turning into a competition between workers, and inciting both politics and 
bureaucracy. The situation will worsen as India continues to develop, the 
manufacturing sector continues to grow and more broadly, the availability of work for 
skilled technicians increases. Currently however, the majority of workers are satisfied 
with the organisation. They are still in the process of learning (both personally and as 
an organisation) and working for a corporation such as Ford has its own rewards. 
These include a prestigious recognition within the wider social community (workers 
proudly touting that they "work for Ford"), a high remuneration rate compared to 
similar Indian and foreign enterprises, extensive on the job training and personal 
development, and treatment by the organisation which engenders respect and equality. 
The western-style of management which Ford employs is the means through which 
workers perceive this environment. The paradox remains however, that in most 
developed countries such as Australia, it is this very system of management which 
workers perceive as promulgating mistrust and exploitation. The contrast however, is 
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prevalent in a large number of Indian based organisations which use an antiquated and 
somewhat debasing system of management. In such organisations workers are not 
allowed to approach management, titles must be used at all times and worker 
conditions are almost non-existent. Thus, the western-style corporation and their 
associated management practices are a revelation to most Indians, who respond with 
gratitude and appreciation when given the opportunity to work in such a culture. The 
candour of management who hold regular employee meetings to discuss business 
progress (including sales and future forecasts) is appreciated by all employees. Such 
meetings are also used to acknowledge the contribution of employees through awards 
and certificates (the respect which comes with receiving such an "honour" in front of 
other work colleagues is a powerful motivator). Being able to speak directly to all 
levels of management on a first name basis, something taken for granted in western 
countries, promotes a feeling of deference and egalitarianism. Further, other employee 
benefits such as transport to and from the plant, the provision of meals and annual 
family days, add to the positive culture. 
As a result, the majority of employees remain satisfied with the organisation and more 
importantly management. This has allowed management to discourage the formation 
of a worker union and indeed the majority of stamping shop floor technicians do not 
believe that one is needed. While some workers in the past have tried to develop a 
union, management has employed a variety of alternative mechanisms to increase shop 
floor involvement in organisational decision making. This has included the 
development of committees with shop floor representatives and senior management to 
address worker issues. Previous expefience has also dampened worker resolve to 
implement unionism and weak government legislation (in comparison to most 
westernised countries) does not support such an initiative. Years previously, another 
local Indian automotive manufacturer was forced to close as a result of crippling union 
strikes. Consequently, workers within FIL are acutely aware of the consequences 
associated with such action. The prospect of losing their principal income and being 
unable to provide for their family is a powerful disincentive, made all the more dire by 
the immense poverty which exists in the communities surrounding the plant. 
The above-average education of shop floor technicians, negates the disparaging effects 
of group over individual decision dominance, relative to FoA. Individuals are 
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educated enough to be able to form their own opm1on m relation to particular 
technologies. Furthermore, the culture is such that acting on these opinions will not 
attract feelings of ostracism by other group members (this is probably more so a 
characteristic of Indian culture). Thus the overwhelming prevalence of a group 
mentality observed in Australian culture is not nearly as significant in an Indian 
context. An additional benefit of the comparatively high education levels coupled with 
South Indian culture (marked by the central dominance of the family) is the facilitation 
of a long-term outlook amongst employees. This is a favourable characteristic for 
technology adoption. 
Quantitative validation 
Quantitative survey data can be used to verify the above qualitative observations, thus 
allowing a cultural comparison between stamping plants. The same attitudinal and 
behavioural surveys used to evaluate the performance of the Ford Production System 
(FPS) in Australia, are also given in the Indian manufacturing plant. As such, the 
results for the NWG Satisfaction Survey (SS) for the previous two years (2002 and 
2003) are presented in Table 3.5 (for both the stamping area and plant as a whole). A 
direct comparison of the plant press shop cultures is depicted in Figure 3 .11 which 
details a plot of Indian versus Australian press shop responses to the NWG SS for 
2003. 
In terms of personal satisfaction an overwhelming majority of employees feel valued 
and "look forward" to coming to work on a daily basis (SS questions 1 and 4). A 
comparison between the two press shop areas highlights an overwhelming difference 
in response rates for these two questions (Figure 3.11). Focusing on organisational 
satisfaction and individual accomplishment however, a trend reversal is observed with 
extremely low Indian response rates (SS questions 2 and 3) relative to Australia. 
Further, in successive years the trend has become progressively worse with over 75 
percent of Indian stamping operators personally dissatisfied with Ford and over 45 
percent perceiving a lack of personal achievement. Initially this may seem aberrant in 
light of the positive cultural attributes observed and discussed above. However, taken 
in context the low response rates fit well with the qualitative description of culture. 
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Table 3.5: FIL NWG Satisfaction Survey results for 2002 and 2003 (result indicates percentage of 
respondents who answered either: agree or strongly agree). 
Questions 
Approximate Sample Size (number of respondents) 
2 
3 
4 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
I feel valued as an employee of Ford Motor Company 
I am satisfied with Ford Motor Company at the present 
time 
My work gives me a feeling of personal accomplishment 
I look forward to coming to work 
. J,»<,::tJ4NJ<ttfl:V\&Yfil:». 
I can be open with people in my group 
The members of my work group listen to each other's 
opinions 
In my work group, members participate m making 
decisions 
Other work groups cooperate with my work group to 
complete tasks 
,o~tG'.liR§li\t4l1t~•I•>:~ 
Plant management actively encourages my work group to 
function effectively 
Union leadership actively encourages my work group to 
function effectively 
Engineering provides an adequate level of support to my 
work group 
equipment to be an 
with information I receive from 
management on what's going on in our plant 
My supervisor does a good job keeping me informed 
Communication between shifts in my department is good 
Members of my work group clearly communicate with 
each other 
Our work group receives feedback 
goals and activities 
The Ford Production System is 
employees and Ford Motor Company 
on our objectives, 
Press Press Plant Plant 
2002 (%) 2003 (%) 2002 (%) 2003 (%) 
75 60 200 200 
91 100 97 99 
60 33 73 55 
60 56 73 66 
80 89 88 76 
85 78 85 87 
78 78 76 81 
75 67 79 73 
40 22 46 25 
32 44 55 67 
13 0 19 20 
42 44 54 44 
33 33 58 50 
41 44 53 70 
45 56 48 54 
34 56 49 67 
52 56 64 66 
54 56 63 62 
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Figure 3.11: Indian (FIL) versus Australian (FoA) 2003 NWG Satisfaction Survey results for 
Press Shop (results taken from Tables 3.2 and 3.5). Legend: FIL(•) and FoA (+). 
A progressive decline in Ikon sales (including exports) combined with a perception 
among individual operators that Ford is not providing adequate opportunities for 
individual growth and development, have primarily contributed to the observed poor 
response rates. Further, workers feel that FIL is not providing adequate training nor 
effectively utilising the skills they have already acquired (SS questions 6 and 15). 
Added support for this claim can be observed in the response to a question included in 
the NWG SS but not shown in Table 3.5. The question asks "I have received the 
necessary training to be an effective work group member?" Over 90 percent of 
stamping technicians disagreed with this statement (in 2003, down from approximately 
60 percent in 2002). Overall this highlights the ambitious culture which exists within 
the plant and the overpowering desire to learn and progress both individually and as an 
organisation. Moreover, the decline in positive response rates over successive years 
indicates the need for innovative human resource solutions to accommodate individual 
growth and development. 
While both job and work group satisfaction remain high (in comparison to Australia), 
cooperation between work groups is extremely low (SS questions 5 and 7 - 11 ). In 
particular, approximately 80 percent of stamping technicians perceive other work 
groups as being mostly uncooperative, a plant-wide trend which has worsened over 
successive years. This is principally due to perceptions that: (i) outside area work 
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groups such as engineering are not readily available and rarely represented on the shop 
floor (SS question 14); and (ii) communication between shifts is low, albeit improved 
on previous years (SS question 20). The same two phenomena also exist in the 
Australian stamping plant although the perception there is significantly worse (Figure 
3.11). Stamping technicians feel comfortable within their NWG which they perceive 
as open, communicative and transparent (SS questions 8 - 10 and 22). Further, 
support for press shop work groups by supervisors and plant management is low (SS 
questions 12 and 16), although not as poor as the perception of management which 
exists in Australia. In addition, the lack of union leadership corresponds to the 
absence of a union and associated activities within the stamping area (SS question 13). 
The information and communication flow throughout the plant remains average (and 
even so, comparably better than Australia). The majority of press shop technicians 
believe that information flow from management could be improved (SS question 18), 
and similarly at a supervisor level (SS question 19). Perhaps the biggest difference 
between Australian and Indian shop floor environments however, lies in the perception 
of recognition for individual and group organisational contribution (SS questions 23 -
24). Indian operators receive far more recognition than their Australian counterparts 
and acknowledgment usually occurs in large forums comprising mostly work 
colleagues. Combined with characteristics of Indian culture which promote a sense of 
pride and honour in the individual and a reciprocal respect on behalf of colleagues, this 
has a positive cultural effect. In terms of the perceived efficacy of the FPS, 
approximately 70 percent of press shop technicians believe that it is beneficial to both 
them personally and the organisation (SS question 25). This is in contrast to Australia 
where only approximately 3 5 percent of press shop operators believe this to be true (a 
trend reiterated by their tool room counterparts). 
3.4.5 Codified observations 
The codified and catalogued observations presented in Table 3.6, are the results of the 
Indian implementation case study presented in chronological order (or as close as 
possible). Like the Australian case study, both primary and secondary adoption 
decision determinants from Figure 2.5 were used for categorisation. Similarly, the 
table presents a description of the observation, followed by the concepts it represents 
and the category used for cataloguing. 
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Obs:. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Table 3.6: Indian implementation case study observation results. 
•yu/ R\,.•!>,. 
The relative youth of the organisation (established in 1999) 
facilitated the introduction of a knowledge management 
philosophy (encompassed within the Simpress system). 
Management felt that it was advantageous to start 
developing an organisational knowledge base while the 
organisation was relatively new. This had a positive 
influence on the primary adoption decision. 
Faced with both increasing local and import competition, 
FIL was (and still is) open to any new technologies which 
have the potential to improve operations and hence induce 
greater competitive advantage. Management hence believed 
that the Simpress system was capable of delivering reduced 
new technician training times, increased shop floor problem 
solving capabilities, improved product development and 
overall reduced lead times and costs. This had a positive 
influence on the primary adoption decision. 
FIL management and shop floor technicians maintain a close 
relationship with colleagues and counterparts in FoA. The 
basis of this relationship is the experience and knowledge 
contained within the Australian operations and a need for 
support and assistance (especially given the relative youth of 
FIL as an organisation). As such both management and 
shop floor technicians perceived the Simpress system as a 
means of gaining access to this knowledge base. Further, 
since the majority ofindian new model development is done 
in Australia, use of the system is a means by which previous 
shop floor problems/issues can be communicated to 
engineers and designers in Australia. This had a positive 
influence on both the primary and secondary adoption 
decision. 
Subsequent to the initial scoping visit in May 2002, 
implementation progress was encouraged and followed by 
senior corporate management in the United States. Thus 
management in India felt obligated to implement and use the 
system within its operations. Senior corporate management 
support was based on Simpress system features which 
promote communication and knowledge sharing between 
both India and Australia. This had a positive influence on 
primary and secondary adoption. 
Management possessed a genuine, clear and unwavering 
view that implementation and use of the Simpress system 
management 
attitude, 
innovativeness 
I 
adopter 
characteristics 
interconnectedness, 
risk reduction, 
competitive pressure, 
rate of technical 
change 
I 
social network, 
environmental 
influences 
interconnectedness, 
knowledge 
resources, 
organisational size, 
structure 
I 
adopter 
characteristics, 
social network 
image, 
management attitude 
I 
innovation 
characteristics, 
adopter 
characteristics 
management attitude 
I 
adopter 
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within their operations would result in positive benefits. -- characteristics 
Further, this was probably the most important moderator of 
organisational adoption. This is in contrast to bulk 
management perceptions in Australia where such genuine 
beliefs in the operational benefits of the system were not 
apparent. This had a positive influence on primary 
adoption. 
6 A reluctance on behalf of management to publicise system management 
launch and claim implementation success highlights support, 
differences in Australian and Indian management culture. organisational 
Management in India preferred to wait until assimilation had culture 
occurred and they were able to demonstrate tangible benefits I 
beliefs & attitudes, 
as a result of system use, before publicly claiming success. 
managerial 
Management in Australia however, seemed to claim system interventions 
success once it was launched regardless of whether 
assimilation had been achieved. This supports observations 
that Indian management is organisationally focused (as 
discussed in Obs. #5), whereas Australian management is 
overtly self focused (in terms of using technology 
implementation for personal/career gain for example). Shop 
floor workers inherently understood this, which in the case 
of India, had a positive influence on secondary adoption 
(and subsequent assimilation). 
7 Continued globalisation and the attraction oflow-paid knowledge utility, 
skilled labour in developing countries such as India and competitive pressure 
China incites parochialism and protectionism. Fearing the I 
loss of work to countries such as India, some Australian beliefs & attitudes, 
shop floor workers view the Simpress system as a means of situational influences 
divesting FoA's competitive advantage to India. This has 
the effect of reducing the utility of the system for Indian 
workers (especially in view of Obs. #3). The result is a 
negative influence on both Australian and Indian secondary 
adoption. 
8 Underdeveloped computer and IT infrastructure (relative to technological 
Australia) made the system harder to use and unreliable. barriers 
The age and speed of the PC infrastructure within the Indian I 
plant resulted in a system which was slow and on some organisational 
machines inoperative. Further, the ratio of shop floor facilitators 
computers to workers is much smaller relative to Australia, 
thus reducing access and availability. This had a negative 
influence on secondary adoption. 
9 The average age of shop floor technicians is low compared innovativeness, 
to Australia. Thus the technician group overall, is receptive organisational 
culture 
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to technology and capable of quick assimilation. The I 
majority perceive new technology as aiding organisational personal 
productivity improvement and thus welcome its characteristics, 
introduction. Further, Indian technicians possess an above beliefs & attitudes 
average computer literacy compared to their Australian shop 
floor counterparts. This had a positive influence on 
secondary adoption. 
10 Technicians' abilities to grasp and understand the long-term innovativeness, 
benefits associated with the Simpress system assisted in outlook 
adoption. The primary motivation of adoption was based on I 
a clear understanding of the organisational and personal personal 
benefits that system use would bring. The explanation of characteristics 
these benefits was cited as important for successful 
implementation and assimilation. This had a positive 
influence on secondary adoption. 
11 The explanation and subsequent understanding of both organisational 
system benefits and operational functioning during training culture 
sessions was difficult to assess. An Indian cultural I 
characteristic, technicians generally show agreement in personal 
terms of having understood (in order to 'save face' in front characteristics, 
of the trainer and fellow colleagues). This makes it difficult beliefs & attitudes 
to assess their learning. Further, their submissive nature 
makes it difficult for them to freely express their opinions in 
the company of relative strangers (such as the researcher). 
12 Only a selection of technicians were trained in Simpress innovativeness, 
system philosophy (incorporating benefits) and use. Those organisational 
who were not asked to attend, instead approached their culture 
colleagues after the training session to learn about the I 
system and its use. The main motivation for doing so was personal 
"out of my own self-interest so that I can learn". This is in 
characteristics, 
beliefs & attitudes 
contrast to Australia where shop floor workers not trained in 
system use wanted no association with it and were negative 
towards its use in their environment. This had a positive 
influence on the secondary adoption decision (and on 
assimilation). 
13 The contribution of individual knowledge is not seen as an knowledge utility, 
impediment to secondary adoption (as was the case in the organisational 
Australian implementation context). The Indian plant culture, 
culture is such that knowledge input is perceived as positive incentives 
and the Simpress system serves to aid this contribution. The I 
following was noted during an interview with a senior 
organisational 
facilitators, 
manager: 
social influences, 
beliefs & attitudes 
118 
"There is a strong belief that the moment you 
defend yourself in a better way, particularly 
with senior people around, like for example me 
sitting in the meeting or the engineer sitting in 
the meeting, they feel that they are getting 
recognised for that and that will help them in 
the long-term growth opportunities, and the 
second thing is that as a part of the culture, as 
people seek to show their knowledge in public 
they feel that they feel proud." 
Further, the following was noted during an interview with a 
die maintenance technician: 
"Management knows each and every person is 
valuable and management knows each and 
every person's ability to do the work. Because 
of this feeding all this information into the 
system, none of the people feel invalid so this 
makes people want to put information into the 
system. In our area everybody has their own 
capacity to do a lot of work, they don't think I 
giving some information to the system and 
because of that management going to make less 
of them - they won't think in that way - they 
will give as much information as they can, 
because they feel proud to give and everybody 
cares about the future." 
This had a positive influence on secondary adoption. 
14 The observed strong opinion leadership and associated organisational 
group mentality which dominates decision making in culture 
Australia, is comparatively weak to non-existent in India. I 
The above-average education combined with inherent beliefs & attitudes, 
cultural and social norms void the influence of opinion personal 
characteristics 
leaders, with each individual evaluating the system and 
forming his/her own opinion. One shop floor technician 
commented that decisions are based on individual learning 
and subsequent reaction is "based on their own judgment 
and not somebody else's." This had a positive influence on 
secondary adoption since negative perceptions were not so 
easily spread and assumed. 
15 A strong link between personal growth and organisational organisational 
growth lends itself to technology implementation. culture, 
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Individuals view their personal growth as being linked to incentives 
that of the company. Thus when FIL as an organisation is I 
doing well (measured in terms of sales) and subsequently beliefs & attitudes, 
growing, the individual perceives a simultaneous personal social influences, 
growth. The introduction of new technologies thus situational influences 
complements personal growth through learning which in 
tum leads to organisational growth through a self-sustaining 
cycle. Each individual perceived this cycle as the basis of 
their future (both personal and organisational) which had a 
overwhelmingly positive influence on both primary and 
secondary adoption. 
3.4.6 Discussion 
Without aggregating each of the categories, it is apparent that innovation 
characteristics (similar to those identified by Rogers (1983)) play a minor to non-
existent role in primary and secondary adoption respectively. This is partly based on 
the absence of a similar technology/system with which to associate characteristics such 
as relative advantage and compatibility. Further, the Indian culture is such that these 
somewhat superficial adoption decision determinants are weighted much lower than 
others associated with personal and organisational growth. For instance, the majority 
of shop floor technicians would adopt a technology which relative to another was more 
complex and less compatible, if they felt that from an organisational and personal 
point of view, it would be more beneficial. Thus in the Indian context, personal 
characteristics play a more dominant role in relation to secondary adoption than social 
influences, which dominate in an Australian context. The main difference between 
these two, is that in the latter Australian context, social influences control individual 
thinking bringing about forced group conformity, whereas in the former Indian 
context, social influences shape individual thinking but the individual is still free to 
engage in independent decision making. Furthermore, since as a group, Indian shop 
floor technicians are driven by the same motivation and goals, final adoption decisions 
are invariably the same across the bulk of the population. 
This primarily stems from an inherent incentive scheme which can be described as 
'soft' in comparison to that of most developed countries such as Australia. Indians 
value personal and organisational growth, which they positively associate with their 
future well-being, above immediate and more tangible incentives such as money. In 
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the long-term they associate personal growth with greater career opportunity and hence 
increased economic reward. In contrast however, Australian shop floor workers 
expect to be immediately compensated through increased remuneration or some other 
means of economic reward if they are to adopt new technology. Learning and growth 
do not feature as part of their personal incentive schemata. These schemata are 
influenced and shaped by both organisational and national culture as well as work 
place social norms. Shop floor individuals evaluate new technology in the context of 
the schemata they have developed during their term of employment. Hence senior 
workers have engrained schemata which have been shaped by experiences with 
technology introduction over many years. Consequently they may be overly negative 
and out-dated, and in a culture such as Australia have a negative impact on technology 
adoption. The use of schemata from an individual primary or secondary adoption 
decision perspective can be compared to a typical cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
performed by an economist. Individuals perceive certain costs and benefits associated 
with adopting new technology, the values of which are determined by their internal 
cognitive schemata. For most individuals this is a sub-conscious process. 
In both case studies the influence of culture and social norms on the adoption process 
is strong. It is apparent that without the qualitative description of culture, the codified 
observations would appear out of context. Further, it is possible to gauge the ease with 
which impending adoption and subsequent assimilation may occur through a 
preliminary understanding of the organisation and its cultural/social norms. This 
affirms the need for a multiparadigm view of the technology transfer process (as 
highlighted in §2.8, summary point 2.8.9) with particular emphasis on the interpretivist 
perspective. In addition, it supports existing literature which discuss the deficiency of 
traditional organisational technology diffusion frameworks and supports an increased 
role for social learning theory (as highlighted in §2.8, summary points 2.8.1and2.8.2). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Results from each case study show that the process of implementation, adoption and 
diffusion, is a complex phenomena. Both case studies involved the implementation of 
the same technology, within the same organisation (albeit different national cultures) 
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based upon voluntary adoption decisions. In each instance, a qualitative longitudinal 
research design was adopted (satisfying both summary points 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 in §2.8). 
Holding both technology and organisation constant, enabled an extensive 
understanding of the cultural, organisational and social affects on the adoption 
decision. Presented as codified observations (in Tables 3.4 and 3.6) and catalogued 
according to decision antecedents in Figure 2.5, results indicate a varying and broad 
range of factors influencing both primary and secondary adoption decisions for each 
national culture. Overall, a large proportion have their grounding in the cultural and 
social context of the organisation with very few related to innovation perceptions. 
This highlights the deficiency in traditional organisational frameworks of technology 
diffusion and the need for additional explanatory power as highlighted in summary 
points 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 (in §2.8). In general, the following differences were observed 
between the two cultures: 
• The dominance of the group versus individual dynamic in the Australian context. 
This was in part due .to the strong effects of opinion leadership not observed in 
India. 
• The different incentive schemata used by individuals to evaluate the Simpress 
system. Such schemata are shaped by culture (both organisational and national). 
Indians have a comparatively 'soft' schema relative to Australian shop floor 
workers. 
• The degree of managerial intervention needed to implement the system in 
Australia was much higher than in India. This indicates the difficulty associated 
with implementation and is a measure of the politics and bureaucracy involved. 
• Each culture has a different notion of time primarily dictated by a management 
mindset which in Australia is characterised by a short-term outlook. In 
comparison, Indians are capable of a longer term view which is favourable for 
complex technology adoption. 
The impending technology transfer and adoption can be conceptualised as a game 
between management and the worker, each weighing perceived advantages and 
disadvantages associated with adoption relative to their internal schemata. This is 
analogous to a typical cost-benefit analysis which the individual performs sub-
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consciously. The extent and senousness of the game is in the first instance 
determined by the technology itself and later moderated by the cultural, organisational 
and social norms which dictate play (as well as form the basis of the individual's 
schema). 
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Chapter 4 - Ford and Technology Transfer 
For global corporations such as Ford, the competitive need for innovation based on 
robust technology transfer is imperative. Underscoring progress and sales growth 
within the automotive industry is a market demand for vehicles stocked with the latest 
technology (Whipp & Clark, 1986). These product technologies are supported by the 
latest process technologies that reduce both production costs and lead times, hence 
resulting in overall efficiency improvements. The greatest competitive advantage in 
terms of sales growth however, will be accorded to the automotive manufacturers who 
have well developed capabilities associated with the timely exploitation of these new 
product and process technologies. In this context, the term exploitation refers to two 
distinct aspects of the innovation process - development and implementation, which 
organisations such as Ford Motor Company (FMC) have struggled to understand and 
improve. A prerequisite to both development and implementation however, is the 
generation process (elements 1 and 2 in Figure 2.1 ). Characterised as the generation of 
ideas and invention based upon basic research, it is the wellspring of knowledge and 
ideas upon which the innovation process feeds. 
The application of these ideas and the harnessing of this knowledge to produce 
something tangible with application in a real world sense, constitutes development. 
Commonly termed experimental development, advanced engineering or applied 
research, development encompasses all these activities (elements 2 and 3 in Figure 
2.1). In reality, basic research is undertaken without any particular application or use 
in mind. Its purpose, as defined by the Frascati Manual (OECD - Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1993 ), is the formulation of new knowledge 
in the form of hypotheses, theories and laws. Applied research (featuring within the 
development phase), develops this knowledge in operational form, which is grounded 
in products, operations, methods or systems. The final aspect of the innovation cycle 
is sometimes termed commercialisation and encapsulates the implementation of the 
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tangibles developed in the preceding stage for economic (in the case of a corporation) 
or social benefit (in the case of government). 
The beginning of the technology transfer process is obscure. The definition adopted in 
Chapter 2 (and depicted schematically in Figure 2.2) is allied around the movement of 
technology from producer to one or multiple users. From a commercial perspective, 
this begins when application within an organisational context is considered - typically 
commencing at the applied research stage. Organisations however, generally employ a 
limited scope of their definition of technology transfer, referring only to the complex, 
risk laden and ambiguous activities surrounding commercial use and diffusion. The 
research undertaken here aims to investigate these activities with a view to developing 
an understanding of the technology transfer processes used within the FMC. The 
preceding chapter investigated the implementation of technology at a micro-level 
within two Ford subsidiaries (located in Australia and India respectively). The 
research in this chapter however, adopts a macro-level perspective, investigating 
processes that occur at a corporate level and on a global scale. 
4.1 A History of Innovation - Ford and the Automotive Industry 
To enhance the contextual understanding of the technology transfer processes utilised 
by Ford, an appreciation of its history from an innovation perspective is necessary. 
The following descriptive overview discusses the technological and organisational 
development of Ford in association with the automotive industry in general and its 
principal competitors. 
The Early Years 
Incorporated on June 13, 1903, the Ford Motor Company began assembling its first 
car, the two-cylinder Model A. During the period 1904/05 the Ford company offered a 
range of vehicles which included: the Model C 'runabout', the Model F 'touring car', 
and the larger and heavier Model B. In an effort to gain a controlling share and force 
out directors who had initially helped to capitalise the company, Henry Ford 
established a new company, the Ford Manufacturing Company. In 1906, Henry Ford 
managed to gain stock control of both companies and committed them to the 
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production of a standardised, low cost, light weight car. With an influx of orders for 
the new Model N, it soon became apparent that the Ford Manufacturing Company 
could not produce enough comp~~enftcto sa"tisfy demand. In that same year, Ford 
hired a machine tool and production specialist, Walter E. Flanders, to reform and 
improve manufacturing output. Thus, over the next two years, the modern concept of 
the production line controlled by a production schedule was born. This was 
accompanied by the introduction of standardised jigs and the arrangement of machine 
tools in lines according to operation (Dassbach, 1989). 
Upon advice from Flanders, the Ford board authorised the purchase of land at 
Highland Park and constructed a new factory which began operation in 1910. This 
facilitated the integration of manufacturing and assembly operations and would later 
lead to the development of the moving assembly line. In 1908, Ford released the 
famous Model T and was immediately forced to cease production of the N because of 
demand. As a result, Ford introduced the modern concept of branch assembly, with 
the first assembly plant commencing in Kansas City in 1910. That was subsequently 
followed by the establishment of another 22 assembly plants throughout the United 
States over the next 5 years. In its Highland Park complex, Ford was able to expand 
production and increase worker efficiency (by replacing universal machine tools with 
specialised single-purpose machines). This created a reinforcing-effect, lowering the 
price of the Model T and thus continuing to increase demand. 
In 1904, the FMC established the Ford Motor Company of Canada to assemble and 
distribute Ford cars to the British Empire (except Great Britain and Ireland whose 
franchises had already been awarded to the American Motor Car Agency). This was 
superseded in 1911 by the incorporation of the Ford Motor Company (England), and 
opening of an assembly plant in Trafford Park, Manchester (to assemble right-hand 
drive Model T's). Two years later, in 1913, Ford opened its second assembly plant in 
Bordeaux, France. By the end of this same year, Ford was the largest automobile 
producer in the world. Its success was based on a period of intense innovation in both 
product, process, people and organisation. This was further demonstrated in 
subsequent years by the introduction of the "five dollar day" wage and the advent of 
mass production. Some authors record both innovations as stemming from separate 
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problems while others believe that the former was a direct consequence of the latter 
(Dassbach, 1989; Braverman, 1974). 
Both innovations however, shared a common impetus - the increasing demand for the 
Model T. The introduction of conveyors in 1913 and a series of time-motion studies 
undertaken in late 1912 precipitated the introduction of the moving assembly line. By 
early 1914, the moving line had cut assembly times from 12.5 hours per chassis to just 
under 1.5. To this day, the same basic principles are used in the manufacture and 
assembly of cars by every automotive company in the world. Further, the conditions 
which surround this type of employment were to become characteristic of the 
automobile industry in general. Previous craft-based production had been turned into 
repetitive detail operation and wage rates were standardised. The deskilling of work 
and the capitalist mode of production disparaged by Marx had been born (Braverman, 
1974). 
The response of workers to the assembly line was one of disgust, claiming its 
"objective was to accommodate men to monotony and maximise labour productivity" 
(Lewchuk, 1993). Extending Marxist philosophy on capitalism, Gramsci popularised 
the terms 'Amercianism' and 'Fordism' referring to the social institutions of mass 
production (Rupert, 1995). The former heralded the formation of unionism which 
effectively turned the socialisation of work into a continual conflict between worker 
and management. The situation was made more intense by massive vertical integration 
of the organisation and the "brutal driving of workers" (Dassbach, 1989) by an 
·exceedingly hierarchical management. The worker mistrust and antagonism, which 
grew out of the hegemony hastened by mass production, is today still evident in 
worker-management relations. This is particularly so in most westernised countries. 
The "five dollar day" introduced in 1914 was not only a direct response to the 
increasing drive by workers for unionisation. Ford had also anticipated high labour 
turnover rates as a consequence of the degradation of work resulting from mass 
production. Despite the intensification of work however, labour turnover at Ford 
virtually ceased after its introduction. Estimating a demand in excess of 2 million 
units per year in 1925, Ford decided to expand its vertical integration and establish 
new manufacturing and assembly facilities. The Rouge was initially opened in 1919 
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and expanded over a six year period to include steel mills, paper mills, glass factories 
and power plants. During this time Ford established assembly plants in South America 
and Central Europe. It adopted a centralised management approach dictating 
instructions relating to every area of business functioning, including accounting, sales, 
production, and purchasing. It was expected that each operation would "follow these 
to the letter" (Dassbach, 1989). All major decisions were controlled from Company 
headquarters in Detroit, which maintained a strict no union policy for all its workers 
worldwide. 
In the early 1920' s Henry Ford's dominance over the company inadvertently resulted 
in the transfer of knowledge and innovation to competing companies such as General 
Motors. This was a direct consequence of a period during which many executives 
were discharged by Ford and subsequently hired by its United States competitors. The 
year 1925 marked both a high-point in the company's sales history and the beginning 
of its decline due in principal to a lack of innovation. The Model T was becoming 
increasingly outdated and compani~s such as General Motors and Dodge were offering 
superior products, based on changing market perceptions and requirements. 
Responding to this Ford discontinued the Model Tin 1927 and started designing the 
new Model A which began production in 1928. By this time it had established 
operations in South-Africa, Australia, India and Malaysia. These and all other 
worldwide facilities were closed after assembling the remaining Model T's. The long 
closure was the result of excessive centralisation accompanied by a lack of structure 
and organisational resources. Ford had no capability to effect a model change. As 
such, all existing machinery had to be scrapped and every factory completely re-
tooled. 
General Motors seized on this opportunity and became the largest selling automotive 
manufacturer in the United States. The release of the Model A was not able to 
replicate the success of the Model T and worldwide sales dropped. This was 
particularly the case in Europe where local manufacturers had copied Ford's mass 
production philosophy and governments had implemented tariff protection making 
imported Ford cars uncompetitive. New innovations by General Motors allowed it to 
dominate the market, a triumph which came to be termed 'Sloanism' after Alfred P. 
Sloan of General Motors. A modification of 'Fordism', Sloan recognised the 
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emergence of the 'mass-class' market and aimed to produce a car in four autonomous 
divisions for each consumer class (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1986). To prevent disruptions 
caused by the large number of model changes required, General Motors introduced 
new ways of forecasting demand, decreased vertical integration by purchasing from 
outside contractors, and began the familiar practice of interchanging parts between 
models. The use of specialised machine tools was decreased, instead employing more 
toolmakers to modify flexible machinery to suit each model variation. All these 
innovations still form the basic principles of automotive manufacture and production 
today. 
Ford however, continued to believe in its mass production principles based on strict 
vertical integration. In 1932 Ford opened a new manufacturing and assembly plant at 
Dagenham, which was then the largest in Europe. It was a smaller version of the 
Rouge with its own foundry and was meant to supply the rest of Ford's European 
assembly facilities. Meanwhile, in the United States declining Model A sales forced 
Ford to develop and introduce its next major innovation - the V8. This marked the 
introduction of affordable, mass produced, large and powerful cars which have 
dominated the United States consumer market since the engine's production in 1930. 
In the year's 1929 to 1932 Ford posted severe losses as a result of excessive capacity 
under-utilisation in its manufacturing sites in Europe and the United States. Another 
reason was the lack of innovation in product. As a result, in 1932 Ford decided to 
adopt a General Motors innovation - annual styling changes, which its other United 
States competitors had been using since the late 1920's. Sales in Europe began to 
steadily increase throughout the mid and later part of the 1930's due to increasing 
decentralisation, which allowed local design of cars to match tastes and environmental 
conditions. 
The Postwar Era 
By this time a strong differentiation between North American and European markets 
had emerged, one which is still evident today. Demand outside the United States 
remained biased towards small, fuel efficient vehicles while in America consumers 
preferred large, powerful vehicles. Further, by 1949, Ford Brit~n had discontinued 
V8 production essentially ceasing any commonality which existed between European 
and North American operations. By this time, within Europe itself, each of Ford's 
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companies (Britain, France and Germany) independently developed and manufactured 
models for their own markets. No standardisation or interchangeability of parts -
innovations earlier pioneered by General Motors, was apparent. Ford of France was 
liquidated in 1954. 
The mid-1930's marked the decline of Ford, first as a leader in sales and second as a 
leader in innovation. The latter firmly entrenched the company as predominantly a 
technology follower - a description which is still befitting of the company today 
(Dassbach, 1989; Pantano, 2003b; 2003c ). Displaced to third behind General Motors 
and Chrysler respectively, Ford was forced to duplicate General Motors in terms of 
increasing automobile size, engine displacements and models to try and regain its 
position. Further, Ford hired a number of General Motors executives to reform its 
organisational structure adopting the decentralised structure of its competitor 
(Banham, 2002). The same executives also introduced a research and development 
area in 1946, supplemented later that year by the construction of a purpose-built 
engineering centre. In 1951 Ford established a scientific research laboratory which in 
1962 was split into two laboratories: the Scientific Laboratory and Applied Research. 
By the early 1950's, the top three United States automotive companies (which 
included Ford), "had turned their backs on innovation and abandoned investments in 
experiments that did not yield quick results. For 20 years, the only major technical 
innovations in the United States came in the field of air-conditioning" (Tolliday & 
Zeitlin, 1986). Ford continued to emulate its main rival General Motors in recognition 
of its leadership, "intentionally" copying its corporate line-up (Dassbach, 1989). The 
same pattern continued well into the mid-1970's. During this time Ford's competitive 
strategies were resigned to emulation as opposed to innovation and consequently the 
chance to reclaim market leadership was lost. In the United States during the mid-
1950' s, a market was beginning to develop for smaller vehicles. Ford had considered 
producing a model to attract this lucrative consumer class, however, the market was 
ignored since General Motors "had no immediate plans for producing a small car" 
(Dassbach, 1989). 
A decline in sales and the increasing costs associated with independent operation 
forced the creation of Ford of Europe in 1967 (with the merger of its British and 
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German operations). This was followed in 1973 by a re-organisation, a result of 
persistent problems with labour in its British operations. Ford of Germany was thus 
established as Ford of Europe headquarters and its British operations were transformed 
into a subsidiary primarily responsible for the manufacture of commercial vehicles 
(Banham, 2002). Thus by the early 1970's "Ford's global organisation consisted of 
two regionally integrated and centrally coordinated production and assembly networks, 
one in Europe and the other in North America; five relatively independent national 
companies in Brazil, Australia, Argentina, South Africa and Mexico linked to these 
regional networks through the transfer of technology; and 19 local assembly operations 
run, in most cases, by licensees" (Dassbach, 1989). 
During this same period, Ford conceived the "world car" project. In North America, 
Japanese imports were starting to grow in sales as consumers recognised their 
superiority and lower gas mileage. In Europe, Ford's small car offerings were 
beginning to age and the company did not offer a small, fuel efficient vehicle suited to 
either market. Precipitated by the global oil crisis in 1973/1974, Ford decided to 
develop a small, modem, fuel efficient vehicle which it would sell globally. Past 
experience in both markets had proven that the vehicle could not be a rehash of old 
technology and hence a duplication of parity. Imports from Japan had led the way in 
introducing a radically new generation of small car and thus Ford was forced to follow. 
To accompany the development of the Fiesta (as the car came to be known), Ford 
restructured its advanced R&D activities. A new Corporate Planning and Research 
group was created and given responsibility for all advanced R&D on a worldwide 
basis. In order to establish technical parity, the group began by disassembling 
competing Japanese and European cars in a massive benchmarking study. 
After the oil crisis had ended, sales of large V8 cars in North America increased to the 
point where Ford was forced to ration supply. As a result, Ford decided not to 
manufacture the Fiesta in North America, a decision based purely on economics as 
expressed by Henry Ford II "minicars meant mini-profits." By 1979 however, Ford 
came to regret this myopic decision. The Iranian revolution resulted in a second oil 
crisis and demand in the United States quickly shifted towards smaller cars. Ford was 
totally unprepared for this shift and had no suitable offerings in the small car market. 
Thus Ford was totally outclassed by European and especially Japanese imports. 
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Competition from Japanese imports also affected its sales in Europe with a decline in 
worldwide sales of almost 25 percent between 1979 and 1980. This prompted a 
massive long-term reorganisation grounded in initiatives to reduce the size of its 
workforce (which was reduced from 506,500 to 390,000 at the end of 1984), 
implement new process and product technology (to rejuvenate an ageing product 
lineup), and integrate its worldwide operations (allowing major western operations to 
source parts from operations in low wage areas). 
The Technological Era 
The early 1980's marked the beginning of a period of abundant technological 
innovation within the automotive industry (Jones, 1989). Forced to follow the lead of 
its principal Japanese competitors, Ford introduced a number of technologies, which 
included computer controlled vehicle production, Computer Aided Design and 
Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) systems, robotics, numerically 
controlled machinery, laser welding and Kanban. This latter innovation, was adopted 
from the system of production developed and used by the Japanese. The system could 
"outpace Western car manufacturers in labour productivity, product quality and cost 
competitiveness whilst also permitting the production of a wider range of models and 
more flexible responses to market trends" (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1986). Large 
technological advances were also being made by the Japanese in the area of engine 
technology. Jones (1989) in an examination of United States patenting activity 
showed that the Japanese automotive manufacturers were awarded twice as many 
patents in this area compared to their European and American counterparts. 
The growth of the globalisation phenomenon had been attributed to increased 
affiuence among western car consumers, making them more receptive to paying for 
new technology. The Japanese were best suited and equipped to exploiting this 
technology gap which formed the basis of competition in the mid-1980' s. The 
Japanese system of production pioneered by Toyota, was probably the most significant 
innovation diffusion to the west in the 1980's (Jones, 1989). Initially, western 
companies attempted to outpace Japanese success by automating and flooding the 
production process with technology. This was followed in the 1990's by the outright 
adoption of the principles associated with the Toyota Production System, by Ford -
resulting in the Ford Production System (FPS). A number of the innovations 
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associated with the implementation of this system were social in nature - the use of 
team working (or in FPS - the Natural Work Group) and the decentralisation of skilled 
tasks to production workers. Ford admits to adopting a strategy of "organisational 
imitation", introducing an "After Japan" program focused on "automation, inventory 
reduction and quality control with more limited shifts in personnel policies and 
relations with suppliers" (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1986). 
Eventually Japanese automotive production principles commonly became known 
under the umbrella term 'lean manufacturing.' In the mid-1990's, Ford conceptualised 
a program (Ford 2000) to revolutionise its global operations creating a 'leaner', more 
efficient company. This involved combining North American and European units into 
a single operation. Later its other units around the world including Ford South 
America and Ford Asia-Pacific would join this operation, increasing global 
purchasing, engineering and manufacturing power. The goal of this program was to 
produce a more efficient international company "embracing teamwork, new 
technology and a worldwide outlook - one far less bureaucratic and insular" (Banham, 
2002). The program never succeeded (a consequence of engrained culture), and was 
later diluted to provide more autonomy for managers. Accompanying Ford 2000, was 
the development of a multi-brand global strategy through the acquisition of Volvo 
Cars, Jaguar, Aston Martin, Mazda and Land Rover. The underlying philosophy for 
these acquisitions was that Ford could "reap synergies in design, engineering and 
manufacturing, helping it squeeze purchasing and production costs and amortise new 
technology and research expenses" (Banham, 2002). 
Today, the major challenge for international automotive manufacturers with multi-
regional operations, remains one of "how best to combine and exploit the particular 
engineering and market characteristics of each region by transferring the knowledge, 
technology and people from one region to another" (Jones, 1989). The importance of 
this inter-regional transfer has grown over the past decade as automotive 
manufacturers rapidly expand into the Asia-Pacific region and established markets in 
North America and Europe continue to mature. Of the expected 18.3 million units in 
new worldwide production capacity to 2010, over 45 percent (or 8.3 million) will 
come from the Asia-Pacific region alone (Stoddard, 2003). Both China and India are 
expected to show the largest increases in capacity, as depicted in Figure 4.1. The 
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product needs, technical challenges and methods of doing business in the Asia-Pacific 
region are very different from those of more mature markets in North America and 
Europe. Complexity is added by the volatile and sporadic geo-political environment 
and vast cultural differences which exist between countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Figure 4.1: Projected Asia-Pacific Capacity (2002 - 2010). Source: Stoddard (2003) 
4.2 Global Technology Transfer Networks 
The Asia-Pacific region offers diverse technical challenges that reqmre a strong 
research and development presence. There is a critical need within the region to 
develop and implement technologies which will primarily reduce cost and increase 
robustness and quality. These technologies are different from those needed in mature 
western markets, where competition has progressed and is partly based on relatively 
advanced product technology. The major aim of multinational firms that establish 
overseas research facilities, is to adapt their products to local conditions and "tap" 
foreign technology (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe, 2001). Consequently automotive 
manufacturers such as General Motors and Toyota have evolved inter-regional triadic 
networks of innovation. Transfer of knowledge and technology within these networks 
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1s facilitated by state-of-the-art communication technologies designed to avoid 
resource and research duplication, and disseminate technical knowledge globally for 
rapid assimilation into products and processes (Pantano, 2003a). In addition, 
establishing R&D nodes within each region allows access to external R&D sources 
through exposure to a broad array of global science and technology assets (which 
include universities and research institutions). If this process is controlled and 
managed effectively, knowledge can be transferred across regions. 
In 1994 Ford expanded its research activities from the United States to Europe, with 
the establishment of Ford Forschungszentrum Aachen (FF A). The primary role of 
FF A is too collaborate with research institutes and universities throughout Europe. In 
this sense, FF A acts as a virtual R&D centre linking external research interests to the 
organisation and facilitating knowledge transfer and implementation. However since 
the establishment of FF A, Ford has failed to follow the lead of both General Motors 
and Toyota who have developed a comparatively significant research and development 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region. While Ford has a number of research programs 
within the Asia-Pacific region they are disparate, as depicted in Figure 4.2a. They 
continue to employ a dual node strategy while both General Motors and Toyota have 
developed triadic technology transfer networks as depicted in Figures 4.2b and 4.2c 
respectively. 
4.3 The Status of Technology Transfer within Ford 
Patent counts are increasingly used as an alternative measure of innovation output and 
technological performance (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe, 2001; Gans & Stem, 2003; 
Griliches, 1990). A patent is a "policy instrument intended to encourage the making of 
inventions and the subsequent innovative work that will put those inventions to 
practical use" (OECD, 2003). Thus patents are indicators of a firm's inventive 
performance and can serve to measure R&D output. Griliches (1990), in a study of 
patents as economic indicators, found that a strong relationship existed between 
expenditure on R&D and patent numbers, implying that "patents are a good indicator 
of differences in inventive activity across different firms." Jones (1989) used this 
principle to measure technological activity across the world automobile industry (in 
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the period 1980 to 1985). Examining patent statistics by automotive company in both 
1980 and 1985, Jones (1989) was able to show that Japanese firms were awarded more 
patents than United States firms in their home market (as depicted in Figure 4.3). This 
was followed by claims that "there is significantly more appropriable technology in 
each car produced by Toyota, Nissan and Honda than by any of their competitors, and 
that US firms are particularly poor at translating R&D into finished products" (Jones, 
1989). 
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Figure 4.3: Automotive corporate patenting activity in the United States 
(for the years 1980 and 1985). Reproduced from Jones (1989). 
The relationship between patent production and technological performance is linked 
through commercialisation and technology transfer (both activities encompassed 
within experimental development). Therefore, claims which associate technological 
performance (in terms of finished products) with patent generation alone, may be 
flawed. While a firm's R&D expenditure may be proportional to its patent generation, 
the same trend does not necessarily apply to finished products. Some firm's have an 
increased propensity for transfer and commercialisation (most notably the Japanese) 
while others find it a major challenge. In 2001, Ford Motor Company generated 360 
patents (as depicted in Figure 4.4), and spent $US 7.4 billion on R&D (Ambrecht & 
Whiteley, 2003)-placing it as the top ranked United States company in terms ofR&D 
investment (General Motors ranked second spending $US 6.2 billion). Consequently, 
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Ford Motor Company generated the highest number of patents of any United States 
automotive manufacturer (General Motors generated 176 patents in the same year). 
This proportionate relationship between R&D expenditure and patent generation was 
noted by Griliches (1990). 
Returns in terms of sales and profits however, where comparably lower relative to 
rival Japanese firms and other United States non-automotive manufacturers (such as 
General Electric and 3M) (Ambrecht & Whiteley, 2003). While commercialisation 
and technology transfer performance cannot be measured autonomously in terms of 
sales and profits as a simple translation from patent generation, it does have some 
effect. The conversion of R&D into finished products or processes has the potential to 
increase market share and production efficiency respectively, having potentially 
positive effects on sales and hence profit. Thus while United States automotive 
manufacturers (most notably Ford Motor Company) have increased patent generation 
(through increased R&D expenditure), they still remain poor at translating R&D into 
finished products as originally noted by Jones (1989). Historical patent generation for 
major world automobile manufacturers over the period 1998 - 2001 is depicted in 
Figure 4.4. 
Success in terms of research and development can be defined in many ways depending 
on the point of view taken. The R&D entity itself may define success using 
quantitative factors such as the number of patents generated or papers published per 
researcher. Its corporate parent on the other hand, will invariably apply a different set 
of assessment criteria. This was not always the case with corporate R&D in the post 
World War II era and for many subsequent decades being left to its own investigative 
devices and direction, regardless of organisational relevance. As a consequence of the 
intensification of global competition however, corporate management now expect a 
high degree of relevancy and a high implementation rate, which they can quantify 
using economic variables such as rate of return on investment in R&D. Accordingly, 
the focus of corporate R&D entities has shifted from what was previously a primarily 
exploratory basis to one which places increased emphasis on applied and 
developmental work. 
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Figure 4.4: Automotive corporate patenting activity in the United States (1998 to 2001). 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office, Office of Electronic Information Products -
Technology Assessment and Forecast Program. Represents patent counts for automotive 
organisations awarded during the calendar year. 
The two primary corporate R&D entities within Ford - Research and Applied 
Engineering (R&A) and FF A (as depicted in Figure 4.2), have adopted philosophies 
that support this change in emphasis. The motivation associated with the critical need 
for change stemmed from a poor internal implementation rate (which was thought to 
be less than 10 percent in 1999). A number of transformative actions were adopted, 
most of which were centred around: (i) a reversal in resource allocation (focusing the 
majority of resources on downstream advanced/development work as opposed to 
upstream research); and (ii) downsizing of the total R&D project portfolio 
(consolidating the number of projects by approximately 80 percent). Both these 
measures, in part, have contributed to an overall increase in the implementation rate 
which as of early 2003 was thought to be around 50 percent (Pantano, 2003c ). 
These major operational and structural transformations, have been accompanied by 
fundamental changes in the way researchers approach their work. The basis for this 
change has its foundation in two primary factors: 
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(i) a realisation of the inherent culture within Ford which can act as a major barrier 
to technology transfer; and, 
(ii) the need for a more entrepreneurial approach to work, especially in view of the 
competitive conditions which now surround project funding approval and the 
subsequent need for implementation. 
Within both corporate R&D entities, debate is centred around whether the 
implementation rate can be increased and sustained (at a high level) through structural 
changes and various other mechanisms (such as placing end users under contractual 
obligation to adopt). It is argued that addressing the fundamental issue of culture and 
its lack of innovativeness as a barrier to advanced technology transfer is the main issue 
which will continue to inhibit a high implementation rate (Pantano, 2003b ). This issue 
of culture has a strong bearing on technology transfer and explains why Japanese 
organisations such as Honda and Toyota have a greater propensity for technology 
transfer (Jones, 1989), and others such as General Electric revolutionised their culture 
to one which supports learning to speed the innovation _process. 
Ford is not alone in this challenge with most other western multinational organisations 
facing similar challenges. The problem is compounded by the global spread of 
operations and the subsequent need to integrate "economics, political forces, energy, 
and national differences in social and cultural norms" across each of these operations 
(Howell & Hsu, 2002). 
4.3.1 Research Methodology 
To better understand the technology transfer process (at a corporate level) and the 
factors which affect its efficiency, a cross-sectional research design was adopted 
utilising interview techniques. While longitudinal designs have certain analytical 
advantages in the field of technology transfer (as described in 3.2), organisational 
access and resources prevented such studies. Interviews (22 in all) were conducted at: 
(i) FF A in Aachen, Germany; (ii) R&A in Detroit, United States; and (iii) Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology Development (AMTD) in Detroit, United States. The 
latter corporate unit is responsible for the development of manufacturing process 
technology and subsequent implementation within Ford plants (predominantly in 
North America). These interviews were supplemented with visits to Ford entities in 
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both Europe and North America to discuss the flow of technology within the 
multinational company. These included: Ford of Germany (Cologne); Jaguar (United 
Kingdom); Ford World Headquarters (Detroit); and Ford Advanced Engineering 
(Detroit). All interviews and visits were conducted between the 23rd of August 2002 
and the 11th of October 2002. 
A number of interview formats were utilised ranging from formal (with pre-defined 
questions) to open-ended, designed to allow respondents to describe anecdotally. The 
format type adopted was dependent on the organisational importance of the person and 
time available. The interview respondents were from a variety of backgrounds 
including: research management, research planning, research, engineering, senior 
management, and manufacturing technology development (AMTD). Interview 
duration ranged from 30 minutes (pre-defined questions) to 2 hours (open-ended 
format). Over 80 percent of the interviews conducted adopted the latter format. All 
interviews were conducted by the researcher and respondent anonymity was a 
precondition of the interviews. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed. As 
a result of the open-ended question format, a grounded theory methodology was used 
to analyse the interview transcripts (as described in §3.3.3). 
After employing an open coding technique the transcripts were reduced to 95 codified 
observations. Observations which occurred more than once were catalogued and have 
been presented below. Each catalogued observation has been classified into five major 
categories which include: (i) R&D; (ii) culture; (iii) strategy; (iv) mechanism; and (v) 
management. 
4.3.2 Codified Observations 
All categories relate to the current state of technology transfer within Ford. All 
codified observations have been listed under each category in random order and in no 
way reflect any order of importance. 
4. 3. 2.1 - Research and Development 
The observations listed under this category reflect the current state of research and 
development within R&A: 
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1.1 R&A works externally through a number of collaborations and joint funding 
projects. The University Research Program (URP) forms a major component of 
this external work. Previously funded at over $US 3 million per annum, its 
funding has been cut in recent years (currently less than $US 1.8 million per 
annum). Further, new measures have been put in place to try and extract more 
value from the URP program through a system of co-sponsorship (with Ford 
employees) and annual monitoring. The Ford-MIT alliance is the largest external 
program in terms of funding ($US 20 million over 5 years). Due to the large 
cultural gaps which exist between United States universities and business 
organisations such as Ford, there has been a long period of learning and 
acclimatisation. Value creation expectations on behalf of Ford have increased 
over this period such that current projects are more closely linked to company 
priorities. The challenge facing the alliance lies in meeting these expectations 
(Pantano, 2003b; 2003c). To date, results from this program (in terms of 
quantifiable value creation for Ford) have been moderate. 
1.2 A reduction in basic and exploratory research (typically termed long-term 
research) has resulted in a greater emphasis on more applied/advanced work 
(typically termed short-term research). This re-focus has its foundation in three 
main causes: (1) a low implementation rate, (2) changing company vision in 
terms of the role of research, and (3) the incorporation of R&A and FF A under 
the Product Development (PD) division. The latter has resulted in a fundamental 
clash of culture as: 
(a) the research function is forced to report to PD, 
(b) a short-term perspective is forced upon research work, 
( c) PD systems of work are utilised which are inappropriate in a research 
environment (having to produce quarterly deliverables is an example. This 
method of work is a consequence of the fundamental way in which PD 
operates - programs and projects must have deadlines and deliverables), 
and 
(d) diverse methods of operation which seem to restrict R&A's efficiency and 
success. 
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This restriction stems from the need for R&A to work and collaborate with a 
diverse range of people throughout the Ford organisation. This is a situation 
which may present resource conflicts (in terms of sharing) to PD. 
1.3 These methods of work may be suited to short-term advanced engineering work, 
but act as barriers to efficiency in terms of research. Given the troubled 
economic conditions which currently exist within Ford, researchers realise that 
the reduction and expedition of long-term research activities to support short-
term and current customer problems is critical to both the long-term survival of 
the company and the availability of resources to conduct future long-term 
research. It is imperative however, that a balanced portfolio of long-term and 
short-term research be achieved in future. This criticality stems from the 
importance of R&D towards innovation within Ford and subsequent 
organisational justification of both the human and physical resources within 
R&A. The R&A - PD cultural differences which discourage long-term research 
must be addressed when developing a balanced portfolio. 
1.4 The reduction in long-term research activities presents a void which has the 
potential to be partially filled through increased dependence and interaction with 
the university establishment. This would allow increased resource within R&A 
for more organisationally critical downstream work - in terms of development 
and application. The current state of university research within the United States 
is geared primarily towards basic research (due to the availability of National 
Science Foundation funding) which may present problems in terms of partnering. 
This is counter to the situation in Europe where universities show more cultural 
similarities to industry and tend to be more industry oriented. This is a result of a 
relatively increased dependence on industry funding in comparison to their 
American counterparts. FF A was partly established to leverage this 
commercially advantageous situation. In relation to the United States, picking 
the "right" university partner and developing relationships based on mutual risk, 
reward and value creation, and developing the mechanisms to manage such 
partnerships is critical. 
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1.5 The current scenario, in which Ford's long-term exploratory research portfolio is 
being reduced in parallel with reductions in external research funding, may seem 
paradoxical. If R&A wishes to outsource this aspect of its research portfolio then 
decreasing available funding will not facilitate this outsourcing and further, 
places Ford at immediate risk in terms of being able to meet its long-term 
technological requirements in relation to its competitors. 
1. 6 As R&A moves towards becoming more organisationally relevant and increasing 
its implementation rate through sustained technology transfer, an elemental shift 
in the way researchers interact with the organisation must occur. The traditional 
"laboratory bound academic" needs to be replaced by a more entrepreneurial, 
market driven researcher who interacts with the customer forming relationships 
based principally on trust. These relationships need to be nurtured over time and 
form the fundamental platform upon which technology transfer takes place. This 
requires researchers who can go between and feel comfortable within the two 
culturally distinct spheres of research and Ford operations - a quality and skill 
which is rare but essential. 
4.3.2.2- C:ulture 
The observations listed under this category reflect the cultural characteristics both 
within Ford as a whole and R&A, that either promote or inhibit technology transfer: 
2.1 Ford North America has a particularly risk-adverse culture which acts as a barrier 
to technology transfer. Interestingly, Ford's European operations display a 
greater propensity to adopt technology than their North American counterparts. 
This explains why a large proportion of R&A's output (research and technology) 
flows to Europe first. The adversity to risk is exacerbated by a short-term focus 
inherent in Ford operations. While the nature of Ford operational work may 
warrant such a short-term focus, the situation is both compounded by high job 
rotation rates and a management outlook which drives short-term time horizons. 
This is perhaps the greatest inhibitor of both organisational growth and 
technology transfer within Ford. In times of organisational crisis however, 
especially ones which are of a technical nature, these factors are not as apparent. 
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2.2 The current reward and recognition structure in conjunction with the 
performance appraisal system have the potential to reinforce both a short-term 
focus and an individual and career-centred perspective on work (as opposed to a 
collective or organisational perspective). In these situations, technology transfer 
can only occur when there is some mutual benefit to the individual involved. In 
other words, the decision maker must be given an incentive to allow the 
technology transfer, which in situations involving long-term research and 
development, can be extremely difficult (the situation again exacerbated by a 
high job rotation rate). 
2.3 In order to adequately establish sufficient incentives for technology transfer, the 
researcher may need to divest themselves of the credit that is normally associated 
with the development of high impact ideas. This is primarily the result of: (i) an 
overt human tendency to claim credit for ideas in situations where the benefits 
are high; and (ii) the need for researchers to offer such incentives (to potential 
adopters) if they are to facilitate technology transfer. Further, the organisational 
exposure given to a particular idea or technology may be considerably higher 
during the implementation, and as such, acknowledgement of the researcher or 
inventor may be lacking. 
2. 4 The evolution of a more entrepreneurial researcher may require adaptation to the 
culture and business mindset of Ford operations. Given the size of R&A in 
comparison to the overall organisation, it is easier for the researcher to adapt than 
to expect an immediate change in operational culture. An understanding of the 
business and creation of business plans that explicitly define customers, 
competitors and elements of value can be used to justify a business case for 
technology transfer. Problems arise however, when considering the disparity in 
timescales which exist between business and research. The development of 
business justification becomes difficult given the nature of research which is an 
exploratory activity whose basis involves discovery over unspecified and 
unknown periods of time. 
2. 5 Researchers have progressively realised the importance of creating organisational 
value. While research may be seen as indirectly contributing to value creation 
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within the company, there is growing consensus that the role of the researcher 
should be to: (1) have an impact in terms of cost reduction; (2) improve business 
and manufacturing processes; and (3) seek Ford first innovation and 
technologies. Justification of the value creating propensity of the researcher and 
R&A as a whole however, cannot be achieved solely through small short-term 
projects which enable high and relatively rapid impact. This again advocates the 
need for a balanced research portfolio. 
In addition, the performance evaluation of researchers within an industrial 
research setting should reflect such contribution to organisational value. This has 
the added benefit of stimulating interaction to encourage technology transfer. 
Performance evaluation should be based upon a mixture of traditional academic 
criteria (patents and papers for example), and business focused criteria that 
include customer interaction and implementation focused performance ratings. 
In the past, a lack of any system or clear mechanism f9r technology transfer 
coupled with no apparent incentives, made it difficult to effect the transfer of 
technology. The previous system involved "throwing the technology over the 
wall" to an operational division or advanced engineering :function. This 
traditionally marked the end of the researchers involvement in the transfer 
process. The system hence resulted in little technology transfer and researchers 
resigned themselves to "working on the next piece of research." New systems 
have now been implemented which do away with the "over the wall" paradigm 
and instead encourage interaction throughout the development and technology 
transfer phase. Thus the research performance evaluation system should seek to 
encourage and reward both the depth and broadness of this interaction. 
Jones (1989) has noted that Graves (1988) attributed the apparent inability of 
United States industry to translate high R&D spending into end-user products to 
differences in R&D organisation. In the United States R&D was vertically 
integrated: "conducted in large separate facilities which are not integrated with 
product development or manufacturing" (Jones, 1989). This was a structure 
epitomised by Ford. In Japan however, Graves (1988) noted that R&D was 
primarily team-based and collaborative in nature, forming an integral part of the 
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product development system. The success of the Japanese product development 
system is based on characteristics which also underlie their R&D systems (Jones, 
1989). Current Ford R&D organisational reforms are based on similar 
characteristics. 
2.6 Relative to Japanese culture, Ford operational culture is very much problem 
reactive. The Japanese have a strong tradition of continuous improvement and 
consequently they are constantly looking to improve processes and products in 
anticipation of increased future competition and economic benefit. It is this 
philosophy which is characteristic of Ford's Japanese competitors - principally 
Honda and Toyota. This forward-looking culture not only facilitates the process 
of technology transfer - it drives it. Although Ford may show signs of such a 
culture, its propensity to accept and assimilate new technology is usually 
heightened only when problems are encountered (crisis reactivity). This 
effectively makes the process of technology transfer difficult since the 
introduction of technology during times of normality is met with considerable 
resistance as operations generally prefer to use the technologies and methods 
which have served them well in the past ("I do not have a problem now - why do 
I need to change?"). Technology transfer is then a matter of timing, which is 
problematic given the disparity in timescales that exist between business and 
research (see 2.4). 
2. 7 The disparity in timescales and the increased propensity to change only in times 
of crisis, has serious implications in relation to the ability to anticipate. The 
corporate motto of R&A is to "Anticipate, Innovate, Incorporate." Anticipation 
in the corporate research sense encompasses the identification of potential future 
problems and innovations both in terms of product and process. It is then the 
function of R&A to solve these problems and develop these innovations through 
research. However, the ability to work on potential future problems and 
innovations is seriously restricted in cultures which are predominantly problem 
reactive ("we do not have a problem now - why are we looking at that?"). In 
addition, current R&A structural and operational transformations which require 
the formation of customer partnerships before project approval is granted, may 
further inhibit the ability ofR&A to anticipate. Justification of such projects are 
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often difficult when customers themselves do not have or cannot foresee such 
problems or the need for such innovations. 
2. 8 The hierarchical nature of the corporation incites a large amount of politics and 
resource protection which restricts the technology transfer process. The 
protectionist culture leads to the isolation of whole organisational units within 
Ford as they seek reward and recognition through the accumulation of credit. 
Association with other internal organisations such as R&A may diminish this 
credit and consequently technology transfer is made all the more difficult. This 
culture does not seem to be apparent at the working levels of the organisation but 
becomes more embedded as one moves up the hierarchy. 
2.9 Stemming from this protectionist culture is another organisational inhibitor of 
technology transfer which is commonly referred to as the "not invented here" 
syndrome. Usually prevalent in multinational organisations in cases involving 
intra-organisational cross-nationaltechnology transfer, the syndrome is the result 
of a tendency for people to reject ideas or inventions in which they had no 
participation. Both the syndrome and the protectionist philosophy which 
surround it, are exacerbated when technology transfer is undertaken by an 
internal technology provider such as R&A. External technology providers and 
consultants do not pose as great a threat in terms of the potential to reduce the 
organisational credit and recognition which follows successful implementation -
especially in cases of high impact technologies. 
2.10 The decision making process and the politics involved in subsequent follow 
through, lacks the consistency needed to achieve sustained technology transfer. 
This is in comparison to Japanese organisations such as Toyota, which have a 
structured and widespread decision making process that usually takes much 
longer than traditional western counterparts such as Ford. The extended process 
is the result of a greater sphere of consultation in relation to the decision. Where 
the two processes differ in terms of importance to technology transfer, is that 
when Japanese organisations make a decision it is adopted collectively and 
across time. Within Ford however, decisions seem to be person dependent, 
making them easily reversible by superiors or successors to the decision making 
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position. This is particularly problematic given the high job rotation rate within 
the company. This can result in a highly unstable technology transfer process, 
which is dependent on an individual as opposed to the collective organisation. 
4.3.2.3 Strategv 
The observations listed under this category reflect the diverse strategies which may be 
employed to effect successful technology transfer: 
3.1 There is a need to set clear and strategic directives in terms of research and 
technology. There is a feeling among researchers that Ford does not adequately 
articulate its strategic direction in terms of technology and future research. 
Further, research and technology direction is too strongly influenced by attribute 
focused marketing which does not allow accurate technology mapping. As a 
consequence, Ford is acknowledged as a technology follower in many respects. 
Other major contributors to this status include: (a) a number of cultural 
complexities that hinder the transfer process (as described in §4.3.2.2), (b) a 
company leadership and hierarchy dominated by financially oriented as opposed 
to technology oriented people, and ( c) no dedicated/fulltime board Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO). The organisation's status as a technology follower 
can be attributed to its risk aversion. Both of these attributes have been firmly 
entrenched into company philosophy since the mid- 1930's. The history of the 
company demonstrates a strong predisposition to 'follow' - first local 
competitors such as General Motors, and then later, Japanese competitors such as 
Toyota (as described in §4.1). 
3. 2 It has been identified that the most likely internal customers for Ford research 
and technology are Jaguar, Aston Martin and Lincoln. These brands exist in a 
low volume, high profit market segment and therefore have sufficient margins to 
be able to absorb the financial risks associated with new technology. Given the 
target consumer market for these brands, the technology required is more 
advanced than those in the high volume, low profit market segment. Both Jaguar 
and Aston are part of the Premier Automotive Group (P AG) which also includes 
Volvo and Land Rover. Collectively, these European based brands are more 
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innovative than the relatively coiiserv.ative brand~ in North America which 
exhibit a high degree of fixed investment. 
3.3 The complexity of automotive technology is such that greater systems integration 
is needed, requiring the delivery of technology further downstream than was 
previously the norm. Accordingly, this requires that the researcher stay with the 
technology longer to ensure its integration. This not only increases the overall 
cost of the technology but makes the technology transfer a costly part of the 
innovation process. New R&A organisational systems designed to promote 
technology transfer, encourage the researcher to become involved with the 
customer earlier and stay with the technology and customer much longer (as 
described in 2.5). This makes resource and funding allocation a key part of the 
technology development and implementation process. 
3. 4 The point of customer involvement in the R&D process is critical, especially if 
. the research is long-range. Ideally a researcher should engage a customer and 
then establish a long-term relationship. This is termed developing a "pipeline" 
for technology transfer where the customer then acts as a first point of contact for 
potential future technologies. The key to establishing such a pipeline is to build 
the relationship upon an initial success encompassing the implementation of 
technology (through perhaps a short-term research project) and then continue to 
develop the relationship based on trust. Once this has been achieved the 
customer may be engaged earlier in the technology development process. The 
development of customer contacts, relationships and pipelines is important for 
technology transfer. It is time consuming on behalf of the researcher primarily 
because high internal job rotation rates require broadness, persistence and 
continual development. 
3.5 AMTD has been able to maintain a relatively high implementation rate by 
focusing on customer needs in the medium to short-term. Since the unit interacts 
directly with manufacturing there is a heightened need for such a contracted 
focus. The Global Technology Manufacturing Council (GTMC) sets the 
strategic direction for manufacturing technology within Ford. The directions set 
by this council then form the focus of 'technology forums' held by AMTD twice 
150 
a year and sponsored by the heads of associated manufacturing divisions such as 
stamping. These forums try to convert the strategic directions set by the GTMC 
into specific manufacturing process requirements from which a gap analysis is 
conducted and the technologies needed to meet these requirements identified. 
This forms the scope of AMTD' s work. AMTD as an organisation, is strictly 
implementation focused and tries to limit project length to within 2 - 3 years. 
3.6 The current Ford business model makes no provision for new technology cost 
relief in terms of technology adoption and may limit the company's ability to 
innovate. The lead program in accepting a technology has to face the full 
investment burden and subsequent variable costs in implementing the new 
technology. The previous business model (encompassed by the "manufacturing 
of the future" fund), made provision for the costs associated with the 
implementation of new technology. Ford of Europe and other automotive 
manufacturers (such as Toyota) still use a similar mechanism whereby a certain 
percentage of program investment is allocated towards future technology 
adoption. Other high technology automotive manufacturers such as BMW use a 
program life saving formula whereby any money saved over the life of a program 
(relative to the Job 1 target cost) is assigned for future program technology 
investment. This effectively enables these later automotive manufacturers to: (a) 
adopt new technology faster; and (b) in the case of Toyota, introduce new 
technology into mid-product segments and then propagate up and down the 
product line. This is contrary to Ford philosophy which dictates introduction to 
P AG brands first, and then propagation down the product line once costs are 
reduced. 
4.3.2.4 Mechanism 
The observations listed under this category detail the specific mechanisms used to 
effect technology transfer: 
4.1 The "Big Bang" process is the name given to one of the new systems adopted by 
Ford Motor Company to promote technology transfer. The process relies on 
explicit timeframes and windows upon which technology development 
progresses and stakeholder involvement fluctuates according to the Job 1 
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deadline. The process uses a contractual mechanism as the platform for 
technology transfer with a view to committing the customer to accepting the 
technology within a 5 year window culminating in Job 1. The contractual 
mechanism forces the customer (usually a vehicle program) to accept 
responsibility for the technology (including funding) 3 years from 
implementation (Job 1 ). Illustrated in Figure 4.5, advanced 3 - 5 year project 
funding will not be available for research which has reached the 5 year window 
and does not have an identified customer who has committed to its 
implementation (the lead implementer). This ensures that funding is available to 
research projects which have customers and therefore have an increased chance 
of implementation. 
4.2 Ford's current cost model coupled with "Big Bang" contractual obligations 
requiring the customer to take full responsibility of technology development (at 
the 3 year window) may not be amenable to technology transfer. Some 
customers may withdraw from such agreements which wer~ made by 
predecessors (a consequence of the high job rotation rate), or because they do not 
have sufficient funding (a result of the Ford cost model as described in 3.6). 
Further, some customers may not be prepared to accept the inherent risk 
associated with technology development in the critical pre-implementation stages 
(0 - 3 years from Job 1 ). Problems with technology development which may 
require additional unforeseen resource and funding will be inherited by the 
customer - which in some cases, may have serious implications for program 
budgeting. 
4.3 The "Big Bang" process does provide some cost relief for the lead implementer, 
which has the added bonus of further technology diffusion (with minimal effort 
on behalf of R&A). This is only if the cost relief can be secured. Under "Big 
Bang" the customer is responsible for developing technology migration plans 
across brands and programs such that if another customer can be secured, the 
costs can be shared and variable costs reduced through increased volume. The 
cost mechanism is designed to drive the spread of technology according to Ford's 
top down cascading cost model. This may put unnecessary pressure on programs 
which are already under-resourced. 
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Figure 4.5: The "Big Bang" process windows. R&A resource allocation is greater 
in the 3-5 year advanced window (2/3), with remaining resources devoted to internal R&D. 
4. 4 Owing to the risk involved in technology transfer, building trust based 
relationships between researchers and operations is the cornerstone of a 
successful transfer event. Researchers have realised that if they are going to 
transfer any research they must work directly with the customer in the 
operational setting. The key to forming the relationship is to first start by 
working on and solving the customer's problems without any research project in 
view. In this way, the researcher is able to quickly establish credibility, respect, 
expertise and trust such that when they later approach the customer with research 
and technology proposals, there is a sense of ease and responsiveness. The 
formation of a working relationship between research and operations is 
imperative for technology transfer because of commonly held perceptions which 
lead to mistrust and a lack of understanding. Establishing a relationship whereby 
the researcher is willing to work with operations on their issues, removes the 
perception that research is only interested in furthering their own work and 
"producing papers and patents." 
4.5 Researchers who have established relationships can use a number of mechanisms 
to transfer technology. They can act as problem solvers and consultants, 
transferring knowledge to operations and in doing so, become recognised as 
technology leaders or experts. They can encompass their research and 
knowledge within technology such as software which the operations can use in 
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their daily work. They can actively work as part of an operation team to transfer 
a more advanced and complex technology and in doing so integrate themselves 
within the team. Embedding the researcher in this manner has certain advantages 
in that the researcher begins to understand the needs of the operations and is able 
to better customise the technology to match operational processes. Such 
embedding however, also has certain disadvantages which can include: (a) the 
researcher becoming another operational resource asked to do work not 
associated with their immediate research or implementation tasks; (b) the 
removal of operational resource devoted to implementation, the researcher 
instead given sole responsibility; and ( c) the pressure associated with the mixture 
of culture and politics may make the implementation event long and drawn out. 
4. 6 Acting as a third party broker between an external supplier and internal operation 
offers an interesting opportunity to effect indirect technology transfer. If 
particular research groups are allowed to act as a liaison between the program 
and potential suppliers, then the research group can coerce the supplier to 
develop and integrate their particular technology into the component. The 
research group is then able to test the different supplier components with their 
new technology incorporated before making a recommendation on which 
supplier to choose. In effect, the research group can use the supplier to develop 
and implement their technology, which they can then test and recommend to a 
program. This indirect technology transfer has distinct benefits which include 
turning a potential push situation into a pull - certainly if suppliers wish to 
compete then they have no alternative but to incorporate the new technology. 
4. 7 There is some conjecture as to whether the best mode of technology transfer is 
initiated at the grassroots level (within the operations) or at the management 
level. Some researchers believe that the technology transfer process begins by 
convincing and gaining management support for the implementation first. Some 
researchers have established close relationships with high level experienced 
people in the operations who are well known by senior management and whose 
opinion is respected accordingly. They use such relationships to champion new 
technology within the operations and they develop their credibility around this 
influential person which also makes it easier to push new technologies within the 
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operations. Further, current R&A processes, which showcase R&D projects to 
Customer Business Groups (CBGs) in an effort to attract potential customers, use 
this management level philosophy. R&A CBGs include: North American PD, 
Jaguar, Volvo, Land Rover, Aston, Ford Asia-Pacific and Ford Europe. 
Although some researchers concede that the CBG process is useful and that 
upper management 'buy-in' is always necessary, there is a strong belief that 
beginning at the grassroots level with people and operators who are going to use 
the technology is key. This relies on the researcher taking the technology to the 
operations and using their existing trust-based relationships to gain grassroots 
acceptance. This is especially important in the case of process technologies. 
Making CBGs and upper management aware of the technology may create some 
push within the operations but if the people and operators who have to use the 
technology are not convinced, then the transfer may become excessively 
difficult. 
4. 8 An interesting and effective model of process technology transfer adopted by 
AMTD, involves a system of piloting new technology. The mechanism 
encapsulates direct involvement of the customer in the transfer process, which is 
first preceded by incorporation of the technology into the customer's business 
plan for the next 5 to 10 years (designed to negate the affects of a high job 
rotation rate). During development the customer is continually engaged and 
asked to define the criteria which constitute success of the technology such that it 
is accepted into their operations. This usually involves some sort of piloting of 
the technology within the customer operations for an extended period of time (at 
full production). During this time, the customer inadvertently becomes 
operationally dependent on the technology and once the defined criteria have 
been met, the technology is signed off and accepted. This acts as a powerful 
symbol of endorsement among other potential adopters who can see the 
technology in operation. This mechanism acts to overcome the natural fear of 
the unknown given that a customer cannot accept a technology unless they 
understand: (i) how it works, (ii) that they can work with it, (iii) that it is robust, 
and (iv) that it will improve current processes. Implementing within the 
operation has the added advantage of reducing the perception of risk on behalf of 
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the customer and allows in-situ modifications of the technology to ensure 
operational system compatibility. 
4.3.2.5 Management 
The observations listed under this category detail the specific management issues 
involved in technology transfer: 
5.1 While it has been acknowledged that the CBG process is useful, its affects on 
long range research prospects may be harmful. While involvement of the CBGs 
is necessary to market potential technologies and to secure potential customers, 
most CBGs are production and program focused and thus do not exhibit the time 
frames needed for long range research. 
5.2 The connection of researchers to operations has been recognised as a problem 
which inhibits technology transfer. Given the difficulties which some 
researchers have had in establishing relationships locally, the problem is 
exacerbated when trying to establish relationships in other continents such as 
Europe and Asia. Some researchers simply do not have the reach or resources to 
interact with operations in countries such as Australia, and this can have harmful 
consequences in terms of ageing technology relative to local competitors. This 
advocates the critical need to establish an R&D node in the Asia-Pacific region 
to increase the flow of technology, knowledge and research developments both in 
and out of the region. Major competitors such as General Motors and Toyota 
have already established such nodes (as depicted in Figure 4.2). 
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
Collectively the observations presented in §4.3.2 underscore the myriad of factors 
which act to inhibit the technology transfer process within Ford. While the majority of 
these observations are context specific, they can be generalised to apply across any 
multinational organisation. This is particularly so in the case of multinationals with 
centralised regional R&D functions and a large number of operational divisions 
scattered around the world. The observations show that technology transfer involves a 
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complex interplay of economics, structure, organisation, culture, social norms, politics 
and power. Each of these factors however, is moderated by one primary factor -
culture. Observations indicate a culture underscored by: 
• risk aversion which shapes a predominantly "technology-follow" attitude, 
• an overtly traditional and hierarchal structure based on a reward and recognition 
system which seeks to acknowledge "stars", 
• short-term perspectives and individual-dependent decision making, precipitated by 
a high job rotation rate, and 
• a protectionist philosophy which impedes collaboration and thus inhibits the 
innovation process. 
Each of these points is detrimental to the organisational technology transfer process. 
They underpin Ford's inherent difficulty with the transfer and innovation process. 
This cultural miscellany has also permeated into local operations and there too acts as 
an inhibitor of innovation. This is evidenced. in observations from the Australian 
implementation case study described in §3.3.5 (see for example Obs. # 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
28, 29 and 32). 
While recent organisational reform within the corporate research areas has led to an 
increase in the implementation rate, the solutions are predominantly 'force-fit'. This is 
underscored by the 'Big-Bang' initiative accompanied by an overall reduction in 
research projects. Certainly it becomes much easier for researchers and management 
to focus on projects that have a high chance of implementation and disregard those that 
are considered relatively high risk (described as a "pick-the-winner" mentality). 
Invariably these high-risk projects are long-range in nature. The paradox then remains 
that given the cultural characteristics described above, the probability of finding a 
'customer' to sponsor the project is small. Thus such research remains difficult to 
justify, yet these projects may potentially lead to the greatest opportunities in terms of 
innovation. Accordingly, by adopting such a position, Ford continues to force itself 
into a 'technology-follow' position. 
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Perhaps even more irrational is the organisational focus on "Ford First Technology" 
grounded in a "leap taking" philosophy. Jones (1989) makes note of the difference 
between Japanese and western technology development habits, observing the "ability 
of the Japanese to bring incremental improvements to market quickly and thereby 
enhance the image of their products." In the automotive industry this may be of 
greater competitive significance than the introduction of new technologies designed to 
"leap-frog" competitors - a philosophy primarily associated with western automotive 
manufacturers such as Ford. Current organisational reform within R&A has restricted 
the ability of researchers to develop competitor "leap-taking" technology which relies 
on the ability and resources to conduct long-range research over extended periods. 
Further, the "pick-the-winner" mentality forces researchers to rely on small 'bursts' of 
technology development primarily associated with product technology. The cultural 
and change implications involved in the implementation of product technology are far 
less than those associated with process technology. 
Undoubtedly the technology transfer mechanisms which have proved the most 
successful, are those which take account of the organisation, social norms and culture. 
These mechanisms seek to adapt to this culture rather than force change or impose 
systems. The two primary mechanisms of significance are those adopted by AMTD 
and the formation of direct relationships between researcher and operation (as 
described in 4.8 and 4.4 respectively). Underlying each of these mechanisms is the 
fundamental development of trust. The need to establish trust based on previous 
performance is a direct consequence of the reward and recognition system and the 
. organisational social stigma attached to failure. This can be described in a game-like 
situation as follows: 
There is a perception of great personal reward associated with the 
introduction of new technology. There is also a great deal of risk involved 
with being associated with new technology implementation. Should the 
implementation or technology fail, this is particularly detrimental to career 
development (depending on the individual and his/her associations with 
more senior members of the organisation). Should the implementation and 
technology be successful however, there is much reward in terms of career 
development. 
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Thus, before becoming involved m technology implementation, the 
individual needs to consider: 
• Will others try to take advantage of me? 
• What political forces are at play? 
• What personal benefits/costs are associated with my involvement? 
• What is my perception of the benefits/costs for others involved? 
• What is the likelihood of success? 
Therefore the development of trust between the researcher and the 
implementers within the operational divisions enables the individual to 
more easily assess these factors. Researchers believe that these trust 
based relationships must be based on past performance. It is the success 
of past performance which precipitates trust and allows the individual to 
understand the researcher's true intentions and their organisational 
exposure. 
It ·is interesting to note that this situation also explains the basis of a number of 
observations: 
1. The difference between Japanese and Ford culture. Japanese decision making is 
based on collective as opposed to individual consensus. Thus the group as a 
whole is responsible for decision consequences, not the individual. This lessens 
the perception of risk and enhances innovation. This is the basis of observation 
2.10. 
2. The difference between a Learning culture and Ford's culture. A learning culture 
forces individuals to confront their mistakes and share lessons with co-workers. 
There are no repercussions and again the perception of risk is reduced and 
innovation enhanced. 
3. The need to provide incentives to implementers. Such incentives are mostly 
based on reward through career progression. To ensure maximum credit to the 
implementer (usually in a management position), researchers are often forced to 
dissociate themselves from the technology. This is the basis of observation 2.3. 
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4. Resource protectionism as a means of max1m1smg credit. Divisional 
management seeks to protect its resources, which leads to the development of 
'chimneys'. This hastens the development of a 'not invented here' culture and 
stifles collaboration. This is the basis of observations 2.9, 2.8 and 2.5. 
5. Contentment with the past as opposed to improvement for the future. The risk 
associated with adopting something new for the future is too great. This 
promotes the establishment of a 'comfort zone' grounded in the past and inhibits 
continuous improvement. This is the basis of observation 2. 6. 
The latter point illustrates how the history of Ford is being used to 'paint' its future in 
a spiralling and innovation-inhibiting cycle. Section 4.1 discussed the history of Ford 
in the context of the automotive industry and its competitors. Following the early 
1930's Ford has continually relegated itself to following its competitors, firstly 
General Motors and then in the later half of the century - the Japanese. While Ford has 
developed many important innovations (such as the electro-coating of car bodies and 
the 'people-mover' concept) it continually fails to lead in bringing them to market. 
While it continues to display high patent production rates relative to its competitors (as 
depicted in Figure 4.4), materialisation in terms of end-user tangibles and 
technologically superior products and processes is lacking. This is a fundamental 
aspect of its culture, systems and cost models. 
This serves to highlight the inadequacy of current knowledge associated with 
technology transfer and the various conceptual models contained within the literature 
(highlighted in §2.8, summary point 2.8. 7). The interpretivist paradigm which deals 
with the social and cultural aspects associated with the impacts of technology is 
particularly important (as highlighted in Figure 2.13). The above observations indicate 
the need to develop models which can aid in the understanding of these complex social 
and cultural processes (as emphasised in §2.8, summary points 2.8.8 and 2.8.9). 
Further, the analysis of technology transfer and implementation at both a local (micro) 
level in the previous chapter and a corporate (macro) level in this chapter, accentuate 
the criticality of differences in culture across countries at both an organisational and 
social level (§2.8, summary point 2.8.6). While the corporate culture described above 
has permeated the Australian context it has not influenced the Indian context as much. 
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This is probably a consequence of the moderating effect of the Indian national culture 
- Australian culture being somewhat more similar to its North American counterpart. 
161 
Chapter 5 - Model Development 
The debate on globalisation ranges between two extremes - a belief that the 
development of free markets will simultaneously increase equality and wealth, and a 
contrasting argument of impending global dysfunction. Davies (2004) favours the 
latter, arguing that neoclassical economic theory is inept at explaining the dynamics of 
globalisation and thus, such dysfunction is a consequence of burgeoning severity. 
Based on the deregulation and subsequent exponential growth of the world's financial 
markets, Davies (2004) cites 'liquidity' as the common nemesis of innovation. 
Liquidity refers to the ability of an individual or enterprise to convert shares in an 
organisation into cash and re-invest in another organisation where returns are 
perceived as being higher. The problem with this practice is that it ignores the 
temporal dimension of the innovation cycle, that is the time difference between 
investment and payoff. Most innovations require substantial investment in plant, 
development and research over a period of a decade depending on the innovativeness 
of the technology. 
The risk associated with long-term development is also high. The technology may 
ultimately fail or the market for the technology may change. Further the internal 
development and implementation pressures such as those discussed in Chapter 2 and 
later evidenced in both Chapters 3 and 4 also increase risk and decrease perceived 
payoff. Davies (2004) thus describes the present organisational environment as 
follows: 
"company managers know they must maintain dividend payments in 
order to maintain their company's share prices. If shareholders 
value short-term profits over long-term prospects, then managers 
must shift their strategies from long-term maximisation of company 
growth and market position to short-term profits. They do this by 
such means as foregoing long-term developments and by cutting 
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staff and services to a mm1mum, though their long-term 
competitiveness and customer base may be put at risk." 
This has been variously referred to as 'short-termism' by Hutton (1995) or 
'chrematistics' as opposed to 'oikonomia' by Daly and Cobb (1994), a distinction first 
made by Aristotle. Chrematistics is based on the exploitation of property and wealth 
to maximise short-term returns, whereas, oikonomia is based on the management of a 
household for long-term benefit. Oikonomia is the root word for 'economics' (Davies, 
2004). A consequence then of increased globalisation is a dominant emphasis on 
short-term returns versus long-term growth. Davies (2004) then goes on to note that as 
a result, shareholder returns have "boomed" over the past couple of decades, capital 
investment has declined, research and development has slowed, corporations have 
become more dependent on borrowing, employee numbers have slumped, 
unemployment has remained high and wages have been stagnant. The primary and 
secondary consequences of these effects have overwhelmingly negative influences on 
innovation and technology transfer in general. 
Consequently, any model which tries to describe the technology transfer process, or 
indeed predict its success will have to incorporate a temporal aspect. Majchrzak and 
Gasser (1992) developed an AI-based software tool named HITOP-A (Highly 
Integrated Technology, Organisation, and People - Automated) to facilitate 
sociotechnical integration planning in relation to technology transfer. More recently, 
Sohn and Moon (2003) have developed a structural equation model which yields a 
technology commercialisation success index (TCSI). Both of these models deal with 
the environment surrounding technology development and transfer by accounting for 
many different factors, but neither directly evaluate the effect of adopting an 
oikonomic or chrematistic perspective. 
An alternative model is developed here. Both national and organisational cultural 
perspectives on time are used to moderate and hence predict technology transfer 
outcomes. The synthesis of the model is based on the gaps identified in the literature 
and the key aspects of the technology transfer process identified from the research in 
both Chapter 3 and 4. The result is an interactive and dynamic multidisciplinary 
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model (as described in §2.8, summary point 2.8.8) which utilises concepts from 
economics, sociology and game theory to: 
(i) predict the likelihood of transfer success; and 
(ii) develop a greater understanding of the key factors (and risks) which will affect the 
transfer process with a view to developing suitable management strategy. 
To this end, the model may serve as an organisational pre-transfer evaluation tool. 
5.1 Top-Level Requirements 
The literature review conducted in Chapter 2, identified a number of opportune areas 
for increasing knowledge and understanding of the innovation adoption field. The 
case studies conducted in Chapter 3 and the investigation of technology transfer on a 
global scale in Chapter 4 served to further emphasise the identified 'knowledge gaps'. 
These gaps can be organised into three distinct elements of a top-level model 
description as depicted in Figure 5.1. Described below in terms of model inputs, 
outputs and operation, these factors define the top-level requirements of the model. 
A. Inputs 
Al. Technology Type - the transfer process is dependent on the type of technology in 
terms of product, process and/or people. Further, the implementation strategy is 
dependent on technology type (this is the basis of observations 4. 7 and 4.8 in 
Chapter 4, §4.3.2). 
A2. Culture/Social Norms - both national and organisational culture and social norms 
can inhibit and/or encourage the transfer process. A large proportion of the 
codified observations in Chapter 3 had their grounding in the cultural and social 
context of the organisation (as discussed in §3.5). This served to highlight the 
deficiencies of traditional technology diffusion models (as noted in §2.8, 
summary points 2.8.1and2.8.2) and the need for a multiparadigm view (as noted 
in §2.8, summary point 2.8.9). In addition, certain corporate cultural traits and 
social norms were found to be detrimental to the transfer process on a global 
level (as discussed in §4.4). 
A3. Management Preferences - the individual reward and value system (which is 
moderated by cultural and social norms on both a national and organisational 
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level) can influence a manager's support for the transfer process. This was the 
basis for a number of observations in both Chapter 3 and 4 and is discussed in 
§3.5 and §4.4 respectively. 
A4. Worker Preferences - the individual reward and value system (which is 
moderated by cultural and social norms on both a national and organisational 
level) can influence a worker's adoption decision. Further, changing perceptions 
in terms of reward and value can influence subsequent diffusion. This was the 
basis for a number of observations in Chapter 3. 
A5. Political Associations - the transfer process is directly effected by organisational 
politics and bureaucracy. Further, such associations determine power 
differentials and thus mediate management and worker preferences. Where 
political associations are high, a greater degree of managerial intervention and 
organisational effort is required. This was the basis for a number of observations 
in both Chapter 3 and 4 and is discussed in §3.5 and §4.4 respectively. The 
adoption of political associations as a model input supports a multiparadigm 
view of technology transfer as discussed in summary point 2.8.9 (§2.8). 
B. Outputs 
Bl. Strategy Development - summary point 2.8.8 (§2.8) specifically calls for a 
model 'which can be used to quantitatively predict transfer difficulty and develop 
strategy'. The development of strategy would be based on a dynamical 
understanding of the affects of the above identified inputs on the impending 
transfer (a need highlighted in §2.8, summary point 2.8. 7). 
B2. Risks - the development of strategy is based on consideration of the risks 
associated with transfer. In a particularly risk averse culture (such as that which 
exists within Ford and highlighted in both Chapter 3 and 4) addressing key 
perceived risks on behalf of stakeholders is a prime mechanism for the promotion 
of technology adoption. 
C. Operation 
C 1. Perspective Variance - different cultures precipitate diverse temporal 
perspectives. Some cultures are more capable of maintaining an oikonomic 
perspective (technologies which allow a long return on investment) while others 
are more chrematistic. Observations contained in both Chapter 3 and 4 
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(specifically Obs. #5 in §3.3.5 and 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2 m §4.3.2) indicate a 
primarily chrematistic view within Ford operations. 
C2. Cross National - changing country will result in variations to the inputs 
identified above and also perspective variance. As such the operation of the 
model should be applicable across a range of countries. This will facilitate inter-
country comparison of impending transfer scenarios and will engender a greater 
understanding of international technology diffusion (as identified in §2.8, 
summary point 2.8.5). 
C3. Open Data Set - technology transfer is contingent upon the inputs identified 
above (among other things). Depending on the context, the factors which 
comprise these inputs can vary (as evidenced in the difference between the 
Australian and Indian implementation case studies detailed in Chapter 3). The 
majority of traditional models have closed data sets limiting their application, 
adaptability and ability to 'learn'. The operation of the model should thus feature 
an open data set allowing the user to add and subtract variables as warranted by 
the immediate transfer context and environment. 
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Figure 5.1: Top-level requirement ('black box') model. Output to input feedback produces an 
interactive, iterative and dynamical interdisciplinary model. 
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5.2 Core Concepts 
The majority of the inputs identified above are qualitative in nature. Consequently, the 
need for a dynamic as opposed to a static model (as identified in §2.8, summary point 
2.8.8), requires the semi-quantitative application of these inputs. This will enable a 
direct understanding of their influence on the output variables hence facilitating 
interaction and subsequent iteration. In addition, the functional requirements of the 
model (specifically Cl and C2), necessitate a method of measuring cultural variation 
along and across multiple dimensions which include: national/organisational and 
spatial/temporal (or place/time). This was a need previously identified in the literature 
and detailed in §2.8, summary point 2. 8. 6. The challenge thus, is in the 
operationalisation of these inputs and functional requirements, which are traditionally 
considered qualitative discussion points, in the innovation and technology transfer 
domain. Hence they are conventionally regarded as complex and their effects on the 
transfer and diffusion process are typically not well understood. 
A number of concepts which include: technology classification, social capital, the 
social discount rate, investment appraisal (utilising cost-benefit analysis) and game 
theory can be used as proxy measures of the above identified inputs, outputs and 
operational requirements. Each concept is subsequently described in detail. 
5.2.1 Technology classification 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988) identify the specific character of a technology as an 
antecedent of the effectiveness of technology transfer across nations (as depicted in 
Figure 2.10). They use the technology classification scheme recommended by Hall 
and Johnson (1970) which differentiates along three dimensions. Process embodied 
technology transfer relates to the transfer of actual processes (encompassed within 
designs, blueprints or patents). Examples within an automotive context include the 
transfer of a forming technology for the manufacture of stamped magnesium 
components and the mechanisms for joining to conventional materials such as steel 
and aluminium. Product embodied technology transfer on the other hand, relates to the 
transfer of a physical product. Examples within an automotive context include 
hydrogen fuel cells and early warning accident avoidance systems. The final 
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dimension is defined as person embodied technology transfer. In this case, the transfer 
is dependent "on the efficacy of a mission undertaken by the supplier organisation in 
developing a sophisticated local technical core to implement and diffuse the imported 
technology" (Kedia & Bhagat, 1988). Examples within an automotive context include 
the Toyota Production System and statistical process control. 
It is hypothesised that both process and person embodied technology is more difficult 
to transfer than product embodied technology. Kedia and Bhagat (1988) argue 
likewise, asserting that both process and person embodied technologies are 
"considerably more difficult to transfer across nations because cultural and strategic 
management factors play larger roles in such transfers and diffusions." More to the 
point, the adoption of both these technology types encompass direct changes to the 
social structure of the organisation and may also involve significant transforms in 
existing power structures. Further, a large proportion of technology transfer involves a 
combination of product, process and people, however some can clearly be classified as 
process or people embodied. Therefore, adoption resistance (or transfer difficulty) is 
dependent on the degree to which a technology is classified as product, process or 
people and the complexity along each of these dimensions. Complexity may be 
measured using other factors such as: language; common ancestry, shared history, 
level of economic development, physical proximity, age of the technology at the time 
of transfer, and number of successful prior transfers. 
5.2.2 Social capital 
The literature relating to the ·concept of social capital is broad and interdisciplinary. 
As such, its definition together with opinions related to its derivation, source and 
operation still constitute significant debate among academics. According to Woolcock 
(1998), the concept of human capital was introduced by Schultz (1961) and Becker 
(1964) who argued that the education, training and health of workers determined how 
productively classical notions of capital (namely land, labour and physical capital) 
could be utilised. Social capital was thus viewed as the means through which the 
productive application of human capital could be effected, as Woolcock (1998) 
explains: 
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"The latest equipment and most innovative ideas in the hands or 
mind of the brightest, fittest person, however, will amount to little 
unless that person also has access to others to inform, correct, assist 
with, and disseminate their work. Life at home, in the boardroom, or 
on the shop floor is both more rewarding and productive when 
suppliers, colleagues and clients alike are able to combine their 
particular skills and resources in a spirit of trust, cooperation and 
commitment to common objectives. The vast majority of people, 
moreover, live, work, pray, and recreate with members of various 
but distinct social groups that shape one's very identity, values, and 
priorities. Membership in these communities provides (or, 
importantly, prevents) access to key professional networks, political 
insiders, and cultural elites; it is also the context in which one gives 
and receives care, friendship, encouragement and moral support." 
Coleman (1988) arrived at similar conclusions, demonstrating. the effect of social 
capital in the formation of human capital. Coleman's study coupled with Putnam's 
(1993) work on social capital and democratic institutions marked the beginning of 
contemporary interest in the concept (APC - Australian Productivity Commission, 
2003). Subsequent studies have yielded different definitions depending on the 
theoretical (economic, political, sociological or anthropological) foundation adopted. 
Some of these include: 
• "Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single ·entity but a variety of 
entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social 
structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors - whether persons or 
corporate actors - within the structure" (Coleman, 1988). 
• "features of social organisation such as trust, norms, and networks that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putnam, 
1993). 
• "Social capital represents the degree of social cohesion which exists in 
communities. It refers to the processes between people which establish networks, 
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norms, and social trust, and facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual 
benefit" (WHO- World Health Organisation, 1998). 
• "the information, trust, and norms ofreciprocity inhering in one's social networks" 
(Woolcock, 1998). 
• "Social capital is networks together with shared norms, values and understandings 
that facilitate cooperation within or among groups" (OECD, 2001). 
The APC (2003) noted that the majority of definitions contained three common threads 
which they define as the "core elements" of social capital: trust, social norms and 
networks. Similarly, Paldam (2001) also identified three ''families" of definitions of 
social capital: trust, ease of cooperation and networks. Norms were defined in §2.5.2 
by Rogers (1983) as "established behavior patterns for the members of a social 
system." This meaning was extended by the APC (2003) who defined social norms as 
"shared understandings, informal rules and conventions that prescribe, proscribe or 
modulate certain behaviors in various circumstances." These norms are generally 
unwritten, grounded in culture and enforced through sanctions which include guilt, 
shame or ostracism. They operate in networks to which individuals belong as a 
consequence of some common attribute (social status or vocation for example). Each 
network has specific and differing levels of norms and reciprocity (mutual obligation 
or expectation) which generates trust, both within the group and towards others 
(outside of the network). Paldam (2001) considers trust as the "deepest definition of 
social capital" which perhaps encompasses its widespread use as a proxy measure of 
social capital in empirical work. 
The network perspective of social capital has yielded a distinction between different 
types of social capital. Defined by Putnam (2000) as bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital, each type has different implications in terms of its positive and negative 
impacts. Bonding social capital refers to linkages within groups of like-minded 
(homogenous) individuals leading to strong intra-group bonds. Bridging social capital, 
on the other hand, involves linkages between heterogeneous groups, strengthening 
inter-group bonds, while linking social capital "refers to "vertical" connections among 
different strata in a hierarchical structure, with respect to, for example wealth or 
power" (Grafton et al., 2002). The APC (2003) identify various mechanisms through 
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which social capital may produce positive impacts (increased economic performance 
or productivity for example). The three different types of social capital may be used to 
explain the operation of each mechanism as follows: 
1. The reduction of transaction costs - norms act to reduce transaction costs within 
and between networks (bonding and bridging capital respectively). Common 
expectations and understandings between parties allow individuals and 
organisations to conduct dealings more efficiently. The high levels of trust 
associated with bonding and bridging social capital reduce the need for expensive 
formal contracts and the monitoring of business transactions. In the workplace 
this may result in a culture of increased cooperation between management and 
workers (linking social capital). 
2. Cooperative and/or socially minded behaviour - the pursuit of individual self-
interest can sometimes produce socially undesirable outcomes. This is 
particularly so in situations where social norms have not evolved to the point 
where self-interested behaviour is limited through internal (guilt) and external 
(shame and ostracism) sanctions (Knack & Keefer, 1997). A workplace culture 
which promotes openness and trust (bonding, bridging and linking social capital), 
increases cooperation and information sharing, overriding the narrow self-interest 
which might otherwise encourage individuals to withhold information. 
3. Dissemination of knowledge and innovation- Rogers' (1983; 1995) theory of the 
diffusion of innovations (as described in §2.5.2) consists of four main elements. 
Two of these - communication channels and social system, are dependent on the 
stock of social capital. For instance, high levels of bonding and bridging social 
capital promote interpersonal communication. Rogers (1983) found this to be the 
most effective communication channel for diffusion particularly between 
homophilous individuals. While this would suggest an emphasis on bonding 
social capital, Adler and Kwon (2000) have noted that bridging social capital is 
perhaps more important. They discovered that strong social groups (bonding 
social capital), can reduce the flow of ideas into a group and inhibit adoption: 
"strong solidarity with in-group members may overembed the 
actor in the relationship. This overembededness reduces the flow 
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of new ideas into the group, resulting m parochialism and 
inertia." 
Communication takes place within the social system, defined by interpersonal 
networks. Further, the extent and power of an individual's interpersonal 
networks is dependent on their personal stock of bridging, bonding and linking 
social capital. The norms established between these networks determine 
acceptable behaviour and thus moderate the flow of information and the uptake 
of technology. 
The conceptual application of social capital within the technology transfer domain is 
novel within the literature. The empirical case-work undertaken in the previous two 
chapters has demonstrated the importance of social aspects in relation to the transfer 
and diffusion process. On a comparative level, the oppressive effects of bonding 
social capital as noted by Adler and Kwon (2000) were not so apparent in the Indian 
implementation context. The resultant social norms dictated a more cooperative and 
trusting environment leading to greater assimilation of the Simpress system and a 
consequent willingness to share knowledge and contribute. Further, the "strong 
solidarity with in-group members" (Adler & Kwon, 2000) had its manifestations in a 
dominant opinion leadership within the Australian context. This acted to inhibit the 
adoption process and was enforced through social norms whose sanctions were 
characterised by ostracism and guilt. 
At a corporate level, conclusions in §4.4 noted that "the technology transfer 
mechanisms which have proved the most successful, are those which take account of 
the organisation, social norms and culture." Two primary mechanisms were then 
identified, each of which relied on the fundamental development of trust between the 
transacting parties. James (2002) defines trust as an expectation that one player will 
not be exploited by the other. A distinction is made between incentive induced trust 
and trust when a player "retains a vulnerability to exploitation." The former is 
engendered through a variety of mechanisms including: 
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(i) the introduction of "exogenous or endogenous changes to the preferences of 
players, so that they "prefer" to cooperate rather than pursue myopic self-
maximising strategies" (James, 2002); 
(ii) writing an explicit and binding contract which is generally enforced by a third 
party; 
(iii) reliance on implicit social norms to dictate rewards and punishments (enforced 
through social sanctions such as ostracism); and 
(iv) repetitive interaction which allows players to invoke two different strategies for 
punishing exploitation. The tit-for-tat strategy (James, 2002) assumes a player 
cooperates in the first round and then subsequently imitates the other player's 
choice from the previous encounter. The trigger strategy on the other hand, 
dictates a player continues to cooperate (trust) until exploitation, and then 
refuses to cooperate subsequently. In each case, both parties have an incentive 
to cooperate based on subsequent interaction. 
Some.of these mechanisms were prevalent in the Ford corporate context. Researchers 
believe that trust based relationships are contingent on past performance (as discussed 
in §4.4). Repetitive interaction thus allows the parties to develop trust, the 
implementer adopting a trigger strategy (or possibly tit-for-tat) should exploitation 
occur. Further, social norms dictate an environment predominantly underscored by 
exploitation which has forced the development of contractual agreements between 
parties (a key initiative of the "Big-Bang" process). The prevalence of this 
exploitative atmosphere precipitates a low social capital, which is underscored by low 
leveis of trust. The organisation's stock of social capital however, is expected to vary 
across cultures and countries which may explain the relative organisational variances 
in propensity for innovation and adoption. 
5.2.3 Social discount rate 
Discounting is a technique used to compare costs and benefits incurred over different 
time periods. It is based on the philosophy that in general, individuals prefer to 
consume now rather than later. This inter-temporal choice underscores the notion that 
such individuals "demand compensation for reducing their consumption today in favor 
of consumption at a later date" (Merkhofer, 1987). The amount of compensation 
required to postpone consumption is known as time preference. As an example, 
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shop floor worker X may agree to postpone receiving $100 today, in preference for 
$120 a year from today. Manager Y however, agrees to forego the $100 today, 
preferring to wait a year for $110 instead. It can thus be said that shopfloor worker X 
has a individual time preference (or discount rate) of 20 percent whereas manager Y 
has a lower rate of 10 percent. 
Society also has a preference to receive goods and services (benefits) sooner rather 
than later, and to defer costs to a future time period (HM Treasury, 2003). This is 
known as the social rate of discount which is also referred to as the social time 
preference rate (STPR) and is the rate at which society values current consumption 
compared to the future. A society which possesses a comparatively high STPR, will 
be less likely to sanction investments which incur short-term costs and produce long-
term benefits (OXERA, 2002), Such a society will instead prefer a short-term benefit, 
long-term cost regime and as a consequence is characterised as having a relatively 
short-term outlook. 
In a review of the inter-temporal choice literature, Frederick et al. (2002) note the 
various inadequacies associated with the use of a "single parameter" discount rate to 
capture all the anomalies of time preference. Prior to development of the discount rate 
(by Paul Samuelson in 1937), inter-temporal choice had its basis in sociological and 
psychological determinants. Frederick et al. (2002) credit Rae (1834) with developing 
the notion of inter-temporal choice through a realisation that society has an "effective 
desire of accumulation" - a psychological factor that differs across countries and 
determines a society's level of saving and investment. Rae (1834) went on to identify 
several inter-temporal choice factors that affect time preference. These psychological 
and sociological determinants were subsequently compressed into a single quantitative 
economic factor, which in the social domain is given by the STPR. Economists define 
the STPR as having two components: (i) the rate at which individuals discount future 
over present consumption (p ); and (ii) the decreasing marginal utility of additional 
future consumption (given by the product of the annual growth in per capita 
consumption (g) and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect 
to utility (c)) (HM Treasury, 2003). Further, p can be broken down into an additional 
two components: (i) 'pure' time preference (<>); and (ii) the risk associated with 
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postponing consumption (L). The STPR is thus given by equation 5.1 (Pearce & Ulph, 
1999): 
STPR (J-L) + g. c: (5.1) 
The application of time preference and specifically the STPR within the technology 
transfer domain is novel. Certainly time has been recognised as a major determinant 
of the diffusion process, acting as a core element of Rogers' (1983) theory of the 
diffusion of innovations. Conclusions from each case study (contained in §3.5 and 
§4.4) noted that time perspectives had a dominant influence on adoption decisions. 
Specifically, organisationally prevalent short-term perspectives resulted in difficulty 
assimilating the benefits of technology adoption when these were perceived as being 
distant. In other words, the adoption of complex technology in such environments is 
difficult since individuals find it challenging to recognise the future benefits that 
adoption will bring. Such cultures are said to have a comparatively high STPR. The 
use of the STPR from a technological perspective, has the potential to ac.t as a useful 
quantitative measurement tool in the characterisation of culture and its influence on the 
adoption process. 
5.2.4 Cost-benefit analysis 
The method of cost-benefit analysis in broad economic terms is used to "assess the 
relative desirability of competing alternatives" (Sinden & Thampapillai, 1995). Such 
assessment usually proceeds in monetary units, however, the analysis can include 
alternatives for which the market does not provide an adequate measure of economic 
value (HM Treasury, 2003). Most commonly used in the investment appraisal oflarge 
public infrastructure projects, the analysis accounts for the trade-off to society of the 
real benefits from a particular alternative versus the real resources that must be 
foregone. The method must necessarily proceed through a sequence of steps which 
ultimately lead to the calculation of the net present value (NPV) as follows: 
1. Determine the scope of the problem and identify the alternatives to resolving it 
2. Identify the benefits and costs associated with each alternative 
3. Value (quantify) the benefits and costs associated with each alternative 
4. Calculate the net benefit or NPV of each alternative 
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5. Test for the effect of changes in assumptions (sensitivity testing for uncertainty) 
The efficiency criterion of cost-benefit theory requires that the alternative which 
maximises the NPV is chosen. The present value is defined by Sinden and 
Thampapillai (1995) as the "equivalent value today of a future benefit (or cost)" and is 
thus calculated using the social discount rate. The NPV is then the sum of all future 
benefits (or costs) which have been expressed as present values. Such benefits and 
costs are usually expressed on an annual basis in which case the NPV is given by 
equation 5.2 (Merkhofer, 1987): 
(5.2) 
where Br and Cr are the benefits and costs in year t respectively, r is the discount rate 
given by equation 5.1, and t is the number of years over which the analysis will be 
performed. The investment appraisal process then advocates the calculation of 
expected values (EV) based on associating probabilities (or risk) with alternative net 
benefits to yield the expected net present value. Thus the EV provides a "single value 
for the expected impact of all risks" (HM Treasury, 2003). In some instances, risk can 
be represented through an increase in the discount rate, but generally using 
probabilities to quantify uncertainties and generating an EV is preferred (BTE, 2002). 
Cost-benefit analysis forms part of decision-making theory, which in itself can be 
categorised into descriptive and normative or prescriptive theory (Merkhofer, 1987). 
The former relates to predicting how people will make a decision and thus requires an 
understanding of the society and culture in question. The latter approach adopts an 
idealistic viewpoint instead concerning itself with how people should go about making 
a decision. Broadly, there are three primary decision aiding approaches, each of which 
can be further characterised into differing secondary methods of analysis as depicted in 
Figure 5.2. A brief description of each is provided here (Merkhofer, 1987): 
1. 0 Cost-benefit theory 
1.1 Paretian cost-benefit analysis - follows a strict objective application of cost-
benefit analysis based on marketplace prices. Alternatives for which there is not a 
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readily measurable market value are ignored. The analysis is generally regarded 
as being incomplete. 
1.2 Decision-maker cost-benefit analysis - allows a more subjective application of 
cost-benefit analysis through the inclusion of alternatives which have no 
measurable market value. The analysis thus contains and states explicitly all 
issues of importance to the decision problem. 
2. 0 Decision theory 
Typically used to describe individual decision making, taking explicit account of 
uncertainty which aids in the calculation of a utility function. The alternative which 
yields the maximum utility is chosen. 
2.1 Clinical decision analysis - is based on identifying the individual (or group of 
individuals) who has the responsibility to make the decision. Analysis then 
proceeds around the evaluation of alternative utilities for the individual (or group). 
2.2 Supra decision-maker analysis - proceeds through the generation of a social 
utility function for each of the individuals (or groups) affected by the decision. 
The supra decision-maker then weights each function based on personal 
preference (which should reflect the relative importance of each party in relation 
to the decision). 
2.3 Social decision analysis - as opposed to supra decision-maker analysis, abdicates 
the need for a single decision-maker, utilising direct individual (or group) 
judgments and preferences. 
3.0 Social choice theory 
Adopts the perspective that "the appropriate criterion for social decisions is not the 
preferences of some single decision maker but rather a rational synthesis of the 
preferences of all those individuals who will be affected by the decision" (Merkhofer, 
1987). Social utility functions are generated through a specific process (which is not 
always linear) of aggregating individual utility functions. 
3 .1 Applied social welfare analysis - generates a social welfare function to allow the 
aggregation of individual preferences yielding a preference rule for society. This 
may be based on either a centralised or decentralised approach of individuals 
expressing their preferences for alternatives over different time streams. 
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Each of these theories tend to use procedures that are closely related for each analysis. 
As an example, decision-maker cost-benefit analysis may use techniques from either 
decision theory or social choice theory to identify various individual (or group) 
preferences. As such, elements from each approach may be combined to yield a 
tailored analysis dependent on the focal situation. In a technology transfer or diffusion 
scenario, an analyst may prefer to adopt a cost-benefit analysis (using monetary as 
opposed to utility measurement terms) and combine elements from social decision and 
applied social welfare analysis to evaluate overall social benefits and costs. This is 
typically referred to as social cost-benefit analysis. Further, both decision theory and 
to some extent social choice theory tend to "use exacting and often time-consuming 
procedures for assessing utility and value functions" (Merkhofer, 1987). In addition, 
both require comparatively more skill and expertise in terms of application and 
interpretation than cost-benefit analysis. As a consequence, cost-benefit theory has 
been chosen as the primary decision aiding approach of interest. While both decision 
theory and social choice theory are equally valid decision aiding approaches, they do 
not readily support the development of a pragmatic and readily applicable 
interdisciplinary technology transfer model (as identified in §2.8, summary point 
2.8.8). 
Social Choice Theory Applied social welfare 
-E 
Clinical 
DECISION 
AIDING Decision Theory Supra decision-maker 
APPROACHES 
Social 
Cost-Benefit Theory L Decision-maker Paretian 
Figure 5.2: Primary decision aiding approaches and secondary analysis techniques. 
The most troublesome aspect of the application of cost-benefit analysis is the valuation 
of alternate costs and benefits. While strict paretian cost-benefit analysis ignores 
intangibles (costs/benefits for which there are no immediately determinable market 
valuations), in a social context these are important. Furthermore, in a technology 
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transfer or diffusion situation, these costs and benefits - the quantification of which is 
dependent on the social, organisational and cultural context, underpin the adoption 
decision. Such costs and benefits rarely have a market value and thus indirect market-
based procedures can be used to value and quantify them for inclusion in the analysis 
process (as depicted in Figure 5.3). These indirect procedures are based on people's 
'willingness to pay' for a change in the level of the outcome of interest (for instance 
"are you willing to pay X in order to have Y"). The application of the willingness to 
pay concept involves inference of a monetary amount through either a revealed 
preference, or an expressed preference as follows (HM Treasury, 2003): 
• Revealed preference involves inferring an implicit pnce through indirect 
comparison in similar or related markets. The most common revealed preference 
procedure is called the hedonic pricing method. 
• Expressed preference procedures rely on survey and interview to elicit 'willingness 
to pay' for, or 'willingness to accept' a particular outcome. The contingent 
valuation . method directly postulates a contingent market through which 
willingness to pay or accept is directly educed. Two fundamental questions are 
utilised: (i) "what is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay to receive 
X"; and (ii) "which of the amounts shown below would you be willing to pay to 
receive X". The former question provides an open-ended format and may result in 
greater variation (but may also be more representative of the truth). The 
contingent ranking method is an alternate technique, eliciting values through a 
series of preference questions asking respondents to rank different alternatives. 
While economists use cost-benefit analysis to assess the desirability of alternatives in a 
broad social context, others (such as behavioural scientists) have used the technique to 
define motivation in a socioeconomic (or organisational) context. Whyte (1991) 
focuses on motivation "imbedded in structures of interpersonal relations and involving 
costs and benefits." The concept of 'economic man' presupposes that an individual 
will estimate the various penalties (costs) and rewards (benefits) associated with 
particular alternatives, and subsequently choose the option that yields the greatest 
material net benefit. Humans however, are not motivated exclusively by material 
reward, especially in an organisational context characterised by a multitude of 
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interpersonal relationships. In such an environment, reward or penalty rarely appears 
in material economic form (such as cash) but is instead "linked with other individuals, 
groups, or organisations" and as such the "meaning of reward or penalty must 
therefore be interpreted in a social framework" (Whyte, 1991). 
Figure 5.3: Indirect valuation techniques for cost-benefit analysis (adopted from 
HM Treasury, 2003). 
Whyte (1991) then goes on to identify a number of organisational transactional 
relationships (between union and management for instance), underscoring the various 
rewards and penalties associated with each. Of particular relevance to organisational 
technology transfer is the authority relationship (between worker and boss). 
Specifically, Whyte (1991) highlights potential aspects of the relationship as follows: 
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• Time lag and trust - in an organisational environment, an individual's actions do 
not generate immediate rewards (there is instead a time delay). The individual 
must evaluate the probability of receiving the reward in the context of the 
individual/group that is giving it. Adverse experiences in the past will lead to a 
lack of trust and belief in the future. This is similar to the adoption of a trigger 
strategy through repetitive interaction in the generation of trust, as discussed above 
(§5.2.2). 
• Cognitive maps - an individual's view of the world is moulded by the culture of 
the organisation and surrounding society. This view engenders the development of 
cognitive maps (or mental schemata) which interpret how individuals will respond 
to certain rewards. 
• Ownership - organisational individuals are more likely to respond to ideas for 
which they perceive a sense of ownership. This is more likely to arise through 
participation (in idea development) rather than imposition. 
• Negative exchange - penalties imposed against workers result in a negative 
exchange relationship when other workers are sympathetic towards the offenders. 
The workers band together in a contest situation and develop strategies to punish 
the boss without drawing cause for further punishment. The boss responds by 
developing new methods to punish the workers and the destructive cycle continues. 
• Competitive transactions - workers may compete amongst themselves to win the 
favour of the boss or to escape his/her penalties. While the former may encourage 
increased performance and productivity, the latter can be disruptive as workers 
seek to shift blame onto their colleagues. This can be time consuming, result in the 
destruction of the group's social capital and ultimately lead to anti-collaborative 
behaviour. 
The costs and benefits associated with collaboration in an organisation, which largely 
relies on authority to accomplish tasks, can be overwhelmingly distorted. Whyte 
(1991) notes that: 
"If people at higher levels come to count on the exercise of authority 
largely or exclusively in order to get the work done, we find the 
organization taking on a rigid structure, where superiors are 
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struggling to impose their will, and subordinates are resisting the 
imposition. The parties on both sides of the conflict then come to 
invest much of their energy and intelligence in a power struggle 
instead of concentrating on accomplishing the organization's 
mission." 
In the case where the organisation's immediate mission may revolve around the 
adoption of technology, such an environment is detrimental to the decision. 
Individuals perceive the costs associated with adoption to be far greater than the 
benefits, and thus will try to resist adoption and diffusion. The results of both the 
Australian and Indian implementation case studies revealed that individuals use their 
inherent incentive schemata to evaluate the rewards and penalties associated with 
adoption (as discussed in §3.4.6). These schemata evolve over time and are influenced 
by cultural and social interactions, grounded in aspects of the authority relationship 
identified above. Certainly if a high degree of negative exchange exists for instance, 
then superior imposed technology transfer will be vehemently opposed by workers 
(regardless of the potential personal rewards which adoption may bring). This was 
again extended in the investigation of corporate technology transfer. Discussion in 
§4.4 illustrated that while individuals may perceive great personal reward in relation to 
technology transfer, this needs to be evaluated in the context of the organisational 
environment. This is a consequence of the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the 
organisation which sanctions competitive relationships, ultimately heightening the risk 
associated with being involved in the transfer. 
The application of cost-benefit analysis in the evaluation of technology transfer is not 
novel. Previous studies have used the technique to evaluate the economic impacts of 
technology transfer from public laboratories and centres of excellence (Papadakis & 
Link, 1997; Rank & Williams, 1998). Its application in the same context, but as a 
prospective tool in the evaluation of individual or group perceived benefits and costs is 
however novel. Previous studies have used the advantage of retrospection to 
determine whether a net economic benefit has resulted from the transfer of technology 
at a broad societal level. This research aims to use cost-benefit analysis as tool in the 
prospective evaluation and understanding of how an individual or group perceives a 
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technology in an organisational context and specifically how this will influence their 
adoption decision. 
5.2.5 Game theory 
Game theory is defined as a "formal way to analyze interaction among a group of 
rational agents who behave strategically" (Dutta, 1999). It is often used in situations 
where individuals or groups (called players) have to make decisions that affect each 
other in diverse domains such as political science, economics, sociology, and social 
psychology (Hamburger, 1979; Jones, 1980). Commonly applied in scenarios 
involving conflict, its aim is to describe the options available to each player, if all other 
players aim to maximise their welfare or benefit from the situation at hand. A game is 
typically characterised by the following features (Rapoport et al., 1976): 
1. There is a set of at least two decision-makers (denoted previously as players). 
2. At determined instances, each player must make a series of decisions (based 
upon their strategy set). These decisions determine the situations of the game. 
3. Each situation determines whose turn it is to make a decision and the range of 
choices available (from their strategy set). 
4. A resultant situation in which game play ends is termed an outcome of the game. 
Each outcome has a payoff for each player which may be either positive or 
negative. 
5. A rational player is one who considering the information available (a result of 
the rules of the game), makes choices (from their strategy set) to maximise their 
expected payoff. 
Games in which outcomes are not based on monetary reward, rely on determining the 
player's utility function for every possible strategy combination. Each player thus 
seeks to maximise their expected utility presenting a multitude of different game plays 
as defined by the payoff matrix. It should be noted that the outcome to a game is 
jointly determined insofar as each player must evaluate their own strategy in light of 
the strategies the other players may choose. In the two player context, a constant-sum 
game is the result of opposing player interests (and thus the sum of the payoffs is 
equivalent for each strategy combination (as depicted in Figure 5.4)). When the sum 
of the payoffs is zero, the game is denoted as a zero-sum game. Some games are 
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played with incomplete information in which players lack relevant information about 
their opponents (such as payoffs, strategies and beliefs). A game is defined as having 
reached an equilibrium outcome if no player can change outcome without impairing 
their payoff. Further, a game is said to be Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome 
which would produce a larger payoff for all players. 
A 
Player 1 
B 
0 
-4 
Player 2 
A B 
0 -3 
3 
4 -2 
2 
A 
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B 
-4 
-3 
Player2 
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-l 1 
-6 
-2 -9 
4 
Figure 5.4: Player payoff matrices: zero-sum (left); constant-sum (right). 
Game theory has been extensively applied in a social context through the theory of 
social situations. The theory is based on the notion that an individual makes "a 
rational decision if and only if the action he chooses is such that no other action 
available to him gives him a higher payoff' (Greenburg, 1990). A description thus of 
all available alternatives (or strategies) must be given, such that the criterion for 
evaluating chosen decisions can be determined. This in essence constitutes the 
formulation of all payoff functions in the construction of the payoff matrix for each 
individual player or group of players. Greenburg (1990) notes that this is essentially a 
"description of the social environment" detailing all the opportunities which are 
available to the players. The game matrix therefore is a useful analytical tool for 
application in specific social situations such as technology transfer and diffusion. The 
matrix allows construction of the social situation surrounding impending technology 
transfer and details the payoffs for individual stakeholders. The ensuing technology 
transfer can be simulated and strategies clearly delineated, such that management may 
gain an increased understanding of the pending constraints. 
5.3 Synthesis and Integration 
A key outcome of the empirical investigations in both Chapters 3 and 4 was the 
conceptualisation of the technology transfer process as a game where each player 
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weighs perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with adoption relative to 
their internal schemata. It was also noted that the extent and seriousness of the game is 
determined by the technology itself and further moderated by the cultural, 
organisational and social norms which dictate play (as well as form the basis of the 
individual's schema). This outcome can be used as the philosophy behind the 
integration of the core concepts discussed above and subsequent synthesis to yield the 
operation of the 'black box' model proposed in Figure 5.1. In the first instance the 
game is defined by two primary players - management and the workers. The model 
can be conceptualised as proceeding in three distinct stages, the levels of which are 
integrated (that is, the preceding stage is a prerequisite to the following). Each stage of 
the model is detailed as follows: 
Stage 1 - Technology Classification Scheme 
The main purpose of the scheme (as dictated by its primary outputs) is to: 
1. act as an analytic~.l depth indicator in terms of the degree of analysis required in 
the latter stages of the model; and 
2. give a precursory indication of the transfer difficulty associated with the 
particular focal technology. 
By way of example, the introduction of new spanner tools across the shop floor is 
perceived as being comparatively easier and less troublesome from a technology 
transfer and adoption perspective, than the implementation of a knowledge 
management system (as described diagrammatically in Figure 5.5). The former has 
minor impacts on people, process, organisation and culture than the latter and thus 
requires comparatively little analysis in subsequent stages of the model. Further, 
analysis required in subsequent stages of the model can be time consuming and thus 
the user must evaluate the time and cost required for analysis against its importance in 
terms of the technology. The technology classification scheme is designed to aid in 
this decision. 
The inputs to the scheme may consist of a number of questions associated with the 
technology and implementation environment. The questions may be scored, the 
addition of which gives a combined total, signifying the transfer complexity and 
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analysis depth. The higher the score, the greater the analysis recommended in 
subsequent stages of the model (a consequence of the higher probability of transfer 
difficulty). In accordance with the operational principles dictated by the top-level 
model (specifically C3 in Figure 5.1), the scheme is open to addition by users who 
over time discover more valuable inputs. A preliminary scheme is suggested in Table 
5.1 and applied in Figure 5.5 by way of example. 
Table 5.1: Technology classification scoring scheme. 
Inputs 
I Is the required absorptive capacity available? (high availability (0) : moderate availability (2) : low availability (4)) 
2 What is the complexity associated with the technology? (low complexity (0) : moderate complexity (2) : high complexity (4)) 
3 What sort of technology is it: Product I Process I People? (product technology (0) : process technology (2) : people technology (4)) 
4 Is adoption mandatory (push) or voluntary (pull)? (mandatory (0) : combination (2) : voluntary (4)) 
- Analysis depth 
- Probability of transfer 
difficulty 
2 
Spanner set 
Score: high absorptive 
capacity availability (O); 
low complexity (O); 
product technology (O); 
combination (2) 
16 
KMS 
Score: low absorptive 
capacity availability (4); 
high complexity (4); process 
+people technology (6); 
combination (2) 
Figure 5.5: Technology classification example output. 
Stage 2 - Investment Awraisal 
Score 
0 2 4 
0 2 4 
0 2 4 
0 2 4 
The main purpose of the investment appraisal is to determine the various costs and 
benefits that each player associates with adoption. In this sense, investment is taken to 
mean the personal penalties associated with adoption versus the potential rewards. 
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This is different to traditional investment appraisal from an economic perspective 
which primarily involves strict financial evaluation to determine return on investment. 
Adoption in this context is usually taken as a given. The fundamental analysis 
technique used to perform the appraisal is social cost-benefit analysis incorporating a 
mixture of both priced and unpriced outcomes. The latter are not typically exchanged 
in markets with identifiable market prices since they have social, environmental and 
cultural groundings which vary between organisations and nations. These unpriced 
costs and benefits therefore, represent the culture and established social norms of the 
organisation and their relative size (or value) defines the extent to which they will 
affect the player's adoption decision. 
The primary output of the appraisal process is the player expected value (EV). This is 
defined as the mean value associated with both adoption and non-adoption. The 
following steps are involved in its determination (as detailed in Table 5.2): 
1. Perform a social cost-benefit analysis over the term of adoption. For each year 
of adoption, minus the costs associated with adoption from the benefits, to derive 
the net benefit (Fn) adoption will bring in that particular year. This constitutes a 
means to formalise what is otherwise a sub-conscious process performed by an 
individual when they are confronted with the adoption decision. A rational 
individual may reason, for example: 
• "the increased pay as a result of my adoption may come at the cost of my 
deskilling"; or 
• ''the decreased work load as a result of my adoption may come at the cost of 
being devalued by the organisation affecting my long-term employment 
prospects"; or 
• "the increased chance of getting a promotion as a result of my adoption may 
come at the cost of being ostracised by my work group." 
2. Calculate the technology transfer NPV. This facilitates comparison between the 
current costs associated with adopting a technology today versus the potential 
benefits adoption may yield sometime in the future. Application of the discount 
rate (DRx) to the NPV allows future costs and benefits to be comparable across 
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time. The discount rate also serves to reduce what economists refer to as 'the 
residual'. In traditional economic analysis the factors which cannot be 
quantified (such as those due to culture) are referred to as the residual. While 
some of these factors are captured in the cost-benefit analysis (described as 
unpriced outcomes in the previous step), others such as time preference are not 
easily defined and captured in this way. Thus the social discount rate (SDR) is 
used to further decrease the residual and capture aspects of social norms and 
culture in the analysis. The SDR (derived in §5.4) is defined as a function of the 
riskless STP R and social capital (SC). Risk is instead accounted for in the 
calculation of the EV. 
3. Determine the player EV. Investment appraisal involves a decision based upon 
the quantification of the merits and drawbacks of all available options in the 
context of risk. Thus, in a technology transfer context, the adoption decision is 
based upon the merits and drawbacks of the focal technology, each being 
evaluated against the risk a player assumes if they decide to adopt or not adopt. 
The EV calculation allows the application and quantification of such risk using 
the probability of success and failure (psucces/ PJailure) both in terms of adoption and 
non-adoption. 
Table 5.2: Player expected value calculation. The NPV calculation is adopted from Equation 5.2. 
Management 
Fo = Benefits0 - Costso 
F1 = Benefits 1 - Costs J 
Fn = Benefitsn - Costsn 
F F NPV = F, + 1 + .. + n 
0 (1 +DR,,,/ (1 + DRmt 
DRm = SDR f(STPR, SC) 
EV= Psuccess NPV.uccess - PJai/ure NP17Jailure 
Stage 3 - Game Theory 
Workers 
Fo = Benefits0 - Costs0 
F1 = Benefits J - Costs J 
Fn = Benefitsn - Costsn 
F F NPV = F + 1 + .. + n 
o (l+DRw/ (l+DRwf 
DRw = SDR f (STPR, SC) 
EV= Psuccess NPV.uccess - PJailure NP17Jailure 
The EV estimates can be used to construct the technology transfer player payoff matrix 
(as depicted in Figure 5.6). The matrix essentially defines the social environment 
surrounding the technology transfer and details the opportunities available to each 
188 
player. If for instance, the worker EV for non-adoption (EV W(na)) was greater than 
adoption (EV W(a)), while the management EV for adoption (EV M(a)) was greater than 
non-adoption (EV M(na)), then management would favour adoption but the workers 
would not. To understand why this is so, the user could investigate the quantified 
costs and benefits from stage 2. By changing these costs and benefits, the user is able 
to vary the EV estimates and in doing so generate a strategy which is favourable to 
workforce adoption. This simulation and iteration is a key aspect of the model 
enabling the user to dynamically understand the factors which are most likely to inhibit 
adoption. 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
Adopt EVw(a) EVw(na) 
EVM(a) EVM(a) 
Management 
EVw(a) EVw(na) 
EVM(na) EVM(na) 
Not Adopt 
Figure 5.6: Workforce versus Management expected value payoff matrix. Notation: M(a) = 
management adoption, M(na) =management non-adoption and likewise for the workforce (W). 
On a cross national level, the user is able to vary the costs, benefits and DR across 
different countries to generate alternative EV estimates. This may enable a cross 
national comparison of technology transfer based on differing probabilities of success 
(as depicted in Figure 5.7). A user in a multinational corporation with multiple 
operations spread over many regions may find this useful when faced with a decision 
based on country of implementation. 
EVw(a) 
--UK ,,,.,,,.,,,. 
................................................................................. ,,.t:":": ........................................ . 
,.,....,,,.,..,,,..,..,' 
,,,.,,,.,,,. India 
-------
-----
-----
0 
30 50 70 90 Psucess 
Figure 5.7: Example plot of expected value of workforce adoption versus the probability of 
successful adoption across various countries. 
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5.4 Derivation of the Social Time Preference Rate - An Hypothesis 
Definitive estimates of the riskless SDR based on time preference for various national 
cultures, are difficult to obtain. Very few developed countries have official discount 
rates based on the STPR - the United Kingdom being the only exception with a current 
pure time preference rate of 3.5 percent (OXERA, 2002). All other countries use 
discount rates based on pure financial indicators such as government bond interest 
rates, marginal products of capital and rates of return to marginal projects in the 
private sector. Such rates have a strict financial grounding and thus have no real 
justification in the social time preference domain and further the two rates are rarely 
the same. In addition, owing to the primitive nature of project appraisal in developing 
countries the availability of uniformly applied discount rates in these countries is rare. 
Researchers such as Evans and Sezer (2002) have tried to estimate the STPR using 
econometric techniques based on the growth rate of per capita real consumption (g), 
. the absolute value of elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption ( e ), and the 
weighted probability of survival of the 'average consumer' (n). The estimate is based 
on the following formula (a deviation on Equation 5.1): 
STPR (1 + g)lel (1/ n) - 1 (5.3) 
It is however, difficult to obtain reasonable estimates of each of these components, 
requiring access to statistical data for each country and subsequent complex 
econometric analysis based on co-integration and log regression models. 
The absence of discount rates based on the STPR and the complexity involved in 
reasonable estimation presents a problem. Application of the model presented above 
requires a STPR based on aspects of society and culture. Thus values associated with 
financial indicators such as interest rates lack the required resolution. Economists 
generally consider the SDR to be a 'parameter' which varies between 0 and 16 percent 
depending on the country in question. Weitzman (2001) demonstrated this through a 
survey study of 2, 160 economists in relation to time based discounting in which it was 
found that the rates varied according to a gamma distribution as shown in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8: Gamma distribution of discount rates. Source: Weitzman (2001) 
5.4.1 Hypothesis development · 
To facilitate a reasonable estimation of the SDR based on time preference, it is 
hypothesised that a country's social capital is proportionately related to its SDR. 
Derivation of the SDR from a purely social grounding (utilising social capital) allows 
application of a discount rate which captures aspects of culture and social norms in 
social cost-benefit analysis. 
It has been postulated and shown that society matters in terms of both the 
socioeconomic development and growth of developed and developing countries 
(Temple & Johnson, 1998). Society influences the quality of investment, the level of 
technical efficiency, the ability of countries to assimilate technology from abroad and 
determines the stock of both human and physical capital. 
Economic activities are accomplished at lower cost in higher trust societies (Knack & 
Keefer, 1997). As such, higher trust societies exhibit higher rates of investment and 
growth as legal and social mechanisms for constraining opportunism are more 
transparent and enforced (Zak & Knack, 2001 ). All economic transactions occur 
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within a social structure, and this structure determines the rewards for cooperation and 
penalties for deviation. 
There exists distinct variations in trust across different societies and cultures, a result 
of differences in social, economic and legal environments (Zak & Knack, 2001). To 
this end, trust is higher in more ethically, socially, and economically homogenous 
societies. Trust forms the basis for measuring the stock of a country's social capital 
(as well as other factors related to communication such as cooperative norm, 
associations and networks as described in §5.2.2). 
Knack and Keefer (1997) use trust as their primary social capital indicator and civic 
norms as their secondary indicator. Obtaining data for 29 market economies from the 
World Values Survey (WVS), both Knack and Keefer, and Zak and Knack (2001) 
found the following: 
1. Trust decreases (declining social capital) in societies which ~xhibit high wage 
inequality and wealth. 
11. Trusting societies (those with a supposedly higher social capital) have stronger 
incentives to innovate and accumulate physical capital and achieve high returns to 
accumulation of human capital. 
111. In higher trust societies people adopt more appropriate horizons in making 
investment decisions and choose production technologies that are optimal over the 
long, rather than the short run. 
This latter finding would support the assumption that such societies have a 
comparatively lower discount rate (based on the STPR) than others with a relatively 
short-term outlook - the result of low trust and hence social capital. 
In summation, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
If social capital (and in particular trust) is inversely related to wealth and 
wealth is directly related to the STP R, it is therefore hypothesised that 
social capital (and in particular trust) is inversely related to the STPR. 
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relationship decreasing social capital (trust) ~ increasing wealth 
relationship increasing wealth ~ increasing STPR 
Hypothesis decreasing social capital (trust) ~ increasing STPR 
The inverse relationship between social capital and the SDR (based on the STPR) can 
be reasoned in terms of trust. Persons living in societies with low trust, would have 
correspondingly low civic norms, preferring to consume goods and services now rather 
than later - the future appearing relatively more uncertain than in societies which 
exhibit greater trust. 
Table 5.3: WVS trust data for the 1981, 1990 and 1995 surveys. Source: Inglehart et al. (2000). 
Country 1981 1990 1995 AVG. 1981 1990 1995 AVG 
26.1 23.3 17.6 38.0 34.2 30.3 
24.7 19.0 24.7 
48.2 40.0 30.8 21.9 
31.8 8.2 
20.5 17.5 33.5 28.l 
20.9 22.2 
25.5 24.l 44.8 53.5 
29.2 33.5 23.2 19.2 
28.3 61.5 65.1 65.3 
6.5 2.8 18.8 
30.4 28.6 5.0 
48.5 53.1 5.5 
22.7 21.4 34.5 17.9 
60.3 52.3 21.7 
10.8 6.0 
25.l 37.5 23.9 
52.7 57.7 17.4 15.5 
26.4 29.0 29.1 15.9 
27.6 21.5 35.l 34.2 29.7 
57.2 62.7 48.8 56.7 66.1 59.7 
24.8 22.8 42.6 37.0 
23.4 41.8 
32.9 33.3 10.0 5.5 
22.5 31.0 
39.8 43.6 43.4 43.7 
35.4 37.9 40.5 51.1 35.9 
41.1 47.4 21.6 
26.8 35.3 13.7 
41.5 41.7 42.3 30.2 
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The WVS uses the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" to assess the level 
of trust in a society. The data in Table 5.3 shows the percentage of respondents in 
each nation who replied "most people can be trusted" for the 1981, 1990 and 1995 
surveys. 
A plot of social capital (based on trust) versus the SDR (based on the STPR) using the 
proposed hypothesis is shown in Figure 5.9. Only countries for which survey data was 
available for at least two survey periods were used. The SDR was varied from 0.5 to 
15 percent and proportionately fitted to trust. The plot shows the United Kingdom 
which falls in the 0 to 6 percent range (towards the upper end) which is comparable to 
current HM Treasury (2003) estimates of a 3.5 percent STPR. Further, HM Treasury 
(1997) acknowledges a discount rate somewhere in the range 4 to 6 percent based on 
both considerations of time preference and cost of capital. France on the other hand, 
uses a discount rate of 8 percent (the derivation of which is not specified by French 
authorities). The plot shows a SDR of approximately 10 percent which is comparable 
to the 'official' rate even though the two rates most likely have contrasting 
determinants (the official rate having an overtly financial grounding). Kula (1994) 
discusses the STPR and uses empirical formula's based on pre-1970 financial data to 
calculate the SDR for the United Kingdom (2.6 percent), the United States (5.3 
percent) and Canada (5.4 percent). The latter rate is comparable to that derived from 
the plot in Figure 5.9, while the rate the United States corresponds more accurately. 
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Figure 5.9: SDR versus Social Capital for various countries. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
A set of top-level requirements were formulated based on outcomes from empirical 
work and a literature review detailed in previous chapters. To construct the model, a 
number of key concepts were put forward and subsequently integrated to produce a 
three stage interdisciplinary model of technology transfer. Summarised in Figure 5.10, 
the relationship between these initial requirements and the model can be visualised. 
Both stages 1 (the technology classification scheme) and 2 (the investment appraisal 
process) encompass open data sets (C3). This allows the user to either add or subtract 
multiple variables according to both the focal technology and environment 
surrounding the technology transfer. The result is a more adaptable and flexible model 
that is essentially able to 'learn' through application and experience. Stage 2 provides 
for another important operational aspect - that of cross national functionality (C2). 
The definition and valuation of player perceived costs and benefits account for culture 
and social norms (A2), management and worker preferences (A3 and A4) and any 
political associations which may affect the transfer process (AS). These costs and 
benefits are subsequently moderated by another cultural and socially specific variable 
- the discount rate (Cl). Therefore, the model allows the user to account for different 
costs and benefits depending on the culture in question and subsequently allows these 
variables to be discounted according to tolerability towards time in terms of 
consumption and preference. 
The discount rate is derived from a cultural and social perspective as opposed to 
reliance on rates with a financially driven bias. A hypothesis is put forward relating 
social capital (and in particular trust) to the STPR. While it is beyond the scope of this 
work to prove the validity of the hypothesis it is based on a solid foundational and 
theoretical platform and yields consistent results. Further the hypothesis may provide 
a solution to the universal deficiency surrounding availability of international discount 
rates based on pure time preference grounded in society. Stage 3 (game theory) 
produces a 'snapshot' of the social situation surrounding the technology transfer and 
allows the user to iterate through stage 2, changing variables to simulate diverse 
strategy (B 1 ). Understanding what factors influence the derivation of expected value 
estimates and varying the probability of success (psuccess) allows the user to simulate 
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varying levels of risk and catalogue risk factors (B2). In addition, the model enables 
the user to apply its cross national functionality to derive expected value estimates for 
adoption across various countries (C2). This allows simulation related to country 
suitability in terms of technology transfer difficulty and probability of success (as 
depicted in Figure 5.7). 
C3 
A2. A3. 
Al. A4. A5. Cl. C2. 
analysis 
• Social rate of time 
preference 
• Net Present Value 
Bl. B2. C2. 
Figure 5.10: Technology transfer model demonstrating top-level requirement satisfaction. 
A preliminary understanding of transfer difficulty is obtained in stage 1 which takes 
account of the technology type (Al) and environment surrounding the transfer. In 
addition, output from stage 1 gives an indication of analysis depth. Significant 
resources may be required to effect stage 2 depending on the competency and 
experience of the user. A supra-decision-maker methodology (§5.2.4) may be adopted 
in which the user determines, evaluates and simulates based on personal preference 
and experience with the culture in question. Alternatively, survey and interview 
techniques may be employed to deduce the expressed preferences of the users directly 
(as detailed in Figure 5.3). 
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The concepts applied to the derivation and operation of the model are together novel in 
the technology transfer domain. In addition, the overt focus on cultural and social 
aspects of the transfer process (among other factors) forces the users to understand 
their influence on the adoption decision. To this end, the model may serve as an ideal 
pre-transfer assessment tool, allowing prospective planning based on the strategy and 
risks derived from using the model across multiple cultures. 
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Chapter 6- Verification & Validation 
Meredith et al. (1989), consider the research process as proceeding in three stages: 
description, explanation and testing. In the context of this research, the first stage -
description, relates predominantly to the case study activities undertaken in Chapters 3 
and 4. The result was a "well-documented characterization of the subject of interest" 
(Meredith et al., 1989), in this case, the transfer of technology within a multinational 
organisation. The next stage - explanation, proceeds through postulation and if 
possible the development of a framework to describe the dynamics of the situation. 
According to Meredith et al. (1989), a framework "offers a conceptual frame of 
reference to help researchers design specific research studies, interpret existing 
research, and generate testable hypotheses." The previous chapter involved the 
construction of a conceptual frame of reference in the form of a model. The model 
was built from a number of concepts and integrated on the basis of previous 
description (in the form of case study outcomes and literature shortcomings). 
The final stage - testing, proceeds either via verification or validation. The former 
according to Meredith et al. (1989), is based on checking (or verifying) the 
observations already made or included in the description against a postulated 
prediction derived from the model. The latter involves prediction (derived from the 
model) and then observation to validate predictive power. To provide rigour, both of 
these approaches are adopted here. The model is first verified using observations from 
the Australian and Indian implementation case study contexts (Tables 3.4 and 3.6 
respectively). This is followed by validation using two separate and distinct 
technology implementations: 
(i) adoption of the Ford Production System as an overall lean manufacturing 
methodology, and 
(ii) adoption of the Grid Strain Analysis technique as a technology to aid in shopfloor 
problem solving. 
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The former case involves an example of a combination (mandatory/voluntary) 
technology, while the latter case is an example of a voluntary technology. 
6.1 Application 
Before applying the model in any technology transfer context, a number of 
considerations need to be addressed. These include simplification assumptions, the 
determination of risk, accounting for different stakeholders (or players) involved in the 
transfer, and the evaluation of anticipated costs and benefits. 
6.1.1 Simplification assumptions 
The degree of simplification employed by the user (or decision-maker) is dependent on 
the number of assumptions integrated into the operation of the model. The greater the 
number of simplification assumptions involved, the less powerful and predictive the 
model may become (moving further away from reality). Consequently, ease of 
application is a trade-off between the nature and number of assumptions .made and the 
predictive power of the model. The following assumptions have been adopted in the 
context of this work. 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
Adopt EVw(a) EVw(na) 
EVM(a) EVM(a) 
Management 
EVw(a) EVw(na) 
EVM(na) EVM(na) 
Not Adopt 
Figure 6.1: 2 x 2 worker versus management payoff matrix 
Recall the 2 x 2 worker versus management expected value payoff matrix (from Figure 
5.6) repeated in Figure 6.1. Each expected value for adoption (EV(a)) and non-
adoption (EVcna)) is calculated from Table 5.2 as follows: 
For the workforce: 
EVw(a) 
EVw(na) 
= PsW(a) NPVsw(a) 
PsW(na) NPVsW(na) 
Ptw(a) NPVtw(a) 
Ptw(na) NPV fW(na) 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
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For management: 
EV M(a) PsM(a) NPVsM(a) 
EVw(na) PsM(na) NPV sM(na) 
PtM(a) NPVtM(a) 
PtM(na) NPV tM(na) 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
The result is four equations yielding 16 different variables. The number of equations 
and thus variables can be reduced under the following assumptive relationships: 
i. The Ps(a) defines the probability that the player will successfully adopt and is 
assumed equivalent to Pf(na) which defines the probability that the player will fail 
to not adopt. 
n. The Ps(na) defines the probability that the player will successfully not adopt and is 
assumed equivalent to Pf(a) which defines the probability that the player will fail 
to adopt. 
Ps(a) 
Pf( a) 
Pf(na) 
Ps(na) 
m. The NPVs(a) defines the NPV that adoption will generate for the player and is 
assumed equivalent to NPV f(na) which defines the NPV that failing to not adopt 
will generate for the player. 
iv. The NPVs(na) defines the NPV that non-adoption will generate for the player and 
is assumed equivalent to NPV f(a) which defines the NPV that failing to adopt will 
generate for the player. 
NPVs(a) 
NPVrca) 
NPVr(na) 
NPVs(na) 
These assumptive relationships can then be used to re-write Equations 6.1 to 6.4 in 
terms of success and failure to adopt as follows: 
For the workforce: 
EVw(a) 
EVw(na) 
PsW(a) NPV sW(a) 
Prw{a) NPV fW(a) 
Prw(a) NPV fW(a) 
PsW(a) NPV sW(a) 
(6.1) 
(6.2a) 
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For management: 
EVM(a) 
EVw(na) 
PsM(a) NPV sM(a) 
PfM(a) NPV fM(a) 
PfM(a) NPV fM(a) 
PsM(a) NPVsM(a) 
(6.3) 
(6.4a) 
The result is four equations yielding 8 different variables. Upon inspection however, 
the following simplification can be made: 
For the workforce: 
EVw(a) PsW(a) NPVsw(a) PfW(a) NPVfW(a) -EVw(na) (6.5) 
For management: 
EVM(a) PsM(a) NPVsM(a) PfM(a) NPVfM(a) -EVM(na) (6.6) 
where for both the workforce and management: Pf(a) 1 - Ps(a) 
As a consequence of these simplifications, one EV (either the EV (a) or the EV (na)) for 
both the workforce and management will be negative. The overall strategy of the 
game then shifts to one of either minimising or making positive a negative EV(a)· 
Similarly, in the case of a negative EV(na), the user should seek to maximise this value, 
thereby increasing an already positive EV(a) and hence further promoting a positive 
adoption decision. 
Recall from Table 5.2 (and consequently equation 5.2), each NPV for adoption 
(NPV(a)) and non-adoption (NPV(na)) is calculated as follows: 
For the workforce: 
NPV = B -C + BsW(a)l -CsW(a)I + BsW(a)t -CsW(a)t 
sW(a) sW(a)O sW(a)O 1 +DR (1 +DR) t (6.7) 
NPV - B -C + BtW(a)I -Ctw(a)I + Btw(a)t -Ctw(a)t 
tw(a) - tW(a)O tW(a)O l +DR (1 +DR) t (6.8) 
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For management: 
BsM(a)l -CsM(a)l + BsM(a)t -CsM(a)t 
NPVsM(a) = BsM(a)O -CsM(a)O +------
1 +DR (I +DR)1 
BfM(a)l -CfM(a)l BfM(a)t -CfM(a)t 
NPVfM(a) =BfM(a)O -CfM(a)O + +------
l+DR (l+DR) 1 
(6.9) 
(6.10) 
where Bt and Ct are the benefits and costs in year t and DR is the discount rate (as 
given by the STPR). Further, Bs and Cs are the benefits and costs the player perceives 
and associates with successful adoption. Conversely, Br and Cr are the benefits and 
costs the player perceives and associates with non-adoption. 
As a simplification, it can be assumed that if a player decides not to adopt, they will 
fail to accrue any benefits preferring instead to remain in their current state. The 
player hence accumulates only cost which may be associated with unrealised 
productivity, competitive advantage or opportunity. In some situations, this 
assumption may prove impractical since a player may perceive certain benefits in not 
adopting a technology. Using this simplification however, Equations 6.7 to 6.10 can 
be modified as follows: 
For the workforce: 
NPV = B . -C + BsW(a)l -CsW(a)l + BsW(a)t -CsW(a)t 
sW(a) sW(a)O sW(a)O 1 +DR (I+ DR)t (6.7) 
-C -C 
NPV = -C + tW(a)J + tW(a)t 
tW(a) tW(a)O I+ DR (I+ DR) t (6.8a) 
For management: 
N V C B sM(a)J - C sM(a)J + B sM(a)t - C sM(a)t p sM(a) = BsM(a)O - sM(a)O +------
l+DR (l+DR)1 
(6.9) 
-C -C 
NPV = -C + fM(a)J + fM(a)t 
fM(a) fM(a)O I+ DR (I+ DR)t 
(6.IOa) 
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6.1.2 Risk 
Any technology transfer and adoption involves an element of perceived risk. Such risk 
is encompassed within Ps(a) as part of the EV estimates shown in equations 6.5 and 6.6. 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis incorporates risk into the discount rate DR as part of 
the NPV equations 6.7 to 6.10. However, the STPR as adapted in this model, is a 
riskless discount rate which captures time preference based on social as opposed to 
purely economic determinants. The incorporation of risk as part of the EV emphasises 
the importance of risk in technology transfer and allows the user to directly evaluate 
the impacts of risk on the ensuing 2 x 2 management versus the workforce game. To 
this end, the model has increased the resolution of risk to reflect its importance. 
The assessment of risk in relation to technology transfer proceeds in a number of steps: 
1. Recognise the risk involved in adoption - list all possible outcomes and identify 
the worst case scenario. 
2. Recognise the degree of consequence associatec:J with each outcome 
3. Assess the outcomes and consequences in relation to past experience 
4. Evaluate risk based on personal preference (is the player risk loving, risk averse 
or risk neutral) 
In this context, Ps(a) becomes an aggregate risk factor which reflects the amount of risk 
associated with adoption and a player's personal preference. A player who is risk 
averse will have a lower Ps(a) compared to another who is able to tolerate a greater 
degree of risk (in the context of the same technology). In addition, the aggregation of 
risk allows incorporation of costs which are particularly difficult to evaluate or require 
increased resolution within the model. For instance, the costs associated with a 
decrease in long-term employability (should the player decide to adopt) may instead be 
characterised as a risk and incorporated as part of the Ps(a) (rather than the NPV). 
6.1.3 The multi-player game 
There are two distinct aspects to the multi-player game depending on the user 
perspective adopted: 
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1. The model assumes a two player game for simplicity (three player game theory 
becomes complex and three-dimensional). In reality however, a technology 
transfer scenario involves three players: (i) the workforce; (ii) management; and 
(iii) the corporation (or greater organisation). The model assumes that 
management as a player in the two person context, will always act in the best 
interest of the corporation (as well as their own) and thus is equivalent to a proxy 
player. Recent corporate examples have shown that in some instances this 
assumption may be questionable, highlighting the consequences of senior 
management who act out of pure self-interest, to the detriment of the organisation 
as a whole. 
11. Within the two player context, the workforce may consist of an aggregate of 
multiple sub-groups or the analysis could be structured such that each sub-group 
is analysed concurrently (the multiple sub-player approach). The approach 
adopted is dependent on the outcomes of the model desired by the user. Piloting 
is a common technique employed for the introduction of new technology within 
large organisations containing a number of different departments and . 
consequently worker groups. The piloting approach was adopted within the 
Australian implementation context as discussed in §3.3.2. From this perspective, 
the user may utilise the model to examine implementation across a number of 
different worker groups within the same organisation. This may aid the decision-
maker in selecting the optimal group for piloting. Once piloting has occurred, the 
user may again analyse each worker group to evaluate changes in adoption 
attitudes. As Rogers (1983) notes, observability and trialability are key 
innovation attributes which influence adoption behaviour (as discussed in §2.5.2): 
6.1.4 Cost-benefit evaluation 
The most challenging aspect of cost-benefit analysis is the identification and 
subsequent evaluation of both costs and benefits. A large number of the costs and 
benefits generated in a technology transfer context are not exchanged in markets and 
thus lack readily available market prices. These 'unpriced' outcomes have either been 
ignored or approached unsystematically in the past, yet they often define a transfer 
project's success or failure. Difficulty exists in the availability of resources and 
techniques for data collection, and in the interpretation of data. Fortunately, such costs 
and benefits are characteristic of an organisation and culture, which means once 
204 
identified, they can be applied across a number of different technology and transfer 
contexts. In this respect, significant use of the model over time, will allow the capture 
of diverse 'unpriced' outcomes and the development of significant understanding in 
relation to their effects on the adoption decision (designated in the form of a monetary 
value). In this respect the model is flexible and adaptable enough to 'learn'. 
Over time, the user may be able to develop a decision-maker approach to evaluation, 
depending on previous evaluation experience and their familiarity with the 
organisation and culture. Failing this, the user may need to rely on survey instruments 
to define outcomes and estimate their quantitative value. The survey may employ a 
number ofrevealed and expressed preference techniques as discussed in §5.2.4. These 
are summarised in Table 6.1, which outlines their application in a technology transfer 
context. 
Table 6.1: Techniques used to derive monetary estimates for unpriced outcomes in cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Contingent 
valuation 
Defensive 
expenditure 
Replacement 
cost 
• Typical questions for respondents revolve around willingness to 
pay: "What is the maximum you would be willing to pay ... ?" 
• Preferred scenario involves asking respondents if they would be 
willing to pay $X for A. Responses to such questions are either 
yes/no and subjects generally find it easier to respond to these 
questions rather than do the mental and speculative arithmetic to 
derive maximum willingness to pay. 
• Expected value estimates based on potential decreases/increases in 
remuneration over future working life may act as suitable proxies 
forX. 
• Individuals and organisations are sometimes willing to pay to take 
action to prevent a deterioration in their situation. This so-called 
deterioration could be brought about through adoption or non-
adoption. 
• The minimum value of an existing benefit is the cost of the 
cheapest means of replacing it. Similar to contingent valuation in 
many respects, typical questions for respondents revolve around 
"Would X be sufficient to replace Y which is what you currently 
use to do so and so?" 
In an organisational context, quantification of both priced and unpriced outcomes can 
be captured monetarily through one of the following means: (i) increases/decreases in 
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salary (in the case of management), (ii) increases/decreases in wages (in the case of the 
workforce), (iii) promotion (equivalent to an increase in salary/pay rate), (iv) 
reduction/increase in overtime, (v) increases/decreases in days/time off, (vi) the cost of 
training (acquiring skills), (vii) extra/increased allowances, and (viii) reward and 
recognition (gifts). 
6.2 Implementation Case Study Verification 
The implementation of the Simpress system across two distinct cultures was detailed 
in Chapter 3. The organisational culture and environmental circumstance surrounding 
each implementation was described and codified observations were qualitatively 
presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 (corresponding to Australia and India respectively). 
These observations can thus be translated into appropriate costs and benefits for both 
the workforce and management as required by Stage 2 of the model (and also 
equations 6.7, 6.8a, 6.9 and 6.lOa). The extrapolation of such costs and benefits are 
presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for both the workforce and management respectively. 
In the context of these costs and benefits the following should be noted: 
a. The costs and benefits apply to both Australia and India. Their subsequent 
evaluation and quantification provide a distinction between the two cultures and 
highlight their significance in relation to adoption. For instance, the cost 
associated with loss of knowledge is not as significant in an Indian context, 
therefore, its monetary value will be relatively lower in comparison to the 
Australian workforce. 
b. Aspects of individual perception such as: innovation negativism, level of training, 
negative experiences with past innovations/implementations, and level of 
management support, indirectly affect the decision to adopt. These may be 
difficult to capture as costs and benefits, however, they will affect the weighting 
and quantification of the costs and benefits outlined in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Hence 
they are captured indirectly within the model. 
c. The majority of category S workers ( 46-65 years of age) feel threatened by 
technology and the potential for category Y workers (17-30 years of age) to 
assimilate and adopt technology more rapidly. Consequently the cost associated 
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Table 6.2: Simpress implementation workforce adoption costs (Csw<•», benefits (Bsw<a» and non-adoption costs (CtW<•> *). 
BENEFITS (Bsw<a>l 
Priced 
(a) Reduction in time to complete the job 
r 
i ~ 
(b) Receive training in system use which 
will expand individual skilland 
.knowledge base 
( c) Direct increased pay rate through 
adoption and use 
Unpriced 
· ( d) Adoption seen in favourable light by 
superiors - assist in career progression 
( e) Closer association with management 
- increased organisational 
communication 
(t) Recognition and feedback for using 
the technology - organisational 
contribution 
(g) Increased job satisfaction 
(h) Personal involvement in system 
development means satisfaction through 
adoption 
COSTS (Csw(a)} & (Ctwca>*) 
Priced Unpriced 
(a) Time to learn and master the new 
technology 
(b) Fellow worker promoted because of 
successful adoption leading to increased 
.... skill and knowledge base "' 
{ c) Become less valuable to the 
organisation through deskilling, loss of 
knowledge and experience 
( d) No organisational slack provided, use 
must be accomplished in addition to 
existing daily tasks 
( e) Adoption against group and fellow 
workers may result in ostracism 
(t) Time and effort associated with 
learning secondary technologies 
(overcoming fears) 
(g) Mistakes and errors associated with 
new technology use may bring reprisal 
from fellow workers/organisation 
(h) Feeling threatened by fellow workers 
who are able to assimilate and use 
technology to their benefit much faster 
(i) Greater exertion of organisational 
control by management 
N o. 
00 
Table 6.3: Simpress implementation managementadoption costs (CsMca», benefits CBsM<•» and non-adoption costs (CIM(a>*). 
BENEFITS (BsM(a>) 
Priced 
(a) Increase in organisational 
productivity/efficiency 
(b) Employees which are more highly 
skilled and trained (flexibility) 
Unpriced 
( c) Industry/organisation/department 
leader in terms of technology adoption 
( d) Adoption seen in favourable light by 
superiors - assist in career progression 
(e) The capture of employee knowledge 
for the long-term benefit of the 
organisation and decrease in employee 
power 
(t) Decrease organisational loss from 
worker movement or redundancy 
COSTS (CsM(a>) & (CCM<a>*) 
Priced Unpriced 
(a) Direct cost of development and 
implementation 
(b) Commitment of 
organisational/department resources 
toward implementation and maintenance 
(c) Other department/organisation 
rewarded because of adoption 
(promotion, recognition, profit, etc) * 
( d) Significant risk associated in 
adoption (could be harmful to career 
·progression/organisation reputation) 
with adoption for category S workers is higher than Y. 
d. Ease of use and complexity (as identified by Rogers (1983)) affect the adoption 
decision but are difficult to capture as a cost or benefit. The perception of both 
ease of use and complexity however, will indirectly influence the weight and 
quantification of the cost associated with "time to learn and master new 
technology." 
e. Loyalty to the organisation may affect the categorisation of some factors as either 
costs or benefits (for example, instead of counting 'loss of knowledge' as a cost 
in the Indian context, it may be classed as .'contribution of knowledge' and 
categorised as a benefit). The model allows factors to be included as costs or 
benefits depending on both the focal technology and organisation. This is a 
distinct advantage of having an open and non-prescriptive framework utilising 
cost-benefit analysis. 
6.2.1 Payoff matrix generation 
The first stage of the technology transfer model (as proposed jn Figure 5.10) involves 
classification. Using the mini-scoring scheme outlined in Table 5.1, the Simpress 
system (primarily a Knowledge Management System), generates a technology score of 
16 (as detailed in Figure 5.5). It is classed as a combination process/people 
technology, of relatively high complexity requiring high absorptive capacity not 
currently available within the targeted adoption environment. Adoption is 
combination (mandatory/voluntary) as some pressure by management is applied during 
the implementation period. The resultant score indicates a high probability of transfer 
difficulty warranting appropriate resources to conduct a thorough analysis of the 
impending implementation scenario. 
Stage 2 & 3 
A spreadsheet prototype model was developed to simulate the technology transfer 
process (based on Table 5.2). The spreadsheet model encompasses a two-country 
implementation scenario and produces as primary outputs: (i) an expected value player 
payoff matrix for each country (in the form depicted in Figure 6.1 ), and (ii) a plot of 
expected value of workforce adoption (EV W(a)) versus probability of successful 
adoption (p5w) across the two countries. The spreadsheet model requires the following 
primary input variables: 
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(i) The SDR (as derived from Figure 5.9 an a per country basis) 
(ii) The time period t (defined as the time period over which the NPV will be 
calculated, or the period over which realisable costs and benefits continue to 
accrue) 
(iii) The probability of success Psw!M (defined as the probability that the player will 
successfully adopt the focal technology. This variable decreases as the resultant 
score from stage 1 increases, that is as the probability of transfer difficulty 
increases) 
(iv) The costs (Csw/M(a), Ctw/M(a)) and benefits (Bsw!M(a)) of adoption (as dictated by 
equations 6.7, 6.8a, 6.9, 6.lOa) 
Further, the spreadsheet model makes the following simplifying operational 
assumptions: 
(i) Costs and benefits remain the same over time t (although the model does allow 
the user to vary these over the time period if required) 
(ii) Costs and benefits accrue for both workforce and management over the same 
time t 
(iii) The SDR remains constant over the time period t (although the model does 
allow the user to vary the rate over the time period if required) 
(iv) Conceptualisation and quantification of costs and benefits are simplified by 
adopting a standardisation unit as follows: 
1 Technology Transfer Unit (TTU) =Average player monthly earnings 
In the context of the Simpress system implementation, player monthly average 
earnings are given in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Approximate average monthly earnings for skilled shopfloor technicians and 
managers in Australia and India (July 2002). 
Australia (AUS $) India (RUP) 
Workforce 1005.00 6000.00 (=: AUS $240.00) 
Management 1500.00 8000.00 (=: AUS $320.00) 
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The use of the model as a corporate tool may necessitate the development of survey 
techniques to elicit not only input variables such as costs and benefits, but also their 
value. In this case, the researcher has adopted a decision-maker approach in the 
evaluation of the costs and benefits identified in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. This 1s a 
consequence of both familiarity and understanding developed during the 
ethnographical case study periods within each adoption environment. The simulation 
input values assumed in both the Australian and Indian implementation contexts are 
given in Tables 6.5 through to 6.7 respectively. 
Table 6.5: Simpress implementation scenario simulation input parameters. 
r-~~---...~A-u-stra-·~1~rnm;] 
Value . 
5 yrs 
SDR 5.4% 
Psw 0.35 
PsM 0.5 
5 yrs 
7.2% 
0.7 
0.7 
A. Knowledge Management System is defmed as a long-term 
return on investment teclmology. In the case of the Simpress 
system, the organisation expects real benefits to be delayed in 
accordance with future new vehicle model launches. 
Derived using the hypothesis outlined in §5.4.1 and 
demonstrated graphically in Figure 5.9. Based on an average 
social capital estimate of 44.1% for Australia and 36.3% for 
India (from Table 5.3). 
Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the 
context of the workforce. 
Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the 
context of management. 
Table 6.6: Simpress Australian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. 
Specific costs and benefits refer to Table 6.2 and 6.3 for the workforce and management 
respectively. 
0.1 0.5 0.5 Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
0.5 
I 
0 
4 
0.1 
3 
0.05 
2 
0 
3 1.5 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
2 
0 
0.3 
I 
0.5 4 
3 
2 
Processing these input values through the spreadsheet prototype model, results in the 
generation of player payoff matrices for both the Australian and Indian implementation 
scenarios (Figures 6.2 (a) and (b) respectively). A plot of EV versus probability of 
successful adoption has also been constructed and is depicted in Figure 6.3. 
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Table 6.7: Simpress Indian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. Specific 
costs and benefits refer to Table 6.2 and 6.3 for the workforce and management respectively. 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
0.1 
2 
3 
0.1 
2 
0.1 
Workforce 
0.1 
0.1 
2 
0.5 
Adopt Not Adopt 
-29.4 29.4 
11.5 11.5 
-29.4 29.4 
-11.5 
-11.5 
(a) 
··Workforce 
d 
0.3 
0.5 
0.5 
e. 
0.5 
0.2 
3 
2 
0 
2 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
0.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.5 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
20.l -20.1 
28.9 28.9 
20.1 -20.1 
-28.9 -28.9 
(b) 
O.ol 
Figure 6.2: (a) Simpress Australian implementation scenario workforce versus management 
expected value payoff matrix. (b) Simpress Indian implementation scenario workforce versus 
management expected value payoff matrix. All values in TTUs. 
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Ps 
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Figure 6.3: Sim press implementation country EV of adoption versus probability of successful 
adoption for both the workforce and management. 
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6.2.2 Discussion 
As a consequence of the simplification assumptions made in §6.1.1, each payoff 
matrix contains two primary values. In each case the EV for adoption is the opposite 
of its non-adoption counterpart. This results in a relatively easier analysis and 
subsequent interpretation. In the Australian context, the EVw(a) is -29.4 TTUs 
indicating a resultant high likelihood of significant challenges and opposition in 
relation to workforce implementation. Analysis of the costs and benefits indicate that 
significant perceived costs associated with social and cultural stigmata including 
deskilling, organisational devaluation and in-group ostracism outweigh the collective 
benefits, producing a negative NPV. In comparison, Indian workers have an EV W(a) of 
20.1 TTUs representative of a strong propensity for adoption and successful 
implementation. In this context, a number of the costs that were weighted heavily in 
the Australian environment, were low and in some cases non-existent. Perceived 
benefits were instead weighted on average more heavily by the Indians, especially 
those associated with an increase in the individual skill and knowledge base, and the 
rec;ognition of organisational contribution. 
In relation to management, each EV M(a) is positive. However, the Indian value of 28.9 
TTUs is significantly greater than its Australian counterpart at 11.5 TTUs. An 
examination of the various costs and benefits reveals that a considerable differentiation 
relative to the motivation surrounding implementation, can explain this difference. 
The Australian management weighted the costs associated with adoption much more 
heavily than their Indian counterparts. Further, the Australians' primary motivation 
(or benefit) {or adoption centred around career progression, whereas the Indians 
weighted consistently and relatively highly those benefits which stemmed principally 
from the organisation as opposed to the individual. It is interesting to note that as a 
result of an agreement between the developers of the Simpress system and Australian 
plant management, costs associated with system development were absorbed by the 
developers themselves. Had these costs been borne by management however, and had 
management not placed such a large emphasis on the association between career 
progression and implementation of the Simpress system, then their EV M(a) would have 
most likely been negative. 
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The effects on EV estimates associated with varying the values of the different input 
variables (as detailed in Table 6.5) is shown in Table 6.8. Such results illustrate the 
sensitivity of the EV to changes in initial input variables. It should be noted, that 
changes in the input variables, regardless of size, cannot induce a sign change in the 
EV. Whether an EV is negative or positive is dependent on the NPV which° is derived 
from the cost-benefit analysis. Hence manipulating the costs and benefits is the only 
way to effect a sign change. In practice this involves either changing the player's 
perception of the technology and associated implementation, which may involve 
distinct shifts in social and cultural norms, or offering significant and tangible priced 
benefits (to outweigh the intangible costs) such as increased pay or a bonus. 
Table 6.8: Country variation in EV estimates (relative to the base values shown in Figure 6.2). 
t represents a positive(+) increase in the original variable (or output in the case of EV) • 
.J, represents a negative(-) decrease in the original variable (or output in the case of EV). 
Variable x y z u v w 
Condition t Ps .J, Ps t SDR 
.J, SDR t t ,i. t 
(0.2) (0.2) (2.0%) (2.0%) (3 years) (3 years) 
-42.9 (-L.) -16.0 (t) -27.9 (t) -31.l (-1.-) -43.7 (-i) -12.7 ( ) 
EVw(na) 42.9 (t) 16.0 (-L.) 27.9 (-i) 31.l (t) 43.7 (t) 12.7 (-i) 
EVM(a) 15.6 (t) 7.4 (-i) 10.9 (-i) 12.l (t) 17.0 (t) 5.0 (-i) 
EVM(na) -15.6 (-i) -7.4 (t) -10.9 (t) -12.l (-i) -17.0 (-i) -5.0 (t) 
EVw(a) 25.7 (t) 14.5 (-i) 19.0 (-i) 21.2 (t) 29.2 (t) 8.9 (-i) 
EVw(na) -25.7 (-i) -14.5 (t) -19.0 (t) -21.2 (-.1-) -29.2 (-i) -8.9 (t) 
EVM(a) 36.5 (t) 21.2 (-i) 27.4 (-i) 30.5 (t) 42.0 (t) 12.8 (-i) 
EVM(na) -36.5 (-i) -21.2 (t) -27.4 (t) -30.5 (-L.) -42.0 (-i) -12.8 (t) 
Manipulating the input variables changes the relative size of the EV only. This may be 
critical in situations where the EV is positive but low or the EV is negative. Changing 
the input variables may then act to increase both a positive EV (making the adoption 
decision more certain) or a negative EV (increasing the likelihood of adoption). Table 
6.8 shows that in the case where the EV is negative (EVw(a) Australia), increasing the 
probability of successful adoption (variable x by 0.2) acts to further decrease the EV. 
In such a case, since the probability of successful adoption has increased, the player 
stands to lose more and vice versa if the probability is decreased. Alternatively, in the 
case where the EV is positive (EVw(a) India), increasing the probability of successful 
adoption will naturally act to increase the EV (and vice versa in the case of a declining 
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probability of successful adoption). These effects are illustrated graphically in Figure 
6.3 
Increasing the SDR on the other hand (variable z), acts to decrease an already positive 
EV. This can be rationalised in terms of its definition in a technology transfer context. 
The higher the discount rate, the more difficult it is for the player to appreciate future 
benefits given current adoption, hence the associated decrease in EV. The same 
thought-process can be applied in the case of an already negative EV. Increasing the 
SDR acts to increase the EV, as the player is less capable of fully appreciating the 
future losses associated with current adoption. Changes in the time period of the 
simulation has the predictable effect of producing similar directional changes in the 
EV. Increasing the time period (variable v) results in: (i) an increase in an already 
positive EV (since the net benefits accumulate over a longer period), and (ii) a 
decrease in an already negative EV (since the net costs accumulate over a longer 
period). 
The resultant model player payoff matrices (depicted in Figure 6.2) accurately verify 
the specific case study implementations undertaken by the researcher. The Australian 
transfer situation was a markedly more difficult undertaking relative to India. While 
the workforce was overtly opposed to adoption in the Australian context, its 
management demonstrated a synthetic commitment to adoption and implementation. 
This was founded upon a partially self-centred perspective in relation to adoption, a 
contrast on the more altruistic and organisationally-centred perspective adopted by the 
Indian workforce and management. 
6.3 Model Validation 
Validation of the model must proceed through its application in a completely novel 
technology context. This facilitates an assessment of its overall predictive power as a 
tool that can be used to both analyse an impending technology transfer and the 
development of associated strategy. In the first instance, the implementation of the 
Ford Production System (FPS) within the Ford of Australia Stamping Plant is 
considered. This is followed by an investigation related to the adoption of the Grid 
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Strain Analysis (GSA) technique across two distinct cultures (Australia and India). 
While these cases allow retrospective validat~on based on historical accounts of the 
events surrounding implementation, future work may involve validation of the model 
as a prospective tool, as this is its intended primary use. 
6.3.1 The Ford Production System 
The FPS is essentially a mixture of core business processes used to drive the 
implementation of lean manufacturing strategies. First pioneered by the Japanese in 
the form of the Toyota Production system, it organises manufacturing into eleven key 
areas which include: safety and health assessment review, quality, environment, 
leadership, workgroups, training, in-station process control, Ford total productive 
maintenance, manufacturing engineering, synchronous material flow, and industrial 
material flow. Each of these areas encompass common lean manufacturing practices 
such as Just-In-Time production, Kanban, Six Sigma and Statistical Process Control. 
The vision of the FPS is defined as follows (Ford Motor Company, 2002): 
"FPS is a lean, :flexible and disciplined common production 
system, defined by a set of principles and processes, that employs 
a group of capable and empowered people, learning and working 
safely together, in the production and delivery of products that 
consistently exceed customers' expectations in quality, cost and 
time." 
Introduced into the Australian Stamping Plant (from the United States) in 1997, 
implementation progressed over a period of 6 to 12 months with varying levels of 
adopter support. The model can be applied in an effort to understand the basis of 
adopter sentiment towards the system, both in the initial instance of its introduction 
and after its application in pilot areas (as depicted in Figure 6.4). Information 
surrounding implementation of the system has been collected from those specifically 
involved in its adoption and management in the form of interviews (conducted 
principally by the researcher). The following commentary is based on actual events as 
interpreted from interview transcripts. 
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Checkpoint 1 
Aug. 1997 
• FPS concept introduced 
• FPS implementation team 
formed and trained 
• Pilot areas chosen 
Management training 
Pilot area implementation 
Checkpoint 2 
Apr. 1998 
• US management returns to 
check progress 
• Plant-wide implementation 
Figure 6.4: Australian FPS implementation time and event line. 
The FPS concept was introduced to the plant and rationalised around the 
empowerment of Natural Work Groups (NWGs) using FPS philosophies. Selected 
plant personnel were then chosen to form a team essentially responsible for the 
implementation of the system. The team was subsequently given an intensive training 
course in core FPS methodologies followed by a mandate to transform current 
production systems in alignment with those espoused by the new 'lean paradigm'. 
Thus, information flow surrounding the mechanics and operation of the system, to 
both management and shopfloor workers, was minimal. As such both players 
(management and workforce) were left to make an initial adoption decision in relative 
isolation. Hence the evaluation of costs and benefits in relation to adoption were most 
probably based on previous experience with similar systems and company initiatives. 
This would have been heavily influenced by: (i) company downsizing in the early 
1990's, (ii) the previous and recent use of time-motion study techniques to improve 
productivity, and (iii) a spate of previous company initiatives which had failed as a 
result of a lack of management support and company resource to sustain follow 
through. 
Payoff matrix generation - Checkpoint 1 
The researcher has again used a decision-maker approach to valuation, based on 
familiarity with the social norms and culture prevalent in the Australian Stamping 
environment. The first stage of the technology transfer model (Table 5.1) implies a 
high probability of transfer difficulty, indicating significant time should be taken in the 
development of implementation strategy. This would also imply an initial low 
probability of adoption success (psMJW). Specifically, while the total number of 
methodologies associated with the various areas of FPS may seem complex and 
onerous, a moderate absorptive capacity exists within the plant in relation to adoption. 
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The FPS itself is classed as a process-people technology. Its introduction, while 
prompted by senior corporate management in the United States, is viewed in the first 
instance, as combination mandatory/voluntary adoption, with no overt emphasis from 
senior corporate management to adopt. This is most likely based on a presumption 
that adopters would recognise the benefits associated with the system and decide to 
adopt voluntarily. Based on the scoring scheme encapsulated in Table 5.1, a total 
classification score of 14 (given successive input scores of 2, 4, 6 and 2 respectively) is 
derived. 
The same spreadsheet prototype model used for verification (in the previous instance), 
was again applied to simulate the technology transfer process. Various costs and 
benefits were identified and are detailed in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 for both the workforce 
and management respectively. The decision-maker approach to evaluation yielded the 
simulation input values given in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 (with all monetary units 
expressed in TTUs). Processing these input values through the spreadsheet prototype 
model, results in the generation of a player payoff matrix as illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
-4.1 4.1 
-0.4 -0.4 
-4.1 4.1 
0.4 0.4 
Figure 6.5: FPS implementation scenario workforce versus management expected value payoff 
matrix (checkpoint 1). All values in TTUs. 
The matrix shows that the expected value of adoption for both management and the 
workforce is negative. This reflects the sentiment observed from both management 
and shopfloor workers by the implementation team. There was a lack of commitment 
to the system by management which precipitated an even stronger pessimism towards 
adoption by the shopfloor. The significance of different costs and benefits gives an 
insight as to the basis of this negativity and suggests a possible implementation 
strategy. 
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Table 6.9: FPS implementation workforce adoption costs (Csw(ai), benefits (Bswcai) and non-adoption costs (CiwcaJ*). 
BENEFITS (Bsw(a>) 
Priced 
(a) Elimination of waste resulting from 
previous productivity inefficiencies 
(b) Greater contribution of personal 
knowledge to aid process 
improvements 
( c) Receive training in system use which 
will expand individual skill and 
knowledge base 
Unpriced 
( d) Increased job satisfaction 
( e) Increased organisational 
communication and teamwork 
(f) Adoption may be seen in favourable 
light by superiors - assist in career 
progression 
COSTS (Csw(a)) & (Ctw<a>*) 
Priced 
(a) Jobs lost as a result of streamlining 
and waste elimination 
(b) Time to learn and implement new 
FPS systems 
( c) Lost jobs result as a consequence of 
failure to increase productivity * 
Unpriced 
(d) Increased work load making job 
increasingly difficult 
( e) Allows the organisation 
(management) to exert greater control 
over the workforce 
(f) No direct reward for increases in 
productivity (benefit goes to 
management only) 
(g) No organisational slack provided, 
systems expected to be adopted in 
addition to existing tasks 
(h) Scant organisational commitment in 
terms of long-term support and resources 
(i) Adoption against group and fellow 
workers may result in ostracism 
G) Management potential to bastardise 
FPS philosophies 
N 
N 
0 
Table 6.10: FPS implementation management adoption costs (CsMcai), benefits <BsM(ai) and non-adoption costs (CtMca/). 
BENEFITS <BsMca>) 
Priced 
(a) Reduction in overall production 
costs 
(b) Increase in organisation 
productivity/efficiency 
( c) Employees which are more highly 
skilled and trained (flexibility) 
Unpriced 
{d) Alignment ofNWG's to overall 
organisational strategies 
(e) Adoption seen in favourable light by 
superiors - assist in career progression 
(f) Less overall reliance on employee 
skill and experience, more data driven 
management 
l 
COSTS (CsM(a>) & (CfM<a>*) 
Priced Unpriced 
(a) Direct cost of applying resources to 
implementation and management 
(b) Other Ford facilities adopt FPS 
resulting in reprisals from senior US 
management * 
(c) Productivity continues to decrease 
and costs increase * 
( d) Redirecting management effort at the 
expense of daily production 
Table 6.11: FPS implementation scenario simulation input parameters (checkpoint 1). 
SDR 
Psw 
PsM 
2 yrs The Ford Production System is defined as a short to medium term return on 
investment technology. The nature of the system is such that different 
initiatives may yield immediate payback while others may take some time 
before any real and noticeable benefits accumulate. 
5.4% 
0.25 
0.25 
Derived using the hypothesis outlined in §5.4.1 and demonstrated graphically 
in Figure 5.9. Based on an average social capital estimate of 44.1 % for 
Australia (from Table 5.3). 
Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of the 
workforce. 
Defines the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of 
management. 
Table 6.12: FPS implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation (checkpoint 1). 
Specific costs and benefits refer to Table 6.9 and 6.10 for the workforce and management . 
respectively. 
Benefits (TTU) 0.2 
Costs (TTU) 2.0 
Benefits (TIU) 0.5 
Costs (TTU) 3.5 
0.2 
LO 
0.5 
0.5 
0.2 
0.75 
0.2 
0.5 
0.1 
1.5 
0.2 
3.5 
0.1 
LO 
1.2 
0.1 
LO 
0.5 
1.5 1.0 2.0 LO 
Focusing on Table 6.12, almost all of the benefits associated with the technology have 
been undervalued relative to costs. This is a consequence of the lack of 
communication and understanding prevalent among both management and shopfloor 
workers as to the purpose, motivation and structure of the FPS. The comparative high 
costs reflect a skewed perception based on past experience and a culture which is 
highly change resistant. Predominant workforce costs are the result of: (i) previously 
observed attempts to reduce labour through time-motion studies (namely cost a), (ii) a 
perception of increased workload without an associated increase in resources or slack 
(namely costs d and g), and (iii) potential ostracism associated with adoption against 
group will (namely cost i). Similarly, management costs were dominated by an 
overpowering perception that the FPS was another attempt to reform production and 
would remove valuable resources from the daily function of producing parts (namely 
costs a and d). Further, since the ability to produce parts is a primary management 
performance indicator, redirecting resources to achieving a longer-term goal such as 
the implementation of FPS, was seen as potentially damaging. 
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Thus a strategy associated with reducing these costs to induce a positive expected 
value of adoption for both management and workforce should have been adopted. 
This may have revolved around: 
1. changing management performance indicators to include and reinforce FPS 
implementation (this would have further demonstrated commitment towards the 
system and avoided its branding as another "passing fad"); 
2. increased communication and promotion of FPS philosophies including: clear 
explanation as to the benefits of the system, the motivation behind its 
implementation and a clear definition of the role of both players in the system 
(this would have acted to dispel the perception that implementation was 
associated with job loss and redundancy); and 
3. targeting key opinion leaders among the workforce to be involved in the 
education and decision making process (which would have acted to reduce costs 
associated with ostracism, provided the opinion leaders were able to develop a 
positive attitude towards the system) 
The implementation team explicitly understood the high ostracism cost and chose to 
base their implementation strategy around its reduction. Given that the majority of the 
workforce would not adopt unless opinion leaders were favourable towards adoption, 
the implementation team decided to pursue transfer into two pilot areas. The NWG's 
within each of these areas were seen as opinion leaders within the stamping plant. The 
implementation team however, failed to immediately address the remaining relatively 
high costs (through the adoption of both strategies 1 and 2) and consequently transfer 
was prolonged and considerably more difficult. 
The implementation within the pilot areas was difficult at first. Workers were openly 
voicing their opposition to the system. Nonetheless the implementation team 
persisted. Over a period of six months (to checkpoint 2 in Figure 6.4) extensive 
training was given to workers within the pilot areas and stamping plant management. 
The implementation team worked on the shopfloor alongside workers, enacting FPS 
principles. Gradually workers came to realise that some of the FPS methods were 
actually making their jobs easier by eliminating waste and improving efficiency. They 
began to understand the system by using and enacting its principles. Further, their 
suggestions for improvement were added to an action list and taken seriously, often 
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being implemented. They saw that cross-functional communication between NWG's 
in 'different areas was being increased, which again had the effect of reducing waste. 
Ultimately, the workers felt more empowered within their areas to make decisions and 
drive productivity. 
Payoff matrix generation - Checkpoint 2 
In terms of Rogers' (1983) innovation attributes, trialability within the pilot areas had 
acted to reduce perceived complexity and essentially highlight compatibility and 
relative advantage which was by now directly observable by others throughout the 
stamping plant. Thus at checkpoint 2, both the workforce and management was 
directly able to re-evaluate the costs and benefits from checkpoint 1. Further, re-
evaluation was facilitated by a trust that had developed over the pilot period between 
those in the implementation team and shopfloor workers within the stamping plant. 
Some new costs and benefits had emerged over the course of the pilot period which 
had essentially changed the implementation game play. The original game matrix 
(developed for checkpoint 1 in Figure 6.5) can be re-evaluated using modified cost and 
benefit simulation input values as given in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. The resulting game 
play matrix is shown in Figure 6.6. 
During the pilot implementation period, shopfloor workers found that they were being 
empowered by the FPS. They were able to question decisions made by management 
and challenge them with opinions based on their experience and data they had 
collected (and were now analysing as part of the FPS). The NWG as a whole became 
motivated and started to derive increased job satisfaction. Thus previously over-
valued costs had been reduced as a result of their familiarity with the system, and 
benefits were attributed higher values. A new benefit was taken into account (namely 
benefit g) and when combined with the increase in job satisfaction (benefit d), acted to 
produce an overall positive expected value for adoption (as depicted in Figure 6.6). 
Management instead felt threatened by the empowerment. A lack of participation and 
interest in the training and pilot implementation exacerbated this feeling. Checkpoint 
analysis 1 had identified that the high cost attributed by management to involvement 
(namely costs a and d in Table 6.12), would hinder participation. Hence their 
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Table 6.13: FPS implementation scenario simulation input parameters (checkpoint 2). 
Vanable Value ~sc:ri11t,i~l,!',;',~\;;:'0~l,,,••,,.',,'" .· 
'"' 
1F:t; . > ' ,;. '•<.".·' 
''" t 2 yrs The Ford Production System is defined as a short to medium term return on 
investment technology. In the nature of the system is such that different 
initiatives may yield immediate payback while others may take some time 
before any real and noticeable benefits accumulate. 
SDR 5.4% Derived using the hypothesis outlined in §5.4.1 and demonstrated graphically 
in Figure 5.9. Based on an average social capital estimate of 44.1 % for 
Australia (from Table 5.3). 
Psw 0.75 Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of the 
workforce. The pilot implementation period had allowed the workforce to re-
evaluate the FPS. 
PsM 0.30 Defines the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of 
management. The pilot implementation period had allowed management to 
re-evaluate the FPS. 
Table 6.14: FPS implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation (checkpoint 2). Costs 
and benefits refer to Table 6.9 and 6.10 for the workforce and management respectively. 
* refers to new costs and benefits as follows: Workforce benefit g - Empowerment and involvement in 
decision making; Management cost e - Loss of power and control; and Management cost/-
Redundancy and/or loss of current job role. 
Benefits (TTU) 1.0 
Costs (TTU) 0.25 
1.0 
0.6 
0.5 
0.75 
1.5 
0.3 
0.75 0.1 2.0 * 
0.2 0.25 0.5 
~\:'1 '•. ~anagement 
.'.:''.<;,.:''{· d e 
Benefits (TTU) 0.75 0.75 
Costs (TTU) 2.5 0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
0.2 
2.5 
0.2 0.5 
2.5 * 3.0 * 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
4.6 -4.6 
-2.9 -2.9 
4.6 -4.6 
2.9 2.9 
1.0 0.2 0.5 
'" 
l1' 
Figure 6.6: FPS implementation scenario workforce versus management expected value payoff 
matrix (checkpoint 2). All values in TTUs. 
appreciation of the benefits of the system had only marginally increased over the pilot 
period to checkpoint 2. In contrast, costs increased significantly as management 
started to question their role in a new FPS environment which gave more of their 
power and control to NWG's. Two new costs were identified (namely costs e and}) 
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which acted to produce an overall negative expected value for adoption (as depicted in 
Figure 6.6). The game matrix clearly demonstrates that over the six month pilot 
period, management's expected adoption value had continued to decrease, while that 
of the workforce had increased to become positive. The pilot period had succeeded in 
reducing the previously high costs associated with ostracism, job loss and increased 
work load, and acted to emphasise the benefits associated with adoption. 
The dominant cost for the workforce continued to revolve around a lack of 
organisational commitment by management (cost h in Table 6.14). Senior Ford 
management had by this stage realised that although its shopfloor workforce was 
motivated to adopt the FPS, they were not being supported by direct management. In 
an effort to coerce adoption by management and induce commitment to the system, 
senior management enacted strategy 1 (discussed above). Performance measurement 
indicators for management were subsequently changed to include cost reduction. This 
essentially forced the adoption of FPS methodologies to meet cost targets and 
eliminate waste. In t.his context, re-evaluation of the simulation input parameters as 
outlined in Tables 6.15 and 6.16, produces the game play matrix depicted in Figure 
6.7. 
Including implementation and assimilation of the FPS as an indirect management 
performance indicator reinforced the organisation's overall commitment to the 
technology. This decreased the perception among the shopfloor workforce that the 
system was perhaps "just another short-term initiative" (as reflected by the reduction 
in workforce cost h in Table 6.16). The previously high costs associated with adoption 
were significantly reduced as management came to realise that incentives associated 
with implementation would provide reward in terms of continued employment and 
career development. The indirect manner in which the performance system was re-
structured also inadvertently re-defined the role of direct management in the stamping 
plant. They now viewed their position as one of aiding the NWG in continuous 
improvement to increase area productivity and efficiency and in doing so reduce costs. 
The FPS philosophy and methodology were viewed as key drivers in achieving this. 
The overall consequence of this shift in attitude is captured in the game matrix of 
Figure 6. 7 which shows a positive and substantial expected adoption payoff for 
management and the workforce. 
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t 
SDR 
Psw 
PsM 
Table 6.15: FPS implementation scenario simulation input parameters (final)~ 
2 yrs 
5.4% 
0.75 
0.95 
The Ford Production System is defined as a short to medium term return on 
investment technology. In the nature of the system is such that different 
initiatives may yield immediate payback while others may take some time 
before any real and noticeable benefits accumulate. 
Derived using the hypothesis outlined in §5.4.1 and demonstrated graphically 
in Figure 5.9. Based on an average social capital estimate of 44.l % for 
Australia (from Table 5.3). 
Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of the 
workforce. The pilot implementation period had allowed the workforce to re-
evaluate the FPS. 
Defines the expected probability of successful adoption in the context of 
management. The pilot implementation period had allowed management to 
re-evaluate the FPS. 
Table 6.16: FPS implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation (final). Costs and 
benefits refer to Table 6.9 and 6.10 for the workforce and management respectively. 
* refers to new costs and benefits as follows: Workforce benefit g - Empowerment and involvement in 
decision making; Management cost e - Loss of power and control; and Management cost/-
Redundancy and/or loss of current job role. 
Benefits (TTU) 1.0 
Costs (TTU) 0.25 
Benefits (TTU) 1.0 
Costs (TTU) 0.5 
1.0 
0.6 
1.0 
0.1 
0.5 
0.75 
0.5 
0.1 
1.5 
0.3 
0.75 0.1 2.0 * 
0.2 0.25 0.5 
0.5 3.5 0.5 
0.25 0.5 * 0.5 * 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
9.2 
-9.2 
5.8 
5.8 
-5.8 
9.2 
-5.8 
-9.2 
0.1 0.2 0.5 
Figure 6.7: FPS implementation scenario workforce versus management expected value payoff 
matrix (final). All values in TTUs. 
This case demonstrates the power and validity of the model not only as an instrument 
which can be used to understand previous technology transfer events, but as a tool with 
potentially significant predictive power. Had the implementation team adopted all of 
the strategies proposed subsequent to the checkpoint 1 analysis, then overall adoption 
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difficulty may have been reduced. Certainly, management adoption would have been 
guaranteed and the pilot area implementation period would have been significantly 
shortened. 
6.3.2 Grid Strain Analysis 
Strain analysis through grid marking is a technology which is commonly used in the 
sheet metal forming industry. When sheet metal is formed (in a press operation), it is 
subjected to a number of different stresses which produce non-uniform strains in the 
finished product. This can sometimes lead to defects such as wrinkling, fracture 
and/or thinning of the material. Grid strain analysis (GSA) usually proceeds through 
marking of the sheet material with a grid before the forming process. The most 
common type of grid comprises repeating patterns of circles (typically in the 2 -5mm 
diameter range) organised into square arrays. Application to the sheet surface is 
achieved either through photochemical etching, or more commonly, electromechanical 
etching using an electrolyte and small amounts of direct current. After deformation, 
the strain distribution can be seen and measured either manually, using a Mylar tape 
for instance, or automatically using a computerised grid circle analyser. 
Critical areas of strain can be identified usmg the forming limit diagram (FLD) 
method. The diagram specifies the maximum strain a material can sustain given a 
major-minor strain ratio. GSA in conjunction with the FLD method can be used to 
assess the criticality of a forming operation. In this respect, areas of high strain can be 
identified and various processing parameters changed to avoid potential defects. In the 
automotive stamping area, the technology can be used in die development, the 
selection of material, fault finding during tryout, and production control. 
While the technology has been available for many years, widespread use has not been 
achieved. For instance, its use within the Ford of Australia Stamping Plant is almost 
non-existent. In contrast, the technology is used on a daily basis in the Ford of India 
Stamping Plant especially in the area of fault finding and production control. While 
undertaking the Simpress case study implementations, the researcher had an 
opportunity to investigate reasons associated with this difference. The stimulus behind 
this investigation was the researcher's involvement in the implementation of a 
software program specifically designed to automate the FLD method. Essentially the 
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operator (typically a toolmaker) is required to input raw data (major and mmor 
measurements along with location images and material selection) from which the 
program is able to generate a forming limit diagram and associated industry standard 
report. The program is beneficial in that it reduces the overall time and complexity 
associated with GSA, and removes the potential for operator induced computational 
error. 
Initially it was thought that the implementation of the software module in the 
Australian context, would provoke renewed interest in the GSA technology and spur 
adoption. This however, was not the case. Currently, GSA technology, along with the 
FLD software module, remains unused in the Australian context, whereas in India, 
both pieces of technology are used continuously as a problem solving and monitoring 
tool. The model can thus be applied in an effort to understand the differences in 
adoption between the two cultures. In the first instance, the model can be used to 
understand the dynamics associated with GSA implementation and subsequently, to 
investigate any changes as a result of the FLD module implementation. 
Payoff matrix generation - GSA implementation 
According to the classification scoring scheme (Table 5.1), in the Australian context 
the technology has a moderate transfer difficulty requiring judicious analysis. In this 
environment, there is a moderate absorptive capacity, the technology is considered as 
being of moderate complexity and primarily process based, while adoption is 
voluntary. Hence a total classification score of 10 (given successive inputs of 2, 2, 2 
and 4) is derived. In the Indian context however, the probability of transfer difficulty 
is lower due to a decrease in the classification score. By virtue of the higher 
educational standards within the plant, there is a high absorptive capacity and 
management's recognition of the potential of the technology makes it combination 
mandatory - voluntary adoption. Hence a total classification score of 6 (given 
successive inputs of 0, 2, 2 and 2) is derived. To this end, the Ps(a) in the Indian context 
will be higher (for both players) relative to Australia (as defined in Table 6.19). 
The same spreadsheet prototype model used for verification and validation (in 
previous instances), was again applied to simulate the technology transfer process. 
Various costs and benefits were identified and are detailed in Tables 6.17 and 6.18 for 
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both the workforce and management respectively. The decision-maker approach to 
evaluation yielded the simulation input values given in Tables 6.19 through to 6.21 
(with all monetary units expressed in TTUs). Processing these input values through 
the spreadsheet prototype model, results in the generation of a player payoff matrix for 
each culture as illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
The quantitative value of the costs and benefits (as identified in Tables 6.20 and 6.21) 
are generally lower relative to the previous verification/validation examples. This is a 
consequence of a dominant perception relating to the GSA technology as being 
relatively minor, quite specialised and only influencing a small part of the stamping 
operation (namely the die tryout area). The Australian workforce undervalues the 
benefits associated with the technology relative to their Indian counterparts. They 
instead place heavy emphasis on the costs, particularly those associated with the 
potential for deskilling and knowledge loss (namely cost j), the lack of perceived 
reward associated with using the technology (cost g), and adoption against the will of 
the group (cost i). They also perceive the costs associated with learning to use the 
technology and its continued application in the normal working context, as being high. 
By comparison, the Indians regard these costs as low and are not concerned with issues 
relating to deskilling and knowledge loss. In contrast, the increase in skill base, 
additional flexibility and hence increased job satisfaction heavily outweigh this cost. 
Their culture does not support the need for direct and personal reward in relation to 
using a new technology nor the need for the group to adopt collectively (hence 
avoiding the ostracism cost). 
The Indian workforce also has a heightened perception of the costs associated with 
failing to adopt (costs c and d). The employment situation surrounding the plant 
reinforces the need to increase productivity and pursue self-development through 
continual increases in skill and knowledge. Australian management perceive heavy 
costs in the implementation and continual use of the technology. The time associated 
with its use far outweighs the total perceived benefits. The situation is reversed in the 
Indian context, with management taking a far greater interest in the technology and 
developing an appreciation of the benefits associated with reduction in costs, increases 
in productivity and a more flexible workforce. 
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Table 6.17: GSA implementation workforce adoption costs (C.wcai), benefits (Bswca» and non-adoption costs (Ciwca>*). 
BENEFITS (Bswca>) 
Priced 
(a) Decreased time to locate fault 
(analysis time) 
(b) Receive training in technology which 
will expand individual skill and 
knowledge base 
Unpriced 
( c) Increased job satisfaction 
( d) Less reliance on fellow workers for 
knowledge and 'know~how' 
( e) Adoption may be seen in favourable 
light by superiors - assist in career 
progression 
(f) More systematic approach to a job 
which often requires creativity of 
thought 
COSTS (Cswca>) & (CtWcat) 
Priced Unpriced 
(a) Time to learn and master the new 
technology 
(b) Time involved in applying the 
technolbgy and analysing results 
(c) Potential for job loss as a 
consequence of failure to increase 
productivity * 
(d) Fellow workers promoted because of 
adoption leading to increased skill and 
knowledge base * 
(e) Increased work load making job 
increasingly difficult (no organisational 
slack) 
(f) Become less valuable to the 
organisation through deskilling, loss of 
knowledge and experience 
(g) No direct reward for increases in 
productivity (benefit goes to 
management only) 
(h) Scant organisational commitment in 
terms of long-term support and resources 
(i) Adoption against group and fellow 
workers may result in ostracism · 
N 
w 
-
Table 6.18: GSA implementation management adoption costs (CsMCa>), benefits CBsM<a>) and non-adoption costs (CrMca>*). 
BENEFITS (BsM(a>) 
Priced 
(a) Reduction in overall die 
manufacture cost ... 
(b) Increase in organisation 
productivity/efficiency 
( c) Employees which are more highly 
skilled and trained (flexibility) 
Unpriced 
( d) Less reliance on employee 
knowledge, development of a systematic 
approach to work 
(e) Adoption seen in favourable light by 
superiors - assist in career progression 
COSTS (CsM(a>) & (Ct'M<a>*) 
Priced Unpriced 
(a) Direct cost of applying resources to 
implementation and management 
(b) Cost of diverting effort away from 
traditional work techniques which are 
proven 
( c) Potential to decrease die tryout time 
remains unrealised - not as competitive 
as other die manufacturers * 
1 yr 1 yr GSA is defined as a short-term return on investment technology. 
Its utilisation can provide immediate payback in terms of 
benefits. Thus the lowest evaluation period (1 year) has been 
chosen. 
SDR 5.4% 7.2% Derived using the hypothesis outlined in §5.4.1 and 
demonstrated graphically in Figure 5.9. Based on an average 
social capital estimate of 44.1 % for Australia and 36.3% for 
India (from Table 5.3). 
Psw 0.45 0.65 Defines the expected probability of successful adoption in the 
context of the workforce. 
PsM 0.45 0.65 Defmes the expected probability of successful adoption in the 
context of management. 
Table 6.20: GSA Australian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. Specific 
costs and benefits refer to Table 6.17 and 6.18 for the workforce and management respectively. 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
0.4 
0.2 
0.5 
1.5 
0.1 
0.5 
0.3 
1.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
0.5 J.O 0.4 0.75 
Table 6.21: GSA Indian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. Specific 
costs and benefits refer to Table 6.17 and 6.18 for the workforce and management respectively. 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
Benefits (TTU) 
Costs (TTU) 
1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
0.1 
1 
0.1 
0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 . 0.1 0.1 0.2 
The results depicted in the payoff matrices of Figure 6.8 indicate that in the Australian 
context, there is no motivation to adopt for either player. The low player payoffs 
would tend to suggest an indifference towards adoption. In the Indian context 
however, both management and workforce have a positive expected payoff and hence 
understand the value of assimilating the technology as part of daily work practice. 
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Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
-0.9 0.9 
-0.1 -0.1 
-0.9 0.9 
0.1 0.1 
(a) 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
1.8 -1.8 
2.9 2.9 
1.8 -1.8 
-2.9 -2.9 
(b) 
Figure 6.8: (a) GSA Australian implementation scenario workforce versus management expected 
value payoff matrix. (b) GSA Indian implementation scenario workforce versus management 
expected value payoff matrix. All values in TTUs. 
Payoff matrix generation - FLD implementation 
In the Australian context, a general belief had developed that the implementation of 
the FLD software module would effectively encourage greater use of the GSA 
technology. Observation in the period following implementation, did not support this 
belief. The Australian workforce continued to remain indifferent towards the 
technology (and hence also the FLD module), while the Indians felt further motivated 
to apply GSA and the complementary FLD method as part of their daily work routines. 
Understanding how the implementation of the FLD software module influenced the 
various costs and benefits generated during the GSA technology transfer (as detailed in 
Tables 6.20 and 6.21) can explain this observation. 
The objective of the FLD software module project was to construct a tool which would 
complement GSA technology and make its overall application easier. Hence the 
module was developed to speed the GSA process and develop a central store for part 
associated grid strain data. The data could then be accessed by all members of the 
organisation and used in critical applications such as part and tool design. Thus the 
module would facilitate increased organisational communication (akin to the Simpress 
system). In this context, the costs and benefits derived for the GSA technology can be 
re-modelled to represent the implementation of the FLD software module (as shown in 
Tables 6.22 and 6.23). Using the spreadsheet model to process these input values, a 
payoff matrix for each player is generated, as illustrated in Figure 6.9. The simulation 
input parameters identified in Table 6.19 remain the same. 
While the Australian workforce identify an overall increase in benefits, this is slight 
compared to the increase perceived by their Indian colleagues. This extends to greater 
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recognition of the benefits associated with increased organisational communication 
(namely benefit g), decreased analysis time, increased skill and knowledge base, and 
generally increased job satisfaction. By contrast, the Australian workforce perceived 
increases in only a few benefits and these were comparatively smaller. In relation to 
costs, the Australian workforce feel that there is a higher overall cost associated with 
learning and implementing the new technology (a consequence of comparative 
differences in education). Further, while costs related to usage and analysis time have 
decreased in both cultures, these still remain high in the Australian context (see for 
example costs band e). 
Table 6.22: GSA+FLD Australian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. 
Specific costs and benefits refer to Table 6.17 and 6.18 for the workforce and management 
respectively. *refers to a new benefit: Workforce benefit g- Increased organisational communication 
and central data store. 
Benefits (TTU) 0.4 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.4 0.25 * 
Costs (TTU) 0.35 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.75 
a b• h 
Benefits (TTU) 0.5 0.35 0.3 0.55 0.5 
Costs(TTU) 1.5 1.6 0.5 
Table 6.23: GSA+FLD Indian implementation scenario simulation cost-benefit evaluation. 
Specific costs and benefits refer to Table 6.17 and 6.18 for the workforce and management 
respectively. * refers to a new benefit: Workforce benefit g - Increased organisational communication 
and central data store . 
a 
Benefits (TTU) 1.2 
Costs (TTU) 0.15 
Benefits (TTU) 1.2 
Costs (TTU) 0.07 
. yb. 
0.65 
0.05 
1.2 
0.05 
0.55 
0.5 
1.7 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
1.1 
0.5 
0.05 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.7 * 
0.1 · 0.1 0.2 
These same dynamics apply to management's perception of the combined GSA and 
FLD technology. Indian management perceive an overall greater increase in almost all 
benefits, whereas their Australian counterparts only recognise slight increases in 
productivity and the development of a systematic work approach (costs b and d 
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Management 
Not Adopt 
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Adopt Not Adopt 
-0.7 0.7 
-0.1 -0.1 
-0.7 0.7 
0.1 0.1 
(a) 
Adopt 
Management 
Not Adopt 
Workforce 
Adopt Not Adopt 
2.6 -2.6 
3.4 3.4 
2.6 -2.6 
-3.4 -3.4 
(b) 
Figure 6.9: (a) GSA+FLD Australian implementation scenario workforce versus management 
expected value payoff matrix. (b) GSA+FLD Indian implementation scenario workforce versus 
management expected value payoff matrix. All values in TTUs. 
respectively). Further, while Indian management perceive a decrease in the cost of 
implementation and use, Australian management distinguish an actual increase in the 
cost associated with use of the GSA and FLD combined technology in everyday work 
practice. This indicates a lack of understanding amongst management in relation to 
the GSA technology and associated FLD software and a perception that its application 
is slow and cumbersome. 
The resulting player payoff matrices (depicted in Figure 6.9) reinforce the researcher's 
field observations subsequent to implementation. The Australian workforce remained 
indifferent towards the GSA technology (and hence also the FLD software module). A 
comparison between player payoff matrices in Figure 6.8 and 6.9, reveal that 
management motivation had not changed whereas the workforce expected a slighter 
higher payoff, but not enough to prompt adoption. The same comparison in an Indian 
context shows that both management and the workforce were further stimulated to use 
the GSA technology and adopt the FLD software module in the process. 
This case agam demonstrates the power and validity of the model as both a 
retrospective explanatory and potential prospective predictive technology transfer tool. 
It specifically authenticates its use in a cross-cultural context and its ability to 
' 
characterise the affects of organisational/national culture and social norms on the 
technology transfer process. Had the model been applied before the FLD software 
module implementation, then it may have been possible to understand that adoption 
was highly unlikely by virtue of the perceptions associated with its predecessor GSA 
technology. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The technology transfer model was verified using original Simpress case study data for 
both Australian and Indian cultures. The model was shown to accurately reflect the 
transfer situation encountered in each case. Validation was subsequently undertaken 
using two new focal technologies. In the case of the Ford Production System, the 
model was used to examine the implementation process and demonstrate its 
effectiveness in the generation of transfer strategies. Further, the model's application 
in evaluating the implementation of Grid Strain Analysis technology served to 
highlight its value in a cross-cultural context. In this case, the model was again able to 
validate the researcher's observations in the field. 
Both verification and validation were undertaken in a retrospective context. Each case 
demonstrated the usefulness of the model an explanatory tool and its potential worth as 
a predictive tool. Subsequent work may involve additional validation through 
application as a prospective tool in both a diverse organisational and industry 
environment. It is thought that the model's greatest potential lies in its use as a pre-
transfer assessment tool. 
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Chapter 7 - Summary, Conclusion & Future Work 
7.1 Summary 
International technology transfer is becoming an increasingly important function of the 
firm. There is thus an increased need to understand the organisational micro-factors 
which influence the technology adoption decision. Current models of technology 
adoption lack the ability and power to explain the complex inter-dependencies which 
exist among such factors and thus determine not only adoption propensity, but also the 
likelihood of achieving assimilation. To this end, three hypotheses framed the 
approach taken in this thesis: 
Hypothesis 1: That current theories in the technology transfer domain underestimate 
the impact of organisational factors such as culture, structure, politics, social norms 
and processes. 
Hypothesis 2: That a pragmatic model may be developed to quantifj; organisational 
aspects that impact technology adoption. Implicit in the structure of the model will be 
its ability to acknowledge cross-cultural issues. 
Hypothesis 3: That the pragmatic model will serve as a pre-transfer tool for 
predicting the likelihood of successful technology transfer. 
A review of the innovation adoption literature, exposed a number of shortcomings and 
deficiencies related to the current state of knowledge. The review considered three 
distinct literature areas in the innovation adoption field - technology diffusion, 
technology transfer and the impacts of technology on work. Synthesis led to the 
identification of nine areas which provide potential opportunity for increasing 
knowledge within the innovation adoption domain: 
237 
2.8.1 Traditional frameworks for technology diffusion lack explanatory power in an 
organisational setting. 
2.8.2 Focus on the core characteristics of the technology has led to neglect of the 
social and cultural characteristics. 
2.8.3 Cross-sectional research has limited technology diffusion and transfer 
understanding. 
2.8.4 Secondary adoption decision determinants are poorly understood (or 
recognised in current approaches). 
2. 8. 5 Little is known about cross-national differences m the determinants of 
technology adoption. 
2. 8. 6 The validity of Hofstede' s cultural variation scales remains a focus of debate 
in relation to adoption behaviour. 
2. 8. 7 The bulk of the technology transfer literature 1s composed of conceptual 
models that are difficult to operationalise. 
2. 8. 8 Research m the technology transfer domain 1s overwhelmingly 
unidimensional. 
2.8.9 The technology diffusion and transfer literature suggest greater emphasis on 
social and cultural perspectives (a multiparadigm view) is needed. 
The last three of these points raise the need for 'an interactive and dynamic 
interdisciplinary model which can be used to quantitatively predict transfer difficultly 
and develop strategy.' The contribution of this research towards extending the body of 
knowledge on technology transfer, is discussed in the context of these nine identified 
opportunity areas, in §7 .1.1 below. 
Longitudinal research methods were used to investigate the implementation of a 
knowledge based technology (Simpress) in two distinct cultures - Ford of Australia 
and Ford of India. Ethnographic techniques including participant observation, 
participatory action research and informant interviews were applied to gain a greater 
understanding of the social, cultural, political and bureaucratic subtleties that 
determine the implementation dynamics of the transfer process. A grounded theory 
methodology was subsequently used to analyse the resultant field notes and interview 
transcripts. Results from each case study showed that a broad range of factors 
influence the adoption decision, the majority of these being grounded in the cultural 
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and social context of the organisation. A number of differences were observed 
between the two cultures. These were predominately oriented around: group versus 
individual dynamics, the degree of managerial intervention required, divergence in 
time perspectives and differences in incentive schemata. The technology transfer and 
adoption process was conceptualised as a game between management and the worker, 
each player weighing perceived advantages and disadvantages associated with 
adoption relative to these internal incentive schemata. The extent and seriousness of 
the game is in the first instance determined by the technology itself and later 
moderated by the cultural, organisational and social norms which dictate play. 
The significance of the game concept as an explanatory tool was again illustrated in 
subsequent work which focused on examining the technology transfer process within 
Ford Motor Company at a corporate (or global) level. Utilising a cross-sectional 
research methodology, interviews were conducted with a variety of Ford personnel 
from both Europe and the United States. The results demonstrated that the transfer 
process is moderated primarily by culture, which in the case of Ford, has an 
overwhelmingly detrimental affect on innovation. A broad review of Ford and 
innovation in the automotive industry revealed that while Ford has developed many 
important innovations and continues to display a high patent rate, it repeatedly fails in 
terms of implementation relative to its competitors (and in particular its Japanese 
competitors). The most successful transfer mechanisms were identified as those which 
took account of the organisation, its social norms and culture rather than seeking to 
change or impose new systems. Fundamentally, these mechanisms engendered trust. 
This had the effect of reducing the perceived risk associated with 'playing the game' 
and thus facilitating adoption. 
The research findings served to highlight the inadequacy of knowledge associated with 
technology transfer and the various conceptual models within the literature. As such, a 
model was proposed to take account of the complex social and cultural processes 
which influence technology transfer in an organisational context. A set of top-level 
generalised requirements were developed based on: (i) the shortcomings within the 
literature (predominantly encompassed within the nine identified opportunity areas), 
(ii) findings from the micro-level cross-cultural implementation case studies and (iii) 
outcomes based on the macro-level investigation of global technology transfer. The 
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resultant model was conceptualised based on the notion that technology transfer can be 
thought of as a game between management and the worker. The three-stage model 
uses an investment appraisal framework - the core of which comprises a social cost-
benefit analysis, to account for the weighting of perceived advantages and 
disadvantages associated with adoption. In this sense, the model exhibits an open 
(non-prescriptive) data set allowing the user to account for multiple factors which may 
influence the adoption decision. The ability of the model to manage multiple cultures 
and associated differences in time perspectives, is captured through a discount rate 
based on the social rate of time preference. An hypothesis is put forward relating a 
culture's social capital (principally a measure of trust) to its discount rate based on its 
preference towards consumption. An expected value for adoption and non-adoption is 
subsequently generated and an associated game-player payoff matrix developed. 
The operation of the international technology transfer model is summarised as follows: 
Stage 1 
1.1 Analyse the technology and transfer environment. Use the technology 
classification scheme to gain a preliminary understanding of transfer difficulty 
and analysis depth (for subsequent stages of the model) based on characteristics 
of the technology and associated implementation context. 
Stage 2 
2.1 Derive the net benefit associated with adoption and non-adoption. Each player 
(management and workforce) perceives a variety of different adoption costs and 
benefits over a period of time (depending on the technology). The costs and 
benefits relate to a variety of (micro- and macro-level) factors which influence 
the adoption decision. They have their basis in both national and organisational 
aspects of culture, structure, social norms, politics, power and process. 
2.2 Calculate the player NPV for both adoption and non-adoption. This facilitates 
comparison between the current costs associated with adopting the technology 
today versus the potential benefits adoption may yield sometime in the future. 
The SDR (or STPR) is derived from estimates of SC and used to make net 
benefits comparable across the term of adoption. 
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2.3 Determine an EV of adoption and non-adoption for each player. The calculation 
is based on the probability of success and failure and allows the consideration of 
player risk in the context of technology adoption. 
Stage 3 
3.1 Generate a transfer payoff matrix for each player. This is based on a 2x2 game 
matrix of EV estimates of adoption and non-adoption for each player. 
3.2 Reiterate and vary parameters. Changing the value of input parameters such as 
adoption/non-adoption costs and benefits or the probability of success, has the 
potential to increase or decrease a player's EV. Understanding this intricate 
'cause-and-effect' relationship facilitates the development of implementation 
strategy. 
The game matrix allows the model user to visualise the impending transfer scenario. 
A negative expected value for adoption indicates that the player is unlikely to adopt 
the innovation. The user may then modify the inputs and re-evaluate the outcome. In 
doing so, the user is able to gain an understanding of the likely impediments associated 
with transfer and in parallel, evaluate diverse strategies for overcoming such 
hindrances. Further, the model allows the user to evaluate transfer across multiple 
cultures (based on varying probabilities of success) and hence may aid in deciding 
which cultures are more amenable in terms of adoption and implementation. 
The model was verified against cross-cultural (Australian and Indian) data collected 
during the Simpress implementation case studies. A number of assumptions were 
made to simplify the application and use of the model. Verification proceeded through 
a definition of the various costs and benefits (derived from the associated case study 
observations) and evaluation based on the researcher's familiarity with the cultures 
under investigation (known as the decision-maker approach). In each case, the 
resultant player-payoff matrix accurately reflected the implementation difficulty 
encountered by the researcher. Two different technologies were subsequently used to 
validate the model. Validation confirmed the explanatory power of the model in a 
retrospective context. Further, it also confirmed the model's ability to aid in 
implementation strategy formulation, its capacity in a cross-cultural context and its 
potential ability as a predictive tool. 
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7 .2 Conclusion 
The analysis of an impending technology transfer is not a straightforward problem. 
Often organisational aspects, which include for instance culture and social norms, are 
difficult to capture in such an analysis (and typically referred to as the residual). A 
review of the literature and subsequent research case studies undertaken in a 
multinational organisation, showed 'that current theories in the technology transfer 
domain underestimate factors such as culture, structure, politics, social norms and 
processes.' (Hypothesis 1) The bulk of the models currently available, deal with the 
process on a macro-level and hence fail to consider the organisational intricacies at the 
worker-level that have an overwhelming impact on the adoption decision and 
subsequent assimilation. 
The impending technology transfer process can be conceptualised as a game between 
two players: management and the workforce. Each player evaluates the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages associated with adoption in the context of the 
technology and associated transfer environment. This is typically a sub-conscious 
process performed by an individual confronted with an adoption decision. The 
application of this game concept led to the development of a pragmatic model 'to 
quantify organisational aspects that impact technology adoption.' (Hypothesis 2) The 
model looks beyond current practice and allows a potential user to gain a greater 
understanding of the complex inter-relationships which exist between organisational 
aspects of adoption (culture, structure, politics, social norms and processes). Further, 
implicit in the structure of the model, is 'its ability to acknowledge cross-cultural 
issues,' (Hypothesis 2) on both an organisational and national level. 
Testing and application of the model proved its usefulness as a retrospective 
explanatory tool. Furthermore, it provided insight as to the potential of the model to 
act 'as a pre-transfer tool for predicting the likelihood of successful technology 
transfer.' (Hypothesis 3) It is thought that its application in this manner, will benefit 
the corporate manager, aiding in the development of a greater understanding of the 
contextual barriers and motivators influencing adoption and hence, the formulation of 
strategy to encourage positive adoption and assimilation. 
242 
7.2.1 Contribution to knowledge 
A review of the literature identified nine areas of opportunity for increasing the overall 
knowledge and understanding of the innovation adoption field. The three hypotheses 
which have guided the research approach underscored in this thesis, have allowed a 
positive contribution to be made in each of these areas. 
(2. 8.1) Traditional frameworks for technology diffusion lack explanatory power in an 
organisational setting. (2.8.2) Focus on the core characteristics of the technology has 
led to neglect of the social and cultural characteristics. 
It was shown that the use of pre-defined attributes ( compatability, trialability, and so 
forth) to predict adoption behaviour is problematic and unreliable. It is instead the 
social system and its elements, which have an overall moderating effect on the 
adoption decision. Positive perceptions of a technology based on innovation attributes 
may have little influence on the adoption decision. This was a clear outcome of both 
implementation case studies. These utilitarian and rational explanations of technology 
adoption thwart the richness associated with alternative and multiparadigm 
perspectives such as social learning theory and interpretivism. The proposed 
international technology transfer model takes account of the organisational, 
environmental and social influences on the adoption process, while incorporating 
innovation specific attributes if deemed significant. 
(2.8.3) Cross-sectional research has limited technology diffusion and transfer 
understanding. (2.8.4) Secondary adoption decision determinants are poorly 
understood (or recognised in current approaches). 
The dominance of the rational approach to technology adoption and diffusion based on 
technology characteristics, was shown to be a consequence of the overwhelming use of 
cross-sectional research methodologies. Such designs are unable to correlate outcomes 
with dynamic innovation practices, and further, are incapable of engendering a greater 
understanding of the organisational complexities associated with the innovation 
process. Researchers have continually called for an intellectual shift towards process 
or longitudinal research, which is based on immersion in the target culture over 
extended periods of time and learning through social participation. Very few such 
studies have been conducted and in this respect, the longitudinal action research 
undertaken here serves as a major contribution to the field of innovation. The resulting 
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richness in observations and outcomes, has not only highlighted the inadequacy of 
existing research frameworks and the dominance of rational explanations of 
technology adoption (as discussed in the previous point), but has formed the 
foundation for the development of a technology transfer model. 
(2.8.5) Little is known about cross-national differences in the determinants of 
technology adoption. (2. 8. 6) The validity of Hofstede 's cultural variation scales 
remains a focus of debate in relation to adoption behaviour. 
It was shown that in both implementation case studies, a qualitative description of 
culture was needed to contextualise the codified observations. Further, in each case 
the qualitative description of culture provided a preliminary indication of the 
impending ease with which implementation, adoption and assimilation would occur. 
To this end, cross-national differences in culture are important moderators of adoption. 
The open data set philosophy encompassed within the technology transfer model 
allows the incorporation of multiple perceptions based on both national and 
organisational differences in culture and social norms. Further, the model enablt1S 
direct comparison (through EV estimates of adoption) between different cultures based 
on the likelihood of adoption (ps(a)). An alternative method of measuring cultural 
variation (as opposed to Hofstede's scales) has been developed and incorporated 
within the model. The SDR allows differentiation based on inter-temporal choice and 
has been derived from estimates of a culture's SC (a measure principally of trust). The 
application of time preference, the SDR and SC is novel in the technology transfer 
domain and may provide a means of immediately distinguishing cultures and 
organisations based on propensity for adoption. 
(2.8. 7) The bulk of the technology transfer literature is composed of conceptual models 
that are difficult to operationalise. (2.8.8) Research in the technology transfer domain 
is overwhelmingly unidimensional. (2.8.9) The technology diffusion and transfer 
literature suggest greater emphasis on social and cultural perspectives (a 
multiparadigm view) is needed 
The interactive and dynamic nature of the technology transfer model allows a potential 
user to understand how variation in the input variables effects the impending 
implementation scenario. This pragmatic approach to modelling combined with the 
open data set philosophy enables the model to span a variety of interdisciplinary 
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domains. Thus for instance, the model may account for the economic effects 
surrounding technology transfer, the social and cultural implications which either 
impede or enhance the implementation and the technology specific characteristics 
which again impede or enhance the transfer. Therefore, the model in itself, perhaps 
serves as this work's greatest contribution not only to body of knowledge on 
innovation adoption, but to the corporate manager or technology transfer practitioner 
who requires practical tools in the development of understanding and hence strategy. 
7.3 Future Work 
Verification and validation of the model have highlighted some limitations which may 
form the basis of future research work. Overcoming these limitations will serve to 
improve the application of the model in terms of usability and predicative accuracy. 
These limitations are discussed below and include: the current subjectivity associated 
with cost-benefit identification and evaluation, the difference between the SDR 
derived from a country's stock of SC versus an organisation's stock of SC and the 
effects of various preliminary assumptions on the power and accuracy of the model. 
1. Subjectivity 
Perhaps the primary limitation associated with the current application of the 
model, is its reliance on a decision-maker methodology towards cost-benefit 
identification and evaluation. The costs and benefits identified for each case in 
Chapter 6, were derived either through observation by the researcher or in-depth 
participant interviews. Subsequent quantification was based on a subjective 
evaluation by the researcher. In a multinational organisation, it is unrealistic to 
assume that users of the model would have sufficient in-depth knowledge of each 
culture such that they could evaluate technology transfer in a variety of contexts. 
In addition, it is impractical to assume that the application of the model be reliant 
on longitudinal analyses based on participant observation and in-depth 
interviews. As with all cost-benefit analyses however, a certain amount of effort 
and resource needs to be expended to ensure an accurate breakdown. In this case, 
stage 1 of the model is meant to act as an indicator of the amount of effort 
required. 
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Future work should entail the development of survey techniques to aid in the 
identification and quantification of various costs and benefits. The development 
of survey mechanisms to elicit potential costs and benefits and establish their 
quantitative significance is a critical area of importance. The research will have 
to address issues associated with identifying various cultural and social factors 
which may hinder the implementation process. This is often difficult when using 
a cross-sectional analysis technique such as a survey. The wording and structure 
of the questions need to be carefully considered. It may also be necessary to 
supplement the surveys with short interviews to aid in contextualisation and 
identification of dynamics which cannot be elicited by survey. For instance, 
establishing prominent social networks and associated opinion leaders is 
important in terms of deriving significant costs and benefits. Such information 
can only be derived through observation or interview. 
It is envisaged that application of the model will become easier over time (as 
discussed in §6.1.4). Inherent in the nature of the model, is its ability to 'learn' 
over successive application and increasing experience. Various costs and 
benefits may be characteristic of a culture and hence reoccur on several 
occasions. This was demonstrated in the reoccurrence of several costs and 
benefits across the various technology cases in Chapter 6. Ultimately, it may be 
possible to establish a mapping between the technology classification (stage 1 of 
the model) and the various costs and benefits which are likely to occur based on 
past experience. This will obviously be particular to the culture under 
investigation. 
2. Social Discount Rate 
The SDR is a riskless variable based on the STPR. The model relies on a 
hypothesis which proposes an inverse relationship between SC (based principally 
on trust) and the STPR. Thus cultures which have low trust (and correspondingly 
low SC) will have a high SDR and a consequently shorter-term outlook. Based 
on this hypothesis, a country's stock of SC (from the World Values Survey) is 
used to derive its SDR as depicted in Figure 5.9. In some cases however, a 
country's SDR may not accurately reflect the SDR of an organisation within it. 
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This is particularly the case in multinational organisations which may impose a 
home country organisational culture over the constituent national culture. By 
way of example, Figure 5.9 illustrates a 7.2 percent SDR for India and a 5.4 
percent SDR for Australia. Observations made by the researcher during the 
Simpress case study implementations however, do not support the higher Indian 
discount rate. Conversely, observations indicate a SDR lower than that of 
Australia. Therefore, the SDR used in the model should be based specifically on 
an evaluation of the organisation's SC - a quantity which is expected to be 
characteristic of the union between national and organisational cultures. 
In this respect, future work should encompass: 
• The development of innovative measurement techniques to establish the SC 
of an organisation. The consideration of SC in an organisational context is 
novel - the bulk of the literature detailing SC in either a national and/or 
community based network context. Thus work in the area of organisational 
SC measurement would be at the leading edge of research into the field 
(Lesser, 2000). A strong link between SC and innovation has been 
established and the conceptualisation of SC as an organisational management 
performance indicator is becoming more prominent (Landry et al., 2002; 
Lesser 2000). Hence, derivation of measurement techniques related to 
organisational SC may have broader applications and implications. 
• Proving the hypothesised inverse relationship between SC and the STPR. 
The model has assumed that a linear relationship exists between the two 
measures. Research in this area would first proceed by establishing a link 
between the two variables and then deriving a mathematical correlation 
(expressing the STPR as a function of SC). Currently, there exists no known 
published data relating to international discount rates based on pure time 
preference (except for the United Kingdom). Country discount rates 
commonly have a financial basis, which have no justification in a social and 
cultural domain. Hence, research related to verifying the hypothesis would 
form the basis of a significant contribution to multiple fields (including the 
discount rate and social capital literature). 
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3. Assumptions 
Application of the model in Chapter 6, involved a number of assumptions to 
facilitate ease of use (as discussed in §6.1.1). The effect of these assumptions on 
the overall explanatory and predictive power of the model is uncertain. Future 
work may investigate the overall effects of various assumptions on model 
outcomes and determine which are tolerable and under what conditions. Such 
work may be integrated into stage 1 of the model which may subsequently define 
allowable assumptions. Further, survey techniques as discussed above, should be 
developed with a view to capturing as much data as possible given that some 
assumptions may no longer hold (and hence certain variables can no longer be 
ignored). 
The following future work may also be considered in an effort to extend the capability 
and ease of use of the model: 
• test the model as a prospective tool in a pre-transfer assessment scenario. This 
will be facilitated by the development of survey techniques as described above; 
• test the model in alternative industry environments and technology contexts. 
This should be supplemented by testing across multiple cultures; 
• integrate multiple players (three or more) and test the effectiveness of the model. 
The increase in complexity may negate the benefits of incorporating a multi-
player strategy; 
• integrate additional concepts from game theory which allow game optimisation 
(equilibrium). This may allow greater development of implementation strategy; 
and 
• development of a more rigorous stage I classification scheme which could 
perhaps aid in determining an estimate of Ps(a)-
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